While this trial
is undoubtedly a positive step, it is unlikely to contribute to a significant
improvement in the rule of law in Ukraine or bolster public confidence in the
court system. My pessimistic assessment is based on two factors. First, the
inconsistencies and large delays in the pursuit of justice for former
Yanukovych regime officials have severely damaged the credibility of Ukraine’s
legal system ahead of these proceedings.
Second, the legal
controversy surrounding the interpretation of Interpol’s exoneration of
Yanukovych, could lead to undesired Russian interference in the judicial
proceedings and media assaults that could weaken Poroshenko’s stature in eastern
Ukraine.
Failed prosecutions shake public confidence in
Ukrainian legal system
One of the most
criticized aspects of Poroshenko’s anti-corruption campaign has been the slow
pace of legal proceedings against Yanukovych regime officials. The first
criminal proceedings were announced only in June 2015, more than 15 months
after Yanukovych’s fall from power.
Serhiy Klyuyev, a
prominent Yanukovych associate, and former owner of the multimillion-dollar
estate Yanukovych lived in during his presidency, was able to flee Ukraine
after losing his parliamentary immunity. The Ukrainian authorities’ inability
to arrest Klyuyev in a timely fashion was heavily criticized as proof of the
ineffectiveness of the Ukrainian legal system.
Poroshenko
attempted to deflect criticism by claiming that 2,702 former Ukrainian
officials had been convicted on corruption charges, but no independent media
source has been able to verify these claims. Daria Kalenyuk, the head of the
Anti-Corruption Action Center in Kyiv, responded to the government’s lack of
transparency on the specifics of these convictions by calling Poroshenko’s
anti-corruption campaign a token effort resembling Yanukovych’s arrests of
petty criminals.
The idea that
Poroshenko is attempting to only create an illusion of justice could also have
implications for Ukraine’s relationship with Europe. The European Union has
assisted Ukraine in the pursuit of justice by retaining asset freezes against
Yanukovych and many of his former allies, including Klyuyev. Asset freezes are
especially important as Ukrainian prosecutors have opted to focus on financial
crimes perpetrated by Yanukovych allies, rather than open cases on their
involvement in the deaths of over 100 protesters during the EuroMaidan
Revolution.
If the Ukrainian
courts do not present evidence in a timely fashion, the EU could feel compelled
to loosen or lift these asset freezes. Four asset freezes, including those
imposed in March 2014 on the son of former Prime Minister Mykola Azarov have
already been lifted due to inadequate evidence. Should the EU begin to
reconsider other asset freezes in light of Interpol’s decision on Yanukovych,
it would undermine the credibility of Shokin’s trials.
The slow and
erratic nature of the trial process for Yanukovych allies has also reduced
public confidence in the credibility of Poroshenko’s commitment to combat
corruption in Ukraine. The long string of deaths of Yanukovych’s relatives and
political allies raise serious doubts about Poroshenko’s ability to control the
legal proceedings and prevent Yanukovych’s opponents from taking the law into
their own hands.
With Poroshenko’s
approval ratings hovering in the 30-40 percent range, these trials could
significantly impact public opinion in Ukraine. The court system in Ukraine is
also in desperate need of a public relations victory, as 76 percent of
Ukrainians believed in June 2015 that the court system has a negative influence
on developments in Ukraine, with just 11 percent approving.
If Poroshenko can
round up corrupt Yanukovych-era officials still residing in Ukraine in a timely
fashion and foster the impression that the in-absentia trials are serious legal
proceedings and not ineptly executed show trials, he can gain substantial
political capital. Should he fail, Poroshenko could be forced to overhaul the
court system to restore public trust, in a similar manner to the mass
dismissals of police officers after the EuroMaidan Revolution.
Russia’s likely interfere in the trial process
Since Yanukovych
actively sought to improve relations with Russia during his presidency and is
currently residing there, the Kremlin has been staunchly opposed to the former
president’s indictment. The Russian authorities clearly regard these corruption
trials not as a pursuit of justice, but mere vindictiveness towards a regime
that they believe was illegally removed from power through a violent coup.
The official
explanation for the illegitimacy of the trial outlined by Yanukovych’s lawyers
is that Yanukovych has been cleared of wrong doing from Interpol, and
therefore, any trial is double jeopardy and a violation of international law.
Yanukovych’s legal team has declared its willingness to appeal against Shokin’s
trial to the European Court for Human Rights, should Ukraine refuse to back
down.
Russia has tacitly
accepted Yanukovych’s case by refusing to allow his extradition to Kyiv. The
Russian Ministry of Justice has denied that the Ukrainian government formally
requested Yanukovych’s extradition to Kyiv for testimony, but regardless, Putin
is extremely unlikely to change his position on this issue. Hermitage Capital
Management CEO Bill Browder, in an interview with me in March, attributed
Russia’s rigid stance to the common kleptocratic nature of the Putin and
Yanukovych regimes. Putin is therefore afraid of the reverberations in Moscow
should Yanukovych be convicted and publicly shamed in Ukraine.
The idea that
Russia could intervene violently in the trial process has also become more
prominent in recent months, in light of allegations of possible Russian
involvement in the mysterious deaths of Yanukovych regime allies. Anton
Geraschenko, an assistant to the Ukrainian Interior Minister told CNN in April that
he believed that Yanukovych’s allies were possibly murdered on Kremlin orders
to foment anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Russia and destabilize Ukraine.
While there is no
empirical evidence for these accusations, the idea that the Russian authorities
could obstruct the trials through political intimidation is a contingency that
cannot be dismissed. Even if Russia does not resort to violence, media assaults
on the Ukrainian justice system will likely be an ongoing feature of the trial
process.
Kremlin-backed
media outlet Sputnik reported on the
trial process on Aug. 6, highlighting the fact that Yanukovych was not
impeached by the Ukrainian Parliament, which would be a typical legal procedure
to implicate the president for corruption. Leonid Slutskiy, the Chairman of the
State Duma Committee for Relations with the CIS bloc, in an interview with RT, condemned the Interpol arrest
warrant on Yanukovych as a sign that Ukraine is a totalitarian and undemocratic
state. If these messages permeate to the conflict-ridden Donbas, which is
saturated with Russian media coverage, the trials could end up damaging
Poroshenko’s credibility in eastern Ukraine.
Ukraine’s
Prosecutor General Shokin’s belated show of decisiveness in indicting
Yanukovych and his former allies should be a positive step for Ukraine’s
democratic consolidation efforts. However, the dysfunctionality of the
Ukrainian court system and Russia’s vested interests in obstructing the trial
may prevent genuine justice for those who suffered in Maidan from being
achieved.
Samuel Ramani is an MPhil student in Russian and East European Studies at St.
Antony’s College, University of Oxford. He is also a regular contributor to
Huffington Post Politics and World Post.
