“The existing regime in Russia is based on the negation of every principle of honor and good faith, and every usage and convention underlying the whole structure of international law; in short, of every principle upon which it is possible to base harmonious and trustful relations . . .”
Fine words you would expect to hear from Secretary of State Anthony Blinken. Yet, these are not Blinken’s words, but those of his predecessor from one century ago. Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby articulated these words in his note of August 9, 1920 to Baron Camillo Romano Avezzana, the ambassador of Italy.
Vladimir Lenin’s Bolsheviks stole democracy from Russia in November 1917. Overnight, Bolshevism became the free world’s new enemy. America’s ambassador to Russia, David R. Francis, bluntly warned: “If these damned Bolsheviks are permitted to remain in control of [Russia], it will …. undermine all governments and be a menace to society itself.”
Colby decried the undemocratic and “outlaw” nature of the Bolshevik regime and its connections with the Communist International which threatened the very existence of the western capitalistic way of life.
One century later, Putin’s Russia (again) threatens the western way of life. What lessons can we learn from Bainbridge Colby’s time?
As World War I came to a close, the Allied powers, represented by the Council of Four (Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States), sought to economically isolate Bolshevik-controlled Russia and bring about regime change. The Allies aided the White Russian opposition movement, conducted a limited military intervention in Russia, and imposed sanctions and an economic and physical blockade.
However, policy variances amongst the Allies about objectives and how to achieve them, undermined their efforts. Furthermore, the Allies could not sway other countries, pressured by their own internal problems, to hold back their economic and trade agendas with Russia.
Never having received sustainable political support at home, the already inadequate Allied military intervention in Russia, ultimately failed. The passage of time began to weaken Allied resolve, and the cordon sanitaire around Russia cracked. The Soviet government opportunely divided its opponents and, by doing so, effectively fought further countermeasures.
In July 1920, the U.S. State Department lifted all trade restrictions on Soviet Russia except for military goods. It pronounced that this change did not imply recognition but by the end of 1920, most currency and financial restrictions were also abolished. Great Britain, France and Italy established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1924, then believing that trade and economic ties with Russia could moderate and change the Soviet regime. Stalin’s rise to power proved them dead wrong.
Bad examples from history can and should offer valuable lessons for today. Trade, as a “civilizing influence,” does not work.
Free market forces alone do not vanquish extremism. The early 1920s showed how quickly the passage of time could dissipate international resolve. Twenty-first-century policy practitioners should heed that lesson and embrace the approach that the faster and harder the hit, the better.
Defeating Putin’s aggression requires continuous uniformity in, and enhancement and implementation of, Allied strategy and tactics. Only through the global control and mastery of money, information and technology flows, in addition to military vigilance, can an enduring united front oppose Russia until the Kremlin ceases its aggression and withdraws from Ukraine.
“We need to steel ourselves for the long fight ahead,” Joe Biden warned in his speech at the Warsaw Royal Castle on March 26.
Bainbridge Colby, leaving us a note long ago in history, would have fully agreed.
