Myth number one: It was the opposition of good and evil rather than election in 2004.
The presidential election of 2004 was not a policy competition between two candidates, Victor Yanukovych and Victor Yushchenko. There was barely any discussion as to what they were offering the society, and the differences in their election programs were microscopic. The then-opposition forced on the country a completely different type of election campaign of political provocations. Here’s the chain of these provocations: In August 2004, there was an alleged shadowing of Yushchenko in Crimea and an alleged attempt by a driver to collide with the candidate’s car. In September there was the alleged dioxin poisoning of Yushchenko. In November, the election headquarters of Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko claimed there were Russian special military divisions deployed in Kyiv. None of these allegations was investigated after the Orange Revolution.
Myth number two: The authorities falsified the election.
There are no legally established facts of falsifications of elections by the authorities. There is a legally dubious ruling by the Ukrainian Supreme Court that came out on Dec. 3, 2004, that established that it’s “impossible to establish the result of the election.”
Myth number three: The threat of use of force.
Despite hot debates at closed-door meetings, the unquestionable fact is that the authorities did not use power. My opinion is that a part of those rallying in the streets convinced themselves that the authorities could use power. This is a good subject for studying the psychology of the crowd by relevant professionals. The facts are that it was the orange team that planned to use force. Yevhen Chervonenko, chief of Yushchenko’s guard, told Ukrainska Pravda online newspaper on March 29, 2005, that “under my command were hundreds of armed people.” Activist of Pora civil movement Oleksiy Tolkachev told Ukrainska Pravda on Nov. 24 that “many activists prepared for war” and “there were hundreds of bottles with Molotov cocktail prepared.” Ukraina Moloda, a newspaper run by Yushchenko’s personal friend, Mykhailo Doroshenko, said on Nov. 22, 2005, that nine machines of a tank brigade in Desna were ready to come to Kyiv in support of the Orange Revolution.
Myth number four: The West did not finance the Orange Revolution.
Leaving aside the motives of the Russian oligarch Boris Berezovsky, who said he had given money to the Orange Revolution, I will say that it’s an established fact that the training camps of Pora civil movement were financed by Freedom House. Oleksiy Tolkachev, its activist, told Ukrainska Pravda on Nov. 24 about improper use for the needs of his organization of a grant issued by the Westminster Foundation for Democracy. It’s impossible that the fund would not know about the unintended use of money. Most likely it preferred to close its eyes to the fact.
Myth number five: The Orange Revolution was peaceful.
Not only did the opposition intend to use force, it actually used it. The blockade of administrative buildings in the center of Kyiv at the end of November and early December 2004, the threats of physical violence received by some people among the “anti-people regime” of ex-President Leonid Kuchma are a good proof of violence. So, what are the conclusions? The myth lives on as long as its bearers are living. And since the collective idea of Maidan has not managed to fall completely apart, it remains an accepted version of the truth that crowds on Maidan appeared spontaneously, and that Russian special forces and tanks were allegedly moving to Kyiv. However, the biblical truth “by their fruits ye shall know them” works very well when one analyzes the achievements of the leaders of Maidan. It’s a good idea to judge them by their results.
Vyacheslav Pikhovshek is a former chief editor of news on 1+1 TV channel. He was also speech writer for former President Leonid Kuchma and former Prime Minister Victor Yanukovych. He can reached at [email protected].
