The effort is complicated by Ukrainian elections in 2012 and Russian attempts to spoil the move and pull Ukraine closer to its custom union.
The outcome of Warsaw’s effort regarding Ukraine will have significant implications for Poland’s status as a regional leader as well as the orientation of Ukraine.
Analysis
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Gryshchenko visited Poland on July 6 to meet with his Polish counterpart, Radoslaw Sikorski, with one of the key topics being Poland’s EU presidency from July to December 2011.
A week into its presidency, Poland has begun addressing the issue of bringing Ukraine closer to the European Union. Specifically, Poland wants to facilitate the signing of an association agreement and a free trade agreement between Kiev and Brussels before its EU presidency comes to an end.
Warsaw’s success or failure in this regard will have significant implications for Poland’s status and reputation as a regional leader and the orientation of Ukraine. Poland has become one of the main drivers bringing former Soviet states in Eastern Europe closer to European institutions in response to Russia’s resurgence into the region, and one of the key points of focus for Poland’s EU presidency is fostering Ukraine’s integration with the European Union.
Specifically, Poland wants to facilitate the signing of an association agreement and a free trade agreement between Kiev and Brussels before its EU presidency comes to an end.
Over the past couple of years, the European Union’s six-month rotating presidency has not had significant influence on the bloc’s decision making, especially since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which created the European Council with a permanent office of president, held by Herman Van Rompuy. However, Poland was already an active player in the European Union and the region, so the EU presidency could serve as a format for Poland to further its priorities.
Poland’s EU presidency comes at a key time, especially in terms of the Ukraine question. EU and Ukrainian leaders have set December 2011 – the final month of Poland’s term in the rotating presidency – as the unofficial deadline to complete an association agreement and a free trade agreement.
One of the main reasons for this self-imposed deadline is related to elections. Poland will hold parliamentary elections in October 2011, and helping to foster Ukraine’s EU integration is a popular issue in Poland that Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk can use to gain support.
Ukraine will hold its own parliamentary elections in October 2012, and due to the country’s routine political instability during election season, the chances that the EU deals will pass will be severely diminished after the end of 2011.
Understanding the time constraints, Poland has already begun to make moves on the Ukraine issue. At Poland’s request, the European Parliament announced July 5 that it had created a support group dedicated to the European integration of Ukraine, with Polish member of the European Parliament Paul Zalewski appointed as coordinator of the group.
An even more important potential obstacle is Russia, which is trying to strengthen ties with Ukraine through its own customs union.
The purpose of this group will be to facilitate the preparations needed to form the association and free trade agreements between Ukraine and the European Union. It is not yet known how effective the group will be, but its establishment does show that Poland is serious about drawing Ukraine closer to Brussels.
There are still many obstacles that could prevent these deals from materializing. Several details on the EU association and free trade agreements need to be worked out, such as protecting some Ukrainian industries like trucking and metals from their competitive EU counterparts, at least initially.
But both parties seem open to leaving some of the tougher questions aside until after the agreements are signed. Additionally, there are external players that could serve as significant roadblocks to the deals. After all, Poland is just one country in the 27-member European Union (albeit a significant one), and an association agreement needs approval from all EU member states as well as the European Commission.
An even more important potential obstacle is Russia, which is trying to strengthen ties with Ukraine through its own customs union.
Moscow is not as concerned with bringing Kiev into the customs union, which lists Belarus and Kazakhstan as members, as it is with dissuading Ukraine from getting closer to the European Union. Russia has threatened to enact trade barriers against Ukraine if Kiev signed the EU free trade agreement and has promised benefits if it were to get closer to the customs union.
While Kiev has publicly remained committed to the EU free trade agreement and has said membership in the customs union is off the table, Ukraine maintains a strategic economic and political relationship with Russia and does not take such statements from Moscow lightly.
Perhaps the most important country in the EU-Ukraine issue other than Poland will be Germany. Berlin has become the de facto political and economic leader of the European Union, but it also has established a strong relationship with Moscow. Germany has significant influence with both entities – though its role as an EU member is currently more entrenched than its relationship with Russia – and could serve as either a facilitator or spoiler to the issue.
Therefore, Berlin’s commitment to the realization of the Ukrainian association and free trade agreements by the end of the year will be crucial to the success or failure of these deals. For Poland to achieve the key goal during its EU presidency of bringing Ukraine closer to the European Union, it will need to maneuver between various influential actors and do so in a relatively short time frame.
Poland understands this, as well as that its reputation as a regional leader that can produce results depends on the realization of this goal.
