Pavel Felgenhauer: Kremlin under siege from health, economic crises

On Jan. 15, 2020, as Russia slowly emerged from its prolonged New Year’s and Orthodox Christmas holidays, President Vladimir Putin suddenly announced a series of constitutional changes. The same day, Putin reshuffled his government, replacing his long-serving loyal prime minister and former president, Dmitry Medvedev, with Mikhail Mishustin (53)—a faceless technocrat and, until then, head of Russia’s Federal Tax Service. Some Cabinet ministers retained their positions, some were moved to occupy top posts in the Kremlin, while others were rotated from the Kremlin to the Cabinet. Initially, the constitutional reform seemed to be, in essence, a rewrite with some editorial changes here and there that did not change that much. After the president announced these constitutional amendments, observers in Russia and abroad speculated whether this marked the “beginning of the transition,” as many believed Putin was planning to delegate power out of the Kremlin in preparation for what would come after the end of his fourth presidential term in 2024—which, constitutionally, should be his last. It was assumed Putin was creating a powerbase outside the Kremlin as, say, the chair of the State Council, or Duma speaker, or prime minister with enhanced powers, or something else. Yet, all those commentators were wrong: Putin is not relinquishing any presidential powers or leaving the political scene. Instead, the constitution is now being amended to strictly ban anyone from holding more than two presidential terms; but the Kremlin-controlled Constitutional Court has simultaneously ruled that Putin’s previous terms do not count and, thus, he is eligible for two more six-year terms (until 2036), should he choose to run again.

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