Up to this point, the overwhelming focus of U.S. Congressional
debate on deterring Russian aggression has been on the supply of lethal arms
such as anti-tank weapons to compensate for any technological shortfalls
Ukraine may possess relative to Putin’s war machine.
America sent 300 paratroopers to western Ukraine to train with
Ukrainian military forces in April 2015 provoking criticism from the Kremlin,
but these efforts have remained largely understated and small-scale in scope. The
lack of emphasis Western policymakers have placed on tactical support as a
potential source of military aid for Ukraine is a severe strategic
miscalculation, as the fiercely polarizing nature of the lethal arms debate has
paralyzed the West’s ability to provide meaningful assistance to Ukrainian
militias resisting combined Russian-separatist forces.
The case for increased
U.S. military training of Ukrainian militias
The debate over prioritizing lethal arms or technical support
boils down to whether Ukraine’s greatest weakness lies in its arms production
capacity or its military preparedness to confront Russia. While the
sophistication of Ukraine’s military arsenal undoubtedly pales when compared to
Russia’s, Ukraine was still the world’s 4th largest arms exporter as recently
as 2012. Ukraine’s equipment shortfalls are therefore more a product of former
President Viktor Yanukovych’s policy of depleting the Ukrainian military for
personal financial gain and chronic low defense budgets, than an inability to
manufacture quality arms.
The precipitous decline of Ukraine’s military personnel from the
750,000 troops it possessed in 1991 (the 2nd highest total in Europe) to
120,000 troops at the time of the Russian annexation of Crimea is symptomatic
of a broader complacency within the Ukrainian Defense Ministry in recent
decades. As the viable military threat of Russia receded in after Ukraine
gained its independence, the Ukrainian military allowed itself to be vulnerable
to Russian intelligence gathering operations. Pervasive corruption within the
military and police bred a culture of incompetence, and restricted Ukraine’s
ability to train its military in post-Soviet era counter-terrorism techniques,
that would have been so valuable in confronting Russian-backed separatists in
Donetsk.
Even though direct Western involvement to defend Ukraine is not a
realistic option as Ukraine is not a NATO member, Ukraine is in urgent need of
tactical and technical support from British and American military operatives
experienced in asymmetric warfare. This support will allow Ukraine to maximize
benefits gleaned from non-lethal weapons shipped by the U.S. military, such as
the lightweight counter-mortar radar system that has already been very valuable
in counter-terrorism missions.
While the age of Ukrainian weaponry is a salient issue (New York
Times reporter Andrew Kramer reported in March 2015 that only 1 percent of
Ukraine’s military technology was produced in the past decade), the inability
of Ukrainian troops to conduct basic tasks like wire-cutting or sledgehammer
use, underscores the necessity of Western training. Should Western training
efforts be successful in Ukraine, the case for lethal arms necessary to alter
the military balance of the conflict will be strengthened greatly, as increased
discipline and technological aptitude within the military’s ranks will ensure
that lethal arms will not be distributed to rogue factions or be used
inefficiently.
The geopolitical
implications of training Ukrainian military personnel
Many Western policymakers have regarded direct training of military
personnel to be a controversial and stigmatic policy. The vagaries of war can
put Western troops in harm’s way, protracted conflict situations like in
Ukraine can increase the risk of mission creep (U.S. involvement in the Vietnam
War after all began with the deployment of technical advisors), and corrupt
governments can be counter-productive for training efforts (as the Iraqi
government has shown in the struggle against ISIS).
In Ukraine, all three of
these risk factors are present which means that a military training policy
could possibly inspire even deeper polarizations within Western governments
than the lethal arms debate.
Notwithstanding these grave potential pitfalls, I believe that a
military training-focused policy provides much greater insurance than the
provision of lethal arms against arguably the most perilous outcome of deeper
Western involvement in Ukraine: the intensification and escalation of Russia’s
military intervention. Lethal arms shipments come with the inherent risk of
triggering a bidding war between Russia and the West, as both actors seek to
provide their allied factions with the most sophisticated weapons.
Ukraine’s inability to gain NATO accession can be partially
attributed to the unwillingness of European countries to assume the burden of
providing for Ukraine’s security, an indication that the West’s stake in
Ukraine is ultimately less than Russia’s. Therefore, a bidding war for weaponry
will evolve into a game of chicken that plays into Russia’s favor, as the Kremlin’s
resolve to hold on to annexed territory supersedes a divided Western
coalition’s willingness to commit resources to the defense of Ukraine. Only the
provision of the highest-grade lethal arms the West possesses could create a
deterrent effect strong enough to curtail Russian aggression, and the
likelihood of Western policymakers agreeing to these shipments is very low.
Military training by contrast is unlikely to provoke the same kind
of bidding war and reciprocal escalation. Russia’s ability to escalate by proxy
through arms shipments is significantly greater than its ability to commit more
military personnel to Ukraine, which would be the most effective way to counter
the benefits anti-Russian militias will gain from Western training. Incessant
propaganda could cause an increase in Russian casualty levels to go under the
radar of the Russian public, but if the rise in casualties is dramatic and
palpable, questioning of the official narrative is inevitable.
If the Ukraine conflict is perceived to be an intractable struggle
akin to the self-destructive Soviet war in Afghanistan, popular opposition to
the Putin regime that could destabilize his hold on power will become more
likely. Should Western training cause Ukrainian militias to more effectively counter
the separatists’ violations of the Minsk peace agreement, it could reset the
military balance of conflict much more effectively than low-to-middle grade
lethal arms could. Putin will be left with no choice but to begin a gradual
pullback from Donbas, or at the very least desist from carving up more
Ukrainian territory. This scenario would become even more likely if Ukraine
could covertly purchase arms from the Gulf countries or in an
arms-for-agricultural produce pact with China, or reignite its natural
manufacturing capabilities.
Ukraine’s greatest Achilles heel in its struggle against Russian
aggression is not access to arms, but a military that is a malfunctioned
institution ripe with corruption and ill prepared for war. Western military training
could be crucial in improving the prospects of a Ukrainian military that prior
to the current war had not experienced front-line conflict since 1991.
Unfortunately, questionable Western resolve and a lingering misplaced focus on
lethal arms will likely prevent such a large-scale training operation from
coming to fruition, a failure that will play right into the Kremlin’s hands.
Samuel Ramani is an MPhil student in Russian and East European Studies at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford. He is also a regular contributor to Huffington Post Politics and World Post.
