rse towards European integration, accession to the World Trade Organization, and development of external economic relations in the framework of free-trade areas and corresponding multi/bilateral international agreements. Unfortunately, as so often occurs when it comes to turning such strategic goals into reality, the process has run into countless technical difficulties and new problems are constantly arising.
This situation was well illustrated at the roundtable “Ukraine and the Euro-Atlantic Community,” which was held in Washington Oct. 8-9. The event was organized by the Ukrainian caucus in the U.S. Congress and a number of Diaspora NGOs, in particular, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America.
The organizers did an admirable job in bringing together state and political leaders, parliamentarians and representatives of various think-tanks, as well as journalists from Ukraine, the United States and Western Europe. The roundtable discussions were very fair. They may occasionally have sounded somewhat harsh in tone, but they were invariably conducted in a proper manner. The event made possible a wide-ranging exchange of views on such sensitive topics as relations between Ukraine, NATO, the United States and the European Union, the possibility of integration and the time parameters of this process. Without being confined to formal documents, this productive exchange helped all sides to reach a better understanding of the others’ positions.
It is absolutely clear today that Ukraine’s drive towards integration, which is central to the dynamics of decision-making at all levels, namely the presidency, legislature and government, is much more clearly articulated at the domestic level than it is abroad. Two problems have arisen regarding Ukraine’s relations with the EU and NATO.
First, the actions taken by the NATO alliance and the EU towards Ukraine display a noticeable lack of strategic thinking. This has delayed the formulation of well-defined integration criteria and is holding up further progress. Ukraine has still not received specific conditions and time limits. Without a clear understanding of what standards it should reach in the areas of economy, civil control of the armed forces, parliamentary control of force structures, and development of democracy and protection of human rights, Ukraine clearly cannot make satisfactory progress in implementing them.
In our subjective view, Ukraine appears better prepared for NATO integration than, say, Romania or Bulgaria. But while these two countries have already received Membership Action Plans from NATO, a MAP still remains an unattainable dream for Ukraine.
The second problem stems from the clear presence of double standards in the positions of the EU and NATO. Why does Romania already have a MAP, while Ukraine does not? In the case of Romania, there seem to be no criteria in which that country is ahead of Ukraine – either from the point of existing economic realities, or from that of the democratic and political requirements to be met by society. This looks like bias. Just the same sort of double standards were apparent when Ukraine was discussing accession to the WTO. In particular, the U.S. delegation was active in lobbying for Russia to be admitted to the WTO at the earliest possible date while hindering Ukraine’s ambitions.
It is somewhat surprising that Western politicians and think-tank experts seem to be almost wholly convinced that Ukraine has no alternative other than integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Certainly, these aspirations have become an integral element in the outlook of the current Ukrainian elite.
However, if these aspirations do not meet with an appropriate response from the West, then the current Western-oriented elite may be replaced by another that is oriented towards co-operation, say, with the Tashkent bloc or with the countries of the Third World. This possibility tends to escape the attention of Western politicians.
On the other hand, NATO will benefit considerably if Ukraine is admitted to the alliance. Ukraine’s entry to NATO and EU will effectively complete the design of a security structure for the European continent. This will automatically lead to completion of construction of the European economic space. However, many Western politicians tend to present the situation in the following terms: “Well, let Ukraine strive to join European and Euro-Atlantic structures. As for us, we will continue questioning and putting forward new requirements.”
It is worth recalling in this connection that Belarus once had a democratic government under Stanislav Shushkevich, and in the early 1990s it actively sought partnership with the West. But these overtures went unnoticed and ignored. After a few years, another branch of the Belarus elite with rather different goals came to power. As a result, the country’s strategic orientation has changed and it has sought other strategic partners. I consider that this outcome has been costly for both the world community and Belarus.
Dmytro Tabachnyk is a member of the Labor Ukraine faction in the Rada, where he chairs the Foreign Policy Committee. He headed the Presidential Administration during Leonid Kuchma’s first presidential term in 1994-1997.
