They suggest there will be no normalization of ties with the Kremlin even after a summer which, owing to Brexit and the migrant crisis, saw the Ukrainian conflict slide firmly down the list of world leaders’ priorities. But with the recent behavior of Russian President Vladimir Putin suggesting ever more strongly that he is likely to stay in office until 2024, it would seem a pertinent moment to examine the durability of the West’s approach over the long-term. Putin has made clear the lengths he is willing to go to keep Ukraine within the Kremlin’s orbit. For him, it would seem there are no compromises to be made even as the bedrock of his domestic popularity—a strong economy—is being gradually worn away. The challenge for the West, then, is to stay the course, even as Ukraine fails to exhibit the kind of progress on reforms and European integration promised by the Maidan uprising of 2013-2014.
Above all, the continuing sanctions mean that hopes long-harbored in Moscow that the West would have by now moved on from Ukraine have once again proven to be unfounded. This, against the backdrop of an economic situation in Russia which is showing little sign of improving, is piling more pressure on Putin to enact deep structural reforms; something to which he has publicly committed but in practice shown little desire to do. This inactivity risks condemning Russia to economic growth in coming years barely above stagnation levels. That, in turn, could reverse the gains in incomes and living standards—already under threat—which have ensured Putin’s popularity since he came to power in 2012 and which have helped maintain Russia’s place at the top table of world states.
The question of the day, then, presents itself thus: if the conflict in Ukraine is well and truly “frozen” and the West can be relied on to maintain the current sanctions regime, what course can Putin pursue which will maintain his power and popularity in Russia? It is widely accepted in the Moscow establishment that the former KGB agent will run for another six-year term when his current one comes to an end in 2018. His recent dismissal of 63-year-old presidential administration head and longtime ally Sergei Ivanov is being seen as a precursor to such a move, ushering in as it does a new generation of loyal Kremlin courtiers who owe their careers to Putin and who have only ever served under his leadership.
But Ivanov’s demotion and others which have come before it in the recent past (Vladimir Yakunin, the 68-year-old former national railways head, was dropped last year), tell us more than that Putin is gearing up for the long-haul. It also suggests he is a shrewder tactician than he is often given credit for and provides further evidence, should any be needed, that he is not one to shy away from tough decisions. As his seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and more recent forays into Syria have shown, the West should by now have learnt not to underestimate his resolve.
Going forward then, when it comes to Ukraine, Putin may not do much of anything. Judging by what we have seen to date, the Russian leader is least inclined to seek compromises, and more likely to lash out, when threats appear either to his personal position or to Russia’s status as one of the world’s “great powers”. Events in Ukraine over the past two years tick both of those boxes.
To understand why this is so we should cast our minds back to the winter of 2013-2014 and the Maidan uprising which toppled Ukraine’s then-president and Kremlin-ally Viktor Yanukovych. Such an outpouring of public anger, which proved too much even for Moscow to stage-manage from afar, came as a double blow to Putin. Not only did it threaten his own rule by offering the Russian people an example to follow, it also diminished Russia’s position as a global power by bringing European and American geopolitics closer to its borders.
Thus the stakes, as far as the Russian president is concerned, could not be higher. That is why there is no reason to believe he will change course. His approval rating at home, which continues to hover around 80% in spite of a stuttering economy, also offers nothing to suggest he will stop using up human and financial resources to derail Ukraine.
Ultimately, it would appear Putin is relying on the U.S. and the E.U. deciding simply that they would like to return to “business as usual.” But the steps taken this week in Washington and Brussels show that is not yet possible. It is unclear how long such a situation can continue however, given widespread disappointment with Kyiv’s inability to overcome vested interests and push through the reforms which were demanded during Maidan. For now, at least, it would seem the West’s desire to punish Russia for its violations of international law is stronger than its desire to punish Ukraine for its lack of progress.
