Summary
Coptic Christian protesters clashed with pro-government forces Oct. 9, killing at least 23 people and injuring 180. If reports of protesters using firearms and violence against security forces are true, this would mark a distinct change in the tactics of such dissenters, as opposition forces may be turning more violent ahead of scheduled parliamentary elections. However, the violence will likely ultimately help the ruling military council, providing it an excuse to slow its plans to hand over power and possibly rallying support from parts of the Egyptian population.
Analysis
The Egyptian Health Ministry has said that 23 people were killed and more than 180 wounded after violence erupted at a Coptic Christian protest outside Maspero, the state television building in Cairo. Three of those reported dead were Egyptian soldiers, who were shot by individuals within the crowd while standing guard at the building. The incident is the first known instance of protesters in the country using firearms against Egyptian soldiers. Egyptian state media immediately reported that those who fired at the soldiers were Copt demonstrators, though these reports remain unconfirmed.
If true, the use of firearms and violence against security forces at these demonstrations represents a marked shift in protest tactics. The main question would then be whether this was a premeditated act organized by Coptic activist groups opposed to military rule, or the result of a few angry individuals lashing out in the midst of clashes with security forces. Coptic protests are common, but such violence is anomalous; this violence could be a sign of increased dissent with the ruling military council ahead of the parliamentary elections scheduled to begin Nov. 28. The incident at Maspero will give the military justification for an increased crackdown on the opposition and may ultimately benefit the ruling council should the incident trigger an outpouring of support from a large segment of the population that is normally silent on matters of politics.
The protest began in Shubra, a district in northern Cairo, before moving to Maspero. Even before reports of deaths surfaced, the protest saw the use of Molotov cocktails by protesters and tear gas by security forces. There also were reports of stone throwing and gunfire along the route from Shubra to Maspero — none of which is unusual for protests in Egypt. However, the situation escalated, and Egyptian troops were dispatched to the television building. Videos from the scene show armored personnel carriers (APC’s) driving at high speeds through the crowds, security personnel beating protesters, and scenes of protesters clashing with security forces. Multiple vehicles belonging to Egyptian security forces were set on fire during the incident, and some media reports stated that demonstrators were reaching into the vehicles and taking firearms from inside.
Large groups of Egyptian men carrying sticks and torches were then seen walking to Maspero, chanting slogans of unity with the army. Other reports have claimed that Salafist groups chanting the word “Islamiyya” — an Islamist slogan that, in this case, was chanted to demonstrate a unified front against the protesters — have also taken to the streets. STRATFOR sources on the ground reported that one female Copt was seen being beaten by Egyptians wearing civilian clothes near Maspero, while a large crowd of Muslims took a male Copt into an alleyway to beat him. It is likely that more such incidents will occur in the coming days and that there will be attempts of reprisals from the Coptic population.
Shortly after the violence at Maspero, protesters began to make their way over to Tahrir Square. Reports estimating the size of the protest put the number of participants at 2,000. (It is difficult to quantify the exact number of participants who are at the square, but this demonstration appears to be smaller than many of the protests that have occurred there in the past.) The demonstrators are reportedly chanting angry slogans at security forces for firing on demonstrators at Maspero, putting them at odds with the mobs who are targeting Copts for reprisals in the Maspero area. Tahrir Square and Maspero are located within walking distance of one another, so the prospect of clashes between these two groups is very real. There have already been reports of Islamist demonstrators heading for the square, and in light of the security situation, authorities have imposed a curfew in central Cairo and Tahrir Square between 2 a.m. and 7 a.m.
The office of Prime Minister Essam Sharaf issued a statement calling for calm, saying the incident should not be cause for a confrontation between Christians and Muslims. The statement was reportedly issued after a meeting between Sharaf and the ruling military council, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). Information Minister Osama Haykal called for “wisdom not escalation” from the media covering the events, seemingly chastising the haste to blame Copts without sufficient evidence. Also, a spokesman for the Egyptian army said a “hidden hand” had to have been responsible for the violence. Whether or not Copts were responsible for the violence, STRATFOR sources on the ground in Cairo have reported that this perception is now widely held among people on the streets.
Coptic protests in Egypt are quite common, and they are particularly fond of protesting at Maspero. The primary cause for the Oct. 9 demonstration was a Sept. 30 attack on a church in the southern Egyptian city of Aswan. Protesters were calling for the removal of Gen. Mostafa al-Sayed, the provincial governor of Aswan, before the violence broke out Oct. 9. As has been seen with most of the other groupings in the Egyptian opposition in recent months, Coptic demonstrations have taken on an increasingly anti-SCAF tone. Many now openly call for the end of SCAF rule.
The unprecedented violence used against Egyptian troops during the incident will give the SCAF justification for a crackdown. An attack on the military also will create the conditions for a surge in public sentiment that the groups that have been protesting continuously since January have gone too far, which could provide the regime with an overall boost in popularity. There will undoubtedly be large numbers of Egyptians who view the incident as having been planned by the SCAF for its own purposes, and they will take to the streets in protest as a result. Nevertheless, it is likely that the SCAF will use the violence of Oct. 9 as a justification for moving even slower in its promised transfer of power to civilian rule. The military has already moved, albeit slowly, toward establishing a date for parliamentary elections, and it has given no real indication of when the constitution might be written or a president will be elected. A dramatic decline in the security conditions in Egypt will likely only slow this process even more.
