If you are sitting in Kyiv, and watching the Ukraine-wide debate about just how much leeway those who violently assumed power in parts of the Donbas should get, you must be thinking that Ukraine is doing everything to meet the conditions agreed to in Minsk, too much, some would say. If you are sitting in Moscow and have heard the drip drip drip of “Kyiv isn’t fulfilling Minsk” for months on end, despite the fact that substance or detail rarely follows that sentence, you must be pretty sure that Kyiv is doing almost nothing, although, you would be a little confused as to why, if you bothered to think that far.
In any case, this issue looks like it is about to be increasingly prominent as Russia continues to probe for an excuse to put Ukraine down for, how dare they, the choice of the Ukrainian people to tackle a corrupt tyrant. Vladimir Putin himself dedicated nearly 7 minutes talking about Minsk in response to a question at the VTB Bank Investment Forum recently. An appearance that was neatly sandwiched between the competing (apparently the timing was coincidental) press conferences about MH17.
Ukraine’s military fought the Moscow backed and directed army that was put up against them to a standstill, and so Russia’s next tactic seems to be to provoke an escalation by manufacturing the impression Ukraine is dodging responsibilities undertaken in Minsk.
This is a good time therefore for an examination of what the Minsk agreements say and who needs to, and who has, done what to fulfill the obligations therein.
There are 13 points:
An immediate and full cease-fire as of midnight on Feb. 15
This date was agreed because Vladimir Putin insisted 72 hours were needed for a ceasefire to be able to start. That, of course, is nonsense, and it became clear that the real reason was because that’s how long his military planners calculated was required to capture the strategically important rail hub at the city of Debaltseve.
Despite screams from various parties of “You’re surrounded, you have to surrender” on the Jan. 15 and Jan. 16, Debaltseve never was surrounded. To avoid more loss of life and destruction, Ukraine’s armed forces withdrew from Debaltseve on Feb. 18. Unlike in Ilovaisk, where they were surrounded, they were not slaughtered as they retreated.
An actual cease-fire has more or less been observed for about three weeks now, a full six months later than it should have been. The suddenness with which the fighting stopped was one of the clearest demonstrations yet that all it took was an order from somewhere.
Who was breaking the ceasefire from Day One? Russia and the forces it controls.
The point is now being (largely) observed by both sides. But, Russia, -1 for not having kept to the initial deadline and grabbing more Ukrainian territory. Ukraine was also not ceasing to fire, but the very important distinction here is defending against an attack, like in Debalsteve, cannot be classed as a ceasefire violation.
Pullback of heavy weapons to be observed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Both sides have done this, although it was done much later than the target dates set out in Minsk because no cease-fire was being observed. This is particularly true in settlements like Pisky and Shyrokyna and Mariivka and when the assault on Mariivka took place (with tanks and other artillery that should have been in storage) the Ukrainian authorities notified the OSCE that they were, literally, breaking out the big guns to defend their land and citizens.
Since hostilities largely subsided three weeks ago not only have 100 mm and above caliber weapons been withdrawn, there is now also a process of withdrawing 70mm caliber weaponry. Better late than never.
The point is being (largely) observed by both sides. The score remains unchanged, Russia still at -1.
Monitoring by the OSCE using technical equipment such as satellites, drones, and radio-location systems
During the six months that the cease fire was not being observed the OSCE reported several occasions when their drones were either shot down or the guidance systems that allow for remote operations of the drones were jammed causing them to crash. The territories over which drones were lost are the territories temporarily not under the control of the Ukrainian state.
Of course, the separatist entities in parts of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts are not formally related to Russia, and so it is reasonable to ask whether this infraction by them can be to be marked down as an infraction by Russia. Do we see Russia guiding, ordering, directing, supplying or staffing those pretend entities at all? Yes, the link is more than casual.
The point now appears to be being observed by both sides. Russia moves to -2 for having repeatedly (via their proxies) interfered with OSCE drones.
Commence dialogue on local elections in accordance with Ukrainian legislation. The passing by Ukraine’s parliament of a law “On Temporary Order of Local self-Governance of in Particular Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts” and the definition within that law of the districts in question corresponding to the line specified in the first Minsk Memorandum of Sept. 19, 2014.
How are we doing on that one… Well, the line from Minsk I certainly didn’t include Debaltseve for a start, so, no, Russia has certainly contravened this part of the agreement (let’s not pretend that Russian regular forces were not deployed to take Debaltseve) and this isn’t a small infraction.
Once again, we see Russia failing to meet a condition agreed to by them in Minsk. So the running total nudges up to -3.
Although the scale of this gross violation should warrant a lot more than one more minus point. The fact that Debaltseve was about securing a strategic rail hub is indicative of Russia’s long-term intentions too, words and agreements aside, the facts on the ground show Russia’s real intent and it certainly isn’t anything to do with boldly rescuing a few poor citizens from non-existent Nazis.
On the other side, has Ukraine passed the required law? Yes, on March 17. It is essential to highlight at this point that the wording of the Minsk agreement specifically states that this law is temporary, despite recent calls from Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and others the special status is not a permanent measure. An insistence today that the status should be permanent is yet another attempt to force a way for Russia to be able to exert control over Ukrainian affairs. So, no.
Amnesty law
This had been agreed to in Minsk I. The relevant law was part of a package of laws passed on Sept. 16, 2014 and has not been rescinded. The law was passed in controversial and irregular circumstances because it was done in a closed session of parliament via an unprecedented anonymous voting procedure.
At the time there was an exemption from amnesty for capital crimes, now, after a full year of more fighting bloodshed and murder that exemption is almost impossible to adhere to. However, as was the case in the former Yugoslavia, despite amnesties being granted, war crimes will still no doubt be prosecuted.
Release and exchange of all hostages and illegally held persons. All for all.
According to recent figures, 156 Ukrainian soldiers remain in captivity and 846 are considered missing in action so potentially some of these could also be in captivity.
The wording “illegally held persons” clearly applies (as was announced by President Poroshenko as soon as the Minsk discussions concluded) to Nadia Savchenko, Oleg Sentsov, and others being illegally held in Russia.
Ukraine holds two (according to their own free admission) Russian soldiers. Their arrest on the territory of Ukraine was and is completely legal.
Russia is in double violation of this point, moving the score to -4 for unreleased prisoners of war and – 5 for keeping illegally held Ukrainian citizens in Russian prisons.
They are distinct and separate breaches of the agreements made in Minsk. At the VTB conference Vladimir Putin asked how it is that Russia is being pressured to abide by Minsk when certain processes are not within Russia’s control. He could release Nadia Savchenko and Oleg Sentsov for a start.
Referring back to point 5, the treatment of captives is likely to be the subject of the war crimes investigations that will fall outside of any amnesty from prosecution.
Provide for safe delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid based on an international mechanism
A Sept. 17 article in the Washington Post starts with the words “Nearly all western humanitarian organizations have been blocked from operating in separatist-controlled areas for close to two months” and then goes on to specify, for example, that Medicins Sans Frontiers is able to work only in Donetsk but not Luhansk and that the Red Cross has no access to that territory. Russia, – 6.
Over the course of the last year almost 40 convoys of white trucks have entered Ukraine from Russia, they are not inspected by or monitored by or overseen by any kind of international mechanism, in fact, Russia has repeatedly refused to allow any kind of independent inspection with the exception of the theater of convoy number one. Another separate infraction of commitments made in Minsk, Russia, -7.
As we pass the halfway point, where exactly is Kyiv not fulfilling Minsk?
Am I biased?
Is this a propaganda piece?
Define the modalities for full restoration of social and economic connections
In short, reconnecting the economy of this part of Ukraine with the rest of Ukraine, very specifically this point refers to payments of pensions from Ukraine and payments of taxes to Ukraine.
A mechanism has been established whereby pensioners and other recipients of various kinds of social assistance who reside in the conflict zone can (and do) collect their (albeit meagre) payments from banks in the government held territories. It is not ideal, but as the government does not have any control over or access to the banking system in the occupied territory it is the best that can be done. This process has been made much easier of late as there is no fighting on the contact line, it will be made much harder very soon as winter starts to bite.
Are taxes being paid from the occupied area to the state? No. Russia, -8.
Restore control of the state border to the Ukrainian government in the whole conflict zone
Russia,– 9.
OK, to be fair, the preconditions stated for this point have not been fulfilled and we have not reached the target date for this, so, it shouldn’t really be a minus point to Russia for this. But, as Russia appears to be making absolutely zero effort to allow for this to happen and as monitoring of the border by the OOSCE remains limited (by Russia) to two small locations, to be fair, Russia does deserve the minus point.
Pullout of all foreign armed formations and equipment military equipment from the territory of Ukraine under OSCE supervision
Russia, -10.
Russian troops are still in Ukraine, Russian military equipment is still in Ukraine.
The presence on Ukrainian territory of invited military trainers from countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States (thanks for them, by the way!) does not contravene this point as the location where they are assisting the Ukrainian army is about 600 kilometers away from the area which is under OSCE supervision and to which therefore this point very specifically applies.
This point also extends to the “disarmament of all illegal groups” and presumably that wording was meant to apply to the Ukrainian volunteer battalions who were fighting for their country but were not part of the command and control structure of the Ukrainian armed forces. This was handled in a logical way by bringing the battalions into the armed forces structure, thus making them not an “illegal group” in any way. However, a very small number have refused to accede to the armed forces structure. They must, immediately. When the war started brave people went to defend their homeland and country folk and they did so under whatever structure was necessary and many feared (not unreasonably) that the official structure was corrupt and a few within it were acting in a treasonous manner. There is no longer any reason for anybody to be operating outside of the official chain of command.
For these few hundred, although they are currently not fighting, Ukraine -1.
Constitutional reform in Ukraine, new constitution to come into effect by the end of 2015, a key element of which is decentralization.
The law on decentralization was passed by Parliament on Aug. 31. Certain political forces, namely Svobodo, decided to campaign against this move and in a shocking event which will forever tarnish them after a small scuffle lasting a couple of minutes 4 young men died.
Decentralisation is not an option, it is a commitment made not only in the Minsk agreements but also to the people of Ukraine throughout the revolution. Constitutional change in Ukraine is not a political football, but it is being treated as such by some short-sighted political parties and while elements of change have been passed and the process moves forward (see comments from the Venice Commission for further information) the deadline stated will more than likely be missed.
While some in Moscow think that the process of constitutional reforms has “not even started” this is simply not true. Even so, it does not move fast enough, and for the politics being played over this issue being the cause of delays, and, sadly, deaths, Ukraine moves to -2.
Local election in eastern Ukraine, monitored by the OSCE
We haven’t got there yet. Despite attempts to thwart the electoral process by the puppets nominally in charge of these territories that would have earned another minus point for their superiors, at the present time elections might be held in-line with the stated conditions.
We shall see, but Russia remains at -10.
Intensify the work of the trilateral contact group.
This round up ends, rather boringly, on a neutral point. The Trilateral Group are working.
Conclusion
Russia seems to be doing very little to either uphold its commitments or ensure that the forces they control in eastern Ukraine do so. Once again, Ukrainian politicians let down their country and country folk.
Russia – 10.
Ukraine – 2.
Rebuttals welcome. But, please, be specific.
