There is no reason to believe that Russia’s President Vladimir Putin would be skittish about using nuclear weapons. Rather, it would be quintessential Putin to do so. As the authoritarian ruler once said, “Fifty years ago, the Leningrad streets taught me one rule: When a fight cannot be avoided, you must hit first.”
Putin’s circle of advisers (which is an echo chamber of “yes men”) did not quit in protest when Putin killed journalists and political opponents. His puppets supported carpet-bombing and use of thermobaric weapons both in Syria and Chechnya. They also resorted to remarkable heavy handedness, which killed Russian citizens, during the terrorist hostage-sieges at the Beslan School and the Nord-Ost Theater. In 1999, then Prime Minister Putin came to power as a result of the allegedly FSB-organized Moscow Apartment Bombings.
Putin no longer has the option of a protracted war and so the use of nuclear weapons are an even easier decision for Putin to make. His national economy is free-falling to collapse; the Russian military lacks supplies, is demoralized by losses, and soldiers’ salaries are evaporating as the ruble goes into freefall. All of this is taking place against the backdrop of rising domestic discontent. Putin could seek an escalation in the war, as prescribed by the Russian military doctrine of “escalate to deescalate,” which would allow his troops to exit the damaging and expensive Ukrainian quagmire and return to Moscow to suppress the potential rise of protests.
The fastest way that Putin can “wrap up” the war is by using nuclear or thermobaric weapons, namely on Kyiv. Such a move could quickly decimate the government, allow Russia to “declare victory,” and scare the West from considering any future entanglements with Russia.
What other means does Putin have, under the pressure of current economic, political, military, and international constraints?
Putin must “win” this war to safeguard his leadership and protect Russia against “destabilizing events” as citizens begin to suffer the tightening screws of Western sanctions. Thus, Putin is likely rattled, as he sees that things are no longer fully within his control, and that they will only get worse. ‘
A story from Putin’s childhood tells of chasing down a rat, which he cornered so that it could not escape. Going to make the kill, Putin was shocked when the rat turned to face him and lunged at young Putin before giving chase. On reflection, Putin said: “That is what everybody should keep in mind: Do not ever back someone into a corner.” At this point, Putin is the “rat in the corner,” and we must begin making plans for whatever he will do next.
About the author
Jason Jay Smart, PhD is a political adviser who has worked in Ukraine, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Russia. Due to his work with the Russian opposition, Smart was declared persona non grata, for life and without right to appeal, from Russia, in 2010.
Smart writes for Ukrainian publications and holds Bachelor’s Degrees in Russian Studies and International Politics; Master of Arts in Political Science (thesis on Russian foreign policy); and a PhD in Political Science (dissertation on US-Russian relations).
