2004. EU enlargement is a momentous achievement, not least for the candidate countries that have managed to understand, adopt and apply the ever-expanding scope of European regulations and directives. But while some rhetorical flourishes are probably to be expected at such an historic moment, it is far from certain that Ukrainians, or Russians and Belarusians for that matter, will share the view of European Commission President Romano Prodi that this enlargement marks the “unification of an artificially divided continent” and the extension of an “area of peace, security and democracy throughout the European continent.”
Unfortunately, Ukrainians who feel part of the European continent are increasingly likely to have their sensibilities assaulted over the next 12 months. Once the 10 accession treaties are signed in spring of next year, most of the acceding countries will be putting EU membership up for popular approval in referenda. The early signs are that campaigning – particularly in Poland, where current opinion polls suggest only a thin majority in favor – will be tough.
So prepare for senior European figures to weigh in with dire warnings of the perils of remaining outside the EU. Just such a warning was voiced by the European Commissioner responsible for enlargement, Gunter Verheugen, at a speech to Polish students in July. “Poland can of course survive without European integration,” he acknowledged. “But its prospects of achieving stability and prosperity would then be very slim … transforming [the Polish] economy was and is difficult enough already. What its prospects would have been without membership, how things would shape up if it did not join – I shudder to think.”
Going on to consider how Poland would defend its interests in the WTO or other international forums on its own, Verheugen said: “[Poland] would be at the mercy of every pressure, easy to blackmail, and cut off from all the advantages of international cooperation.”
This message might well succeed in bringing Warsaw closer to Brussels. It is unlikely to do the same for Kyiv. Ukraine, together with Moldova, is the only post-communist country in Europe to have expressed a desire to join the EU without getting a positive signal in return. Whatever the merits – or otherwise – of the Ukrainian case, the apparent unwillingness of the EU to entertain even in principle the idea of Ukrainian membership suggests a double standard. Add in the notion that a Ukraine cut off from EU membership is unlikely to be stable or prosperous, and you have a recipe for frustration and political confrontation.
Which is pretty much where things stand at the moment. Invited to speak on the theme of EU enlargement at a meeting in Salzburg in September, President Leonid Kuchma focused almost exclusively on the issue of future membership for Ukraine. His edgy lament accused the EU of creating new dividing lines in Europe and separating Europeans into first- and second-class citizens. Referring to the reported idea within the EU to offer Ukraine a new and upgraded “neighborhood” agreement to replace the existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, Kuchma was blunt: If this new agreement does not include an eventual promise of membership – as the name would seem to imply – then Ukraine has no plans to sign.
The ambiguity of the Ukrainian position is only underlined by the preliminary proposals for a new EU Constitution unveiled on Oct. 28. Article 43 suggests enshrining the principle that the Union is “open to all European States which share its values and wish to pursue them jointly, which strictly respect fundamental rights, and which accept the Union’s rules of operation.” While this might appear to be an unequivocal statement of principle, its effect is qualified by the inclusion of a draft article 42 on “the Union and its immediate environment,” which would define a “privileged relationship between the Union and neighbouring States.”
So which is it to be? Where does the “immediate environment” of the EU begin? Ukraine’s credentials as a “European state” would appear impeccable, yet there are already strong indications that the non-member “privileged relationship” has been formulated with Ukraine, Russia and perhaps Turkey in mind. The problem for the EU – on this question as perhaps on some others – is that its rhetoric has got ahead of its ambition. Using “Europe” as shorthand for “the EU” may be convenient, but it has consequences in places like Ukraine where the two are still distinct. Likewise, it is tempting to present membership as being subject to impartial and apolitical criteria, but this creates antagonism in places where the influence of politics seems all too clear.
For its part, Ukraine has made it easy for the EU to put off any contentious choices. Decisions on the enlargement to Central Europe were made in the sure knowledge that Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and the rest were always likely to emerge as strong European economies, with societies, democratic institutions and standards that would be – at least – compatible with those in the western half of the continent. How much credibility would the community have had if it had tried to ignore their claims?
Ukraine can put together a strategic case, perhaps even a geopolitical case for membership. It can appeal to history, to Kievan Rus, even to religion. But, crucially, it has yet to make plausible the idea that it will one day be a compatible partner for the rest of the Union. Rejecting a vision of eventual Ukrainian membership under these circumstances is logically uncomfortable for the EU, but it is not an obvious injustice. This is the effect of Ukraine’s dismal record on reform, its political scandals, and its reputation for corruption. All of these serve to minimize the discomfort for the EU of having a contradictory position.
There are other obstacles too. Ukrainian membership would not only mean an extension of physical borders for the EU. It would entail also an adjustment in thinking about the European continent. For if the existing enlargement process shows that the EU has adapted to the events of 1989, the debate over Ukraine shows that it has still to come to terms fully with the implications of 1991. There are relatively few signs that political opinion in Western Europe, clouded by residual assumptions about Russian interests, recognizes the legitimacy of Ukrainian aspirations.
The EU is nonetheless alive to the need to forge a new relationship with Ukraine. The prospect of common borders and pressure from future member states such as Poland are forcing Ukraine up the list of EU priorities, as the realization grows that Kyiv’s co-operation – and Ukraine’s stability – is fundamental to the EU’s own security.
This will not be easy, particularly given that the one instrument that would give unparalleled leverage over Ukraine – the prospect of membership – is also the instrument that the EU appears determined not to use. Nor will it be easy in the current political climate, when EU states are understandably wary of any approach that could be seen as providing reward to Ukraine’s tarnished president. Yet there is still no reason why Ukraine and the EU cannot develop a meaningful and diverse partnership, even a “privileged relationship” including positive incentives for eventual participation in the European single market and in other EU programs and policies. But to do this, the EU now faces a paradoxical challenge. It must convince Ukraine that EU membership is not everything, that life outside the EU can still be prosperous and stable, and that non-members of the EU can still enjoy the advantages of international co-operation. But this it seems is a message for Ukrainian ears only, at least until after the enlargement referenda.
Tim Gould was formerly executive director of the European Business Association in Kyiv. He is now based in Brussels.
