Less than six months ago, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan publicly complained that the Black Sea had become a Russian lake and sought regional and NATO cooperation against this threat. Russia and Turkey’s long-standing relationship was on the rocks, especially after Turkey had shot down a Russian fighter plane over Syria in November 2015. In its place, Ukraine and Turkey developed warmer ties and increased cooperation. But this new status quo began to change over the summer as Turkey sought to mend relations, and Putin spotted an opportunity to ingratiate himself after Turkey’s failed coup on July 15. Since then, Moscow and Ankara have reestablished relations and are cooperating deeply again. But Turkey’s rapprochement with Russia shouldn’t surprise those who study Russia’s foreign policy and its power projection.
Since Russian President Vladimir Putin came to power in 1999, he has made partnership with Turkey a cornerstone of Russian foreign policy. But while this may be a mutually beneficial relationship for him, it is by no means an equal partnership. For Moscow, the economic goal is to increase Turkey’s dependence on Russia through trade, contracts, gas, and tourists. Politically the Kremlin aims to neutralize Turkey’s ability to carry out an independent or pro-Western program in the Caucasus and the Black Sea and to ensure that the Black Sea remains closed in wartime to NATO. A close relationship with Turkey also means that Russia can curtail an independent Turkish policy in the Middle East as a whole, and not just in Syria, if needed. Lastly, it is clearly in Moscow’s interest that Turkey dissociates itself from NATO and the West. Erdogan suffers from a bad case of Putin envy and is trying to emulate his autocratic tendencies at home.
