The president has promised an early visit to Donetsk. That would present the ideal venue to lay out
his thinking in detail. He might
elaborate these ideas and add a few others.
Government decentralization is needed. Political power in Ukraine has long been
overly concentrated in Kyiv. Delegating
some authority to regional and local governments makes sense in terms of more
effective and efficient government—as well as governance that is more
accountable to the citizens. It would be
useful for Poroshenko to put forward concrete proposals for
decentralization, which may require constitutional reform. One obvious measure to consider is to make oblast
governors popularly elected as opposed to appointed by the president. It would also be sensible to transfer some
budget authority to regional governments.
The president said that he would guarantee free usage of Russian
language in the east. The Rada’s hasty
vote on Feb. 22 to strike down the 2012 language law that gave official
status to Russian in certain regions caused great concern among Russian speakers,
even though it was subsequently vetoed. Poroshenko now can articulate how he would guarantee Russian’s use without
fear of discrimination or penalty.
The May 25 presidential election gave Poroshenko a strong
democratic mandate, something that even Moscow appears to be acknowledging,
albeit slowly. Early Rada elections
would revalidate the democratic legitimacy of the parliamentary body as
well. If elections took place in Donetsk
and Luhansk, they could select deputies representing those oblasts’ current
mood, interests and concerns.
Kyiv’s foreign policy is of interest to many Ukrainians—and
potentially controversial. Many in the
east do not want deeper ties with NATO.
How far Ukraine wishes to take its relationship with the Alliance is a
decision for Kyiv and NATO. Poroshenko appears interested in cooperation but has ruled out moving toward
membership.
That is a sensible policy
for three reasons.
First, seeking to deepen relations with NATO would further
complicate Kyiv’s already difficult relationship with Moscow.
Second, there is no appetite within the alliance to accept Ukraine as a member or offer a membership action plan. This is particularly the case since Russia
illegally occupied Crimea; NATO decided 20 years ago that prospective members
should have no ongoing border disputes.
Third, and most important, a push toward NATO would prove hugely
divisive within Ukraine—and would make reconciliation with the eastern part of
the country more difficult. Without
forever foreclosing the option, Poroshenko could make clear that NATO is
not in the cards in the near- or medium-term, a policy that the alliance could
acknowledge.
The European Union presents a different question.
Poroshenko, the Rada and a majority of
Ukrainians favor drawing closer to the European Union and signature of the
Ukraine-EU association agreement, which is now scheduled for June 27. Moscow complained last fall that the European
Union refused to discuss the association agreement with Russian officials. Kyiv could suggest that it is prepared for a
trilateral EU-Ukraine-Russia discussion on steps that the European Union and
Ukraine might take to ameliorate negative effects that the association
agreement might have for Ukraine-Russia trade—but not on the question of
Ukraine’s right to decide for itself whether or not to sign the agreement.
At some point, Kyiv and Moscow should more toward restoring more
normal relations. Poroshenko has
left the door open. The question is
whether Russia will cease its efforts to destabilize Ukraine, end support for
the armed separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk, and begin to deal with Ukraine as
a sovereign state.
Poroshenko said that Ukraine will not compromise on Crimea. Unfortunately, it is difficult to envisage a
scenario by which Ukraine regains sovereignty over the peninsula. That does not mean that Ukraine or the West
should accept Russia’s illegal occupation. However, in a broader dialogue, it might make sense for Kyiv and Moscow
to set Crimea aside for the time being and return to the issue after settlement
of other issues.
Nothing would contribute more to creating a better atmosphere for
dialogue than a de-escalation of the fighting in eastern Ukraine. Poroshenko has called for an end to the
fighting within a week. This is where
Russia could make a big difference; it must use its influence to persuade the armed
separatist groups to stand down and disarm. If that happens, the Ukrainian government should disarm irregular forces
such as the Praviy Sektor.
When Poroshenko goes to Donetsk, a principal challenge will be
persuading the population there that his presidency will look out for their
political and economic interests, in the same way that it will watch out for the
interests of western and central Ukraine.
A package along the lines of the above elements—which build on points
that oroshenko has already articulated—could help him win the confidence
of the east.
Such a package would secure support from Europe and the United
States. And it would give Poroshenko
the clear high ground in dealing with Moscow.
Steven Pifer, a senior fellow at the Brookings
Institution, is a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine.
