As the August drums of war beat in the Caucasus and the western alliance watched haplessly as columns of Russian tanks lumbered into a tiny mountainous country, politicians in Kyiv were busy devising a haphazard response to this act of Russian aggression.
The Russian-Georgian war became the perfect opportunity for Ukraine’s embattled president, Victor Yushchenko, to kill two birds with one stone. The first was to draw attention to what he believed was the West’s historical error during the NATO summit in Bucharest by not granting Ukraine and Georgia the Membership Action Plan they needed for a future place in NATO. The second was to continue his fullcourt press on discrediting the government of Yulia Tymoshenko. Which goal took priority is difficult to say with any certainty.
The Ukrainian leadership knew full well that its options were severely limited. To dispatch Ukrainian armed forces to fight alongside its unofficial Georgian allies was immediately ruled out of the question. A hasty statement threatening to prevent warships from the Russian Black Sea Fleet to return to their base in Sevastopol until the conflict was settled was seen as a bad joke by the Russian military command. It was so bad that two weeks later the Ukrainian side was forced to admit that it “had no conflict with Russia” and rescinded its “threat.”
Ukrainian support for Georgia was symbolized by Yushchenko grandstanding in Tbilisi, alongside Georgia’s President Mikheil Saakashvili, while his administration issued statements that Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, by keeping silent on the Georgian issue, was nothing less than a traitor. Tymoshenko, according to the dubious Yushchenko scenario, was selling herself to Moscow allegedly to win the Kremlin’s support in her future bid for president.
Yushchenko’s main show of support for Georgia, once boiled down to its essence, was to declare war on Yulia Tymoshenko.
Only poorly informed optimists expected Western armed forces to come to Georgia’s aid in its war with Russia. And while most Western governments properly condemned Russian behavior, nobody in his or her right mind could understand why Saakashvili chose to knowingly subject his country to such punishment by sending Georgian tanks into South Ossetia. The Russian response was evident and most likely premeditated. A wiser leader would have taken measures to prevent such a tragedy.
Instead of moderation, the Georgians opted for confrontation and lost. Their Ukrainian “allies” proved to be fair weather friends – big on words but incapable of deeds.
And while the Georgians might have been provoked by Moscow to go to war, this does not absolve them of irrational behavior. National suicide is not the best method of defending a country’s independence