Victor Pinchuk, according to the sign-off on the bottom of his just-published op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, is a “Ukrainian industrialist and philanthropist.” He’s much more than that.
Pinchuk is the son-in- law of a former Ukrainian president, and was actively involved in Ukrainian politics until shortly after the 2004 Orange Revolution when he removed himself formally from politics and focused on his business empire and charitable activity. Pinchuk is a product of a time in Ukrainian history when it was considered legal for the politician son-in-law of the president to amass a fortune of billions of dollars.
In fact it was a business deal involving Pinchuk that was to be one of the catalysts for the Orange Revolution, the June 2004 privatization of the Kyrovrohstal steel mill. So undervalued was that deal, in which Pinchuk partnered with billionaire Rinat Akhmetov to purchase the plant for $800 million, that reversing this deal (which was eventually done on a technicality rather than with any finding of guilt or admission of fault) became a central focus of the demands of the Maidan during the Orange Revolution, regardless of the technicality used for reversing the initial deal when Kyrovrohstal was resold in 2005 to ArcelorMittal the $4.8 billion purchase price was at the time the largest single investment in to the post-Soviet space.
It would be extremely remiss, and grossly unfair, to write about Pinchuk without talking about the charitable deeds he has been responsible for since his exit from politics. His charitable foundation has spent many tens of millions of dollars to refurbish hospitals, for example.
The Yalta European Strategy, Pinchuk’s brainchild, is one of the foremost annual gatherings of great minds in this part of the world. The list of people that this conference has attracted, and who have been brought to focus on Ukraine, is a star-studded list of the global political and cultural elite, society leaders and the world’s greatest philanthropists.
Like many people living in Kyiv, I have enjoyed viewing the works of world-renowned artists in the Pinchuk Art Centre. Pinchuk has shared his cultural passion with the city and has enriched the lives of many, at no cost to visitors. The Pinchuk family have brought Sir. Paul McCartney, Queen, and Sir. Elton John to Kyiv, these artists have all performed for free on Kyiv’s central square and for all of this we are grateful.
However, many people are expressing misgivings over some of the content of Pinchuk’s Op Ed.
The opening “Many Ukrainians are worried about the new U.S. administration because it has promised a different approach to Russia” and correctly observed the “so-called separatist movement” which was initiated by and is supported by Russia start the piece well. More opening paragraph scene setting of an “anti-establishment currents in Europe,” that may “usher in leaders who will want to make a deal with the Kremlin,” is also correct other than to maybe point out that the “anti-establishment” feeling of some isn’t being channeled by an “anti-establishment” movement, rather that mood is being exploited by opportunists, but that’s another debate for another day.
Pinchuk continues (selective passages follow, for the full op-ed text see here and responses, where appropriate, in bold:
There will not be a solution over the heads of the more than 40 million Ukrainians. Our citizens have demonstrated since the end of 2013 that they will fight if the prospect of living in a free, democratic, tolerant and fair country is taken away.
Excellent.
Yes, we must stand up for the fundamental principles of our struggle—Ukraine’s right to choose its own way, safeguard its territorial integrity and build a successful country.
These are exactly, as Pinchuk says, the fundamental principles. Ukraine’s right to choose. Territorial Integrity.
Moscow must implement its obligations under the 2014 and 2015 Minsk agreements to end the conflict in eastern Ukraine. It must ensure enforcement of the cease-fire and the withdrawal of its fighters and heavy weapons, which it has failed to do.
Absolutely true. Moscow has failed to live up to commitments made twice in Minsk. There can be no excuses made for this. The basic first demands on Moscow are simple “enforcement of the cease-fire and the withdrawal of its fighters and heavy weapons.”
But this can be part of a larger picture in which we make painful compromises for peace. Consider the following ideas.
- Ukraine should consider temporarily eliminating European Union membership from our stated goals for the near future. We can build a European country, be a privileged partner, and later discuss joining.
What happened to the fundamental principle of Ukraine’s right to choose? Is it being suggested, under pressure from a third party state, that this principle should be “temporarily” abandoned? It’s quite obvious that Ukraine will not be an EU member any time soon, Ukraine simply isn’t ready (nor is Europe, yet, but for different reasons) but an abandoning of a theoretical path for any period of time is a worrying precedent that will be exploited at a later date.
- While we maintain our position that Crimea is part of Ukraine and must be returned, Crimea must not get in the way of a deal that ends the war in the east on an equitable basis.
