While Congress has been actively pushing for US lethal arms supply to Ukraine for some time (a vote on arms provisions in the US House of Representatives in March passed by anoverwhelming 348-48 margin), U.S. President Obama has resisted Republican-led efforts to escalate America’s involvement in the conflict.
In the context of open hostilities, Obama’s policy of checked resistance to Russian aggression was the most rational approach for US policymakers to pursue. The Ukrainian military’s lack of preparedness and technological shortcomings raised serious questions about the usefulness of lethal arms.
Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko’s insufficient control over oligarch-led militias sparked fears of weapons entering into the wrong hands. Europe’s resolve to support American efforts in Ukraine was also seriously questioned, as was the West’s willingness to continue to escalate further in the likely event of a Russian counter-deployment.
Although it seems counter-intuitive that US arms supplies to Ukraine are occurring at a time when hostilities in Donbas are dying down, lethal arms can be very valuable in a frozen conflict scenario for two main reasons.
First, America’s new Ukraine strategy raises the costs of continued Russian ceasefire violations.
Second, the experiences of Nagorno-Karabakh and Georgia demonstrate how the Kremlin can re-inflame frozen conflicts at will for its own purposes. Arms provisions can deter Putin from destabilizing Ukraine in the future, and also provide protection against continued Russian provocations in the CIS region.
Repeated cease-fire violations in Donbas necessitate lethal arms provisions
From the very inception of the ceasefire mandated by the Minsk II peace talks in February 2015, eastern Ukraine has been beset by periodic episodes of violence that have occurred inflagrant defiance of the Minsk agreement. The first incident was the takeover of Debaltseve by pro-Russian separatists, and this conquest was followed by astring of more indirect acts of aggression from both sides. On July 15, Newsweek reported over 100 cease-fire violations in one day in Donetsk and Luhansk.
The landmark agreement to remove heavy weaponry from the Ukraine conflict was a major boost to theprospects of peace. Following this deal, hostilities subsided, but a sharp increase in ceasefire violations in early November confirmed that the war inDonbas is not as frozen as previously thought.
The war of words between the Ukrainian military and pro-Russian forces on who is responsible for ceasefireviolations, makes lethal arms provisions to one side, seem like a dangerous misreading of the conflict that will only escalate tensions.
To prevent this outcome, a distinction needs to be made between offensive and defensive weaponry. It isundeniable that Russia has conducted destabilizing military activities in eastern Ukraine.
Some of these military operations use Ukraine as a testing ground for new military hardware, like air defense systems, that the Kremlin could utilize in Syria. The use of Ukrainian territory for these kinds of trials is an egregious violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty that Poroshenko must implore the West to resist.
Ukrainian government forces are therefore in need of improved logistical training and defensive weapons, like anti-tank and anti-artillery technologies, to neutralize and deter further Russian aggression. To avoid a reheating of the conflict that would bedetrimental to the Ukrainian economy, the temporary focus should be onpreserving the Minsk II boundaries and not recapturing territory illegally annexed by Russian troops in 2014.
Lethal arms will prevent Russia from reheating Ukraine conflict
Since the mid-1990s, Russia has exploited and intervened militarily to create frozen conflict situations across the CIS region. Russia’s most significant interventions occurred in Moldova, Georgia and the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno Karabakh. In these countries, the Kremlin sought to gain what New York Times journalist Ivan Nechepurenko recently described tome as a “golden stake” over their future. Russia’s military presence wouldobstruct national unity efforts by shoring up support for semi-autonomousregions and secure Russian hegemony by preventing NATO’s expansion too close toits borders.
The prevalence of unresolved, infrequently inflamed border disputes in the CIS region is the lasting legacyof Russia’s neo-imperial strategy. Despite outward demonstrations of support for lasting peace in Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia has stoked the conflictrepeatedly through arms sales to the Armenian government.
And in Georgia, Russia has frequently attempted to redraw the border boundaries in the areathat encompasses the BP-operated Baku-Supsa pipeline. Leading Russia expert Karen Dawisha, a professor at Miami University in Oxford, Ohio, and the authorof the best-selling book Putin’sKleptocracy told me in a recent interview that these border skirmishes inGeorgia are a direct reaction to perceptions of Russian weakness in Ukraine.
Ukraine is at high risk of similarly destabilizing Russian activity, especially if it attracts more European investment by launching aggressive anti-corruption efforts and deepens its security linkages with the West. While France and Germany still are reluctant to guarantee Ukraine’s security, public support for NATO membership is at an all-time high and Ukraine has officially rejected its long-standing neutrality policy.
Therefore, the specter of EU and NATO integration of rUkraine, which alarmed the Kremlin in 2013, remains and Russia could be tempted to escalate in a knee-jerk fashion in Donbas if it feels as if its losing its grip over Ukraine. Russia’s full control over the Black Sea and Sevastopol, combined with its residual military presence, makes a sudden escalation a low-cost endeavor that would be easily justifiable to the Russian public.
Therefore, Ukraine needs to guarantee its security and lethal arms provide a potent deterrent to Russian provocations. Ukraine was woefully unprepared for the 2014 war (it shed more than 80% of its military personnel in the first two decades after the Sovietcollapse and was dependent on out-of-date weapons systems); and it must becareful to ensure it is not caught off guard again. Escalated sanctions, theblacklist of pro-Kremlin individuals, the suspension of electricity imports and renegotiations of its debt obligations, demonstrate that Poroshenko is pursuing a strategy of self-isolation from Russia.
Poroshenko must demonstrate that Ukraine can fend for itself on the world stage. Putin’s reluctance to engage in military campaigns that lead to widespread Russian civilian casualties plays in Ukraine’s favor. So if Ukraine possesses effective Western-made defensive weaponry, it will make a successful Russian charge for Odesa extremely unlikely.
The Obama administration’s decision to provide Ukraine with lethal arms at a time of reduced hostility in Donbas is a wise move that will contribute greatly to Ukraine’s long-term security. Lethal arms will increase the credibility of Ukraine’s efforts to develop economically and build security pacts outside of Russia’s orbit. As the locus of Russia’s military efforts shift to Syria, Putin’s capacity to provide a counter-deployment in Ukraine will decline, increasing the prospect for long-term peace in Donbas.
