Even before the final vote was counted, reporters and political commentators throughout the world were trumpeting Ukraine’s retreat from the 2004 Orange Revolution’s pro-Western vector to its “historical” eastern neighbor.
After five years of the President Victor Yushchenko-Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko regime, it appeared that Ukrainian voters had chosen a policy of closer integration with Russia. After all, President Victor Yanukovych had proposed Russian as a second language, argued against NATO, suggested a lease extension for the Russian Black Sea fleet, condemned recognition for UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) veterans, and, generally, conducted himself as Vladimir Putin’s acolyte.
But such airy generalizations often hide a complex and contrary popular logic that resists the expressed intentions of elected leaders. Yanukovych won the presidency with a relatively narrow margin of 3.5 percent. But he did not even win a majority. His victory was based mostly on support in 10 of the 28 electoral regions. He lost the other 18. He won against an opponent who was heavily handicapped by the president, and who was widely held responsible for a depression-like economy, chaotic management style and widespread corruption. What should have been a historic landslide turned out to be a contested squeaker.
So what do Yanukovych’s unimpressive numbers really mean? Before we can look at the “votes behind the votes” we must recognize that the second round of presidential elections always boils down to one of two things: either a vote for a candidate and what he/she stands for, or a vote against his/her opponent– i.e., the “lesser of two evils.” The only way we can determine whether the voting public really supports a candidate’s policies is if we can determine what part of his second-round vote was cast for his candidacy and policies rather than simply against the dismal record of his opponent. In short, we must look at first-round results and opinion surveys.
The first round of voting included 18 candidates of every possible political persuasion. Yanukovych received 35 percent to Tymoshenko’s 25 percent. This brings us closer to both his and her base support, but still includes many who held their noses but would not have wanted to “throw away their votes” on preferred “third-party” candidates. So we must look further – to pre-election surveys.
Commencing with the 2004 elections (when Yanukovych received 44 percent in the second round), we find polling results show a three-year consistency of 23-24 percent support for Ukraine’s most prominent Russian-friendly politician. In fact, although he softened his pro-Russian rhetoric in his recent campaign, this had been his most distinguishing position in the past.
In one of the most recent surveys leading up to the elections, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems found that “a precipitous decline in satisfaction with socio-political conditions and political elites in the country since the Orange Revolution are driving factors in the presidential race.” The survey found that Yanukovych is viewed negatively by 55 percent of Ukrainians while only 42 percent view him positively. Tymoshenko’s negative rating is 67 percent and only 30 percent view her positively. Almost all Ukrainians – 96 percent – surveyed are dissatisfied with the economic situation and 92 percent are unhappy with the political situation. It is clear that economic and governance concerns dominate the list of issues.
So what did Ukrainians really vote for, and what do they really want in their dealings with Russia? The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology conducted a survey in February 2009 asking a simple question: What relations would you like to see between Ukraine and Russia? The answer: 75 percent of Ukrainians simply want the two countries to be friendly and independent with a more open and freer border, visa and custom controls – somewhat analogous to that of the United States and Canada.
The only conclusion we can draw from Yanukovych’sunimpressive election results and opinion surveys is that the public voted against the status quo and for improvement in their lives. He won against a highly controversial and disliked opponent who is blamed for widespread economic suffering and governmental instability. And even at that he was barely able to squeak through to a victory. His core constituency – those who look to him primarily for closer ties with Russia – is estimated to be 25 percent.
Despite his undistinguished past and unimpressive electoral victory, Yanukovych can yet turn out to be a good president and a unifier if he focuses his attention on the task for which he was selected. The public did not vote for a pro-Russian or pro-Western vector but for economic improvement, political stability and a fight against corruption. As Yushchenko recently warned, Yanukovych should be careful that he does not end up simply as the “President of Donbas.”
George Woloshyn, a native of Kupnovychi, Ukraine, is an American citizen living in Linden, Virginia.