Many people criticized the structure of the Minsk Agreements because they did not consider the question of Crimea. The negotiators of Minsk were absolutely correct in doing this. Because the Minsk Agreements do not mention Crimea, there is absolutely no way that the question of Crimea gets in the way of a deal that ends the war in eastern Ukraine. The position stated here is based on a false premise. We want peace in eastern Ukraine, we insist on the implementation of Minsk. Crimea is another question, one which Mr. Pinchuk provides a sensible proposal about, as follows:
It will take Ukraine 15 to 20 years to generate enough economic growth and stabilize our infrastructure, social safety net and financial system. Everyone from Crimea will then want to live in this future Ukraine—just as East Germans wanted to become part of West Germany.
- Conflict in the east was initiated from abroad and is not a genuine autonomy movement or civil war. There will not be conditions for fair elections until Ukraine has full control over its territory.
Absolutely correct.
But we may have to overlook this truth and accept local elections.
What does this mean? “Local elections”? As someone who grew up in mature democracies I found it hard to understand the concept of “free and fair” elections, because elections just were that for me. There was no other kind. And Ukraine deserves no less.
If there are to be elections in the presently occupied territories, and there absolutely should be, only free and fair elections are acceptable. Only free and fair elections will allow the citizens of eastern Ukraine to truly express their will, there is no compromise to be made on “free and fair.” And, again, Minsk contains the tools to get us there.
Such compromises may mean letting down Ukrainians from the east who have suffered enormously. But if this is what it takes to demonstrate Ukraine’s commitment to peaceful reunification, then we may have to make this compromise to save thousands of lives.
The democratic principle of free and fair elections isn’t something to be bargained with. We cannot pretend that a solution to the problems in eastern Ukraine can come from allowing there to be an electoral process that will be manipulated. The people of the east have suffered enormously, allowing for the possibility of a continuation of an existence overseen by Kremlin appointed warlords is not a solution to their problems, and as Ukrainian citizens they deserve that the leaders of Ukraine insist on them having nothing less than an opportunity to be heard at the ballot box, without interference.
- Finally, let’s accept that Ukraine will not join NATO in the near- or midterm. The offer is not on the table, and if it were, it could lead to an international crisis of unprecedented scope. For now, we should pursue an alternative security arrangement and accept neutrality as our near-term vision for the future.
The offer to join NATO is not on the table, nevertheless, “What happened to the fundamental principle of Ukraine’s right to choose? An abandoning of a theoretical path for any period of time is a worrying precedent that will be exploited at a later date.”
And something else, of the utmost importance; at the time that Ukraine became the subject of an absolutely unprovoked military attack from Russia Ukraine WAS a neutral state. Being a neutral state did nothing to stop Russian aggression, suggesting a return to it now as part of a solution is frankly bewildering.
Ukraine will need security guarantees. In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum the U.S., Russia, Britain, France and China gave security assurances in exchange for Ukraine giving up its nuclear arsenal. We trusted this agreement but learned painfully when Russia invaded Crimea that assurances are not guarantees.
Not only when Russia invaded Crimea, but also when Russia then felt emboldened by the mirage of a quick victory (we know now, it was nothing of the kind) Russia then invaded eastern Ukraine too. The suggestion here is that Ukraine seeks new security “guarantees” as we are told that Mr. Trump is a deal maker, what does Ukraine have to offer? There’s nothing to suggest that Ukraine can expect to coax guarantees out of an international community who have failed to live up to the assurances made by heads of state, or, in the case of Russia, who have quite demonstrably thrown their assurances out of the window. The best course of action is to demand, yes, demand, that the assurances in place are taken far more seriously.
The Budapest Memorandum wasn’t written in the back room of a pub on a scrap of paper. It contains a requirement for the parties to seek immediate United Nations Security Council action, this should happen, and irrefutable facts should be placed in front of the international community. This task should be the number one priority of Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
We should also make clear that we are ready to accept an incremental rollback of sanctions on Russia as we move toward a solution for a free, united, peaceful and secure Ukraine.
Not in dispute. Ukraine has never made any statement disagreeing with the lessening of sanctions, provided Russia acts in a way that merits the removal of said sanctions. Whether they are related to Russia’s failure to fulfill Minsk obligations, or Russia’s occupation of Crimea, because the international community should not let the first movement of borders by force in Europe since World War II slide by or be swept under the carpet, because we know from history that to do such a thing would not be a step towards peace.
Many people would suggest that the measures outlined by Pinchuk amount to appeasement of the aggressor. Considering the proposals being made and the return sought, that is not unreasonable. In exchange for stopping a war that they started, beyond any shadow of doubt, Russia would get a neutral Ukraine and an unspoken but clear veto on Ukraine’s future sovereign choices as a reward for their military aggression, and with the also unspoken but equally clear threat of a return to conflict should Russian decide that Ukraine is exercising too much sovereignty.
