Following YouTube’s decision to block the channel of State Duma, the lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia. State Duma’s Deputy Chairman, Piotr Tolstoy, urged the government to ban the platform, accusing it of a hostile policy toward Moscow.
At a glance, Tolstoy, a former TV host, descendent of the great novelist and an ardent supporter of Russian President Vladimir Putin, is making reckless moves.
Banning YouTube would render useless dozens of state media, government, and local authorities’ channels that are key for spreading official propaganda messages.
Yet there is method to the madness.
Although Putin’s regime is successfully maintaining tight control over mass communication channels in Russia, banning YouTube is aimed not so much at western darlings like Aleksey Navalny, but at those whom the government considers a real threat to its regime: the motley crew of ultranationalists, Stalinists, and Orthodox fundamentalists that are once again trying to hog the limelight.
Since 2012, the Kremlin has either precluded new political parties from emerging in contemporary Russia or demanded that its leaders coordinate their steps and decisions with Sergey Kiriyenko, the first deputy chief of the Kremlin’s administration in charge of controlling political processes.
Those who dared to finance political projects without seeking the Kremlin’s permission have wound up in prison, such as Ziyavudin Magomedov, co-owner of the seaport in Novorossiysk, who was detained in 2018.
That said, the Kremlin has been much more benevolent towards others, allowing certain marginals to occasionally take the floor. Among them is Zakhar Prilepin, a popular writer and leader of the “For Truth Party” between 2019-2021, and a former member of Russia’s unregistered National Bolshevik Party from 1996 to 2019.
Prilepin had been calling for a full-scale war against Ukraine from 2014. He also asserts that the war should continue until the ultimate defeat of Ukraine, regardless of losses and casualties.
Prilepin and other ultranationalist leader-wannabes believe that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was inevitable and adequately planned. Yet due to bureaucracy and senior incompetence, widespread corruption and sabotage of the liberals, the plan did not achieve the expected level of success.
To fix the situation, the President, according to Prilepin and his cronies, should lean on those who glorify the atrocities of war, fully disregard the West, and take the stance that violence is the only way to save Russia from its internal and external enemies.
They also suggest getting rid of the oligarchs and confiscating their money, imprisoning the liberals, and protecting traditional values from Western influence. And they are more than ready to start fulfilling their vision as soon as the President gives them such an opportunity.
With the war becoming protracted, Ukraine receiving heavy weapons from the U.S. and its allies, and sanctions crippling the Russian economy, the likelihood of Putin heeding the extremists is growing.
Russia’s existing political system can guarantee the loyalty of local elites and society only in times of economic stability. However, looming mass unemployment, reduced incomes, and embargos are bound to undermine the status-quo, meaning that Putin’s regime will be in dire need of active supporters who can demonstrate popular anger against oligarchs and regional politicians.
Prilepin and the like seem to be perfect for this role. Their aggressive agenda, coupled with the denouncement of capitalism, speaks to millions of poverty-stricken Russians.
Such an alliance feels all the more potent since it already took place in 2014, the year Russia faced an economic crisis due to a plunge in oil prices. Although Russia’s economy deteriorated, the government managed to preserve social stability in part thanks to ultranationalists and Stalinists, who resurfaced for the first time after Boris Yeltsin’s resignation and helped intimidate those who opposed Crimea’s annexation and Moscow’s military intervention in Donbas.
As a result, a large proportion of Russian society considered these hardships a fair price to pay for annexing Crimea and “protecting” the children of Donbas from “Ukrainian Nazis”.
The regime subsequently tried to remove its former allies who had failed to gain any political influence, although some managed to become MPs though representing other parties.
With the stakes of Russia’s current war in Ukraine escalating, and Putin looking more vulnerable than ever as exemplified by his unconvincing speech during the May 9 military parade, the biggest danger is that the motley crew of extremists will seek leverage should the government look to secure a deal with them. Their appeal to the masses is strong, which is one of the reasons Tolstoy urged the government to ban YouTube.
For example, that they will want an array of benefits from Putin and his clique, ranging from political independence to purging bureaucracy and repressing all liberals.
Should they manage to fight their way into politics, or let alone take over the reins, there is a high chance that we will see a new Russia emerging that is even more dangerous and deranged that the current one.
Dmitriy Galkin is a Kyiv-based Russian historian, political commentator and a critic of the Putin regime
The views expressed in this article are the author’s and not necessarily those of the Kyiv Post
