Victor
Yanukovych pushed through the 2010 law on non-bloc status as a means
to improve his relations with Vladimir Putin. Senior officials in
Kyiv noted at the time, however, that the law barred a move to join
NATO but would not block a push to draw closer to or join the
European Union. As Ukraine grimly learned in 2014, Moscow decidedly
opposes either.
The
Rada overturned the non-bloc status law by an overwhelming vote of
303 to eight. That came as no surprise. Russia has used its
military to seize Crimea, supported the separatists in Donetsk and
Luhansk, and sent regular army units into the Donbas when it appeared
the Ukrainian military was on the verge of defeating the separatists
in August.
Ukraine’s
non-bloc status did little to protect the country’s territorial
integrity from Russia.
How
should Kyiv now proceed with NATO?
NATO’s
“open door” policy says any European state that can meet the
standards of the Alliance and contribute to trans-Atlantic security
is eligible to apply for membership. But it is not just a matter of
Ukraine asking. A decision to take in new members is a weighty one
and requires a consensus vote, as Article 5 of the NATO treaty
commits allies to consider an attack against one as an attack against
all.
The
Ukrainian government and Rada should consider several things. First,
as President Poroshenko recently stated, Ukraine has much to do to
prepare itself for any membership bid.
Second,
NATO’s 1995 enlargement study noted that prospective members should
resolve territorial disputes. The Alliance does not want to face an
Article 5 contingency immediately upon bringing in a new member.
Crimea’s annexation and the situation in eastern Ukraine would
affect consideration of any Ukrainian bid to join or get a membership
action plan (MAP).
Third,
in general, there is no sentiment within NATO at present to put
Ukraine on a membership track. In Bucharest in 2008, President Bush
pressed for MAPs for Ukraine and Georgia. The German, French and
other leaders resisted and blocked consensus.
If
anything, a Ukrainian bid to secure a MAP now would receive more
critical scrutiny. During previous enlargement rounds, NATO faced a
Russia that it believed wished to be a partner with the West.
Alliance members saw, at most, a very low prospect that Russian
aggression would cause an Article 5 contingency.
Russian
actions over the past year have changed that. NATO members have to
weigh a greater prospect that they might actually have to meet their
Article 5 commitments.
This
is not to say that Ukraine can never hope to join NATO. But it often
is wise not to ask a question unless one already knows the answer. A
push would not make sense unless/until Kyiv ascertained through quiet
diplomacy that its request for a membership or a MAP would meet with
a “yes” from NATO.
What
should Ukraine do in the meantime? Kyiv should continue an active
program of practical cooperation with the Alliance, including in the
military-to-military area; take advantage of the trust funds that
NATO has created to help modernize its defense establishment; and
consult actively with NATO on the range of issues set out in the
NATO-Ukraine charter. Such practical actions would strengthen
Ukraine’s case, should Kyiv later decide to seek membership.
Since
a membership path is not on offer for the foreseeable future, the
Ukrainian government should consider whether taking NATO off the
table could help resolve the crisis with Russia. President
Poroshenko has said Ukraine would need at least six years before it
could consider applying to join the Alliance. Kyiv could offer—as
part of an arrangement that brought peace to eastern Ukraine and
restored full Ukrainian sovereignty there—that it would not seek to
join NATO for a certain period of time. Moreover, any membership
bid or request for a MAP would come only after a national referendum,
as President Poroshenko has suggested.
Kyiv
should not offer this unilaterally but as part of an overall
settlement to the crisis in eastern Ukraine (with the status of
Crimea put off to a later date). At this point, it is not apparent
that Moscow is interested in a settlement; it seems instead to aim at
creating a frozen conflict in the Donbas as a means to pressure Kyiv.
But, were Russia’s approach to change, taking NATO off the table
for some years could help secure peace—and given current views
within the Alliance, it would be a concession that Ukraine could
readily afford to make.
Steven
Pifer is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, is a former U.S.
ambassador to Ukraine.
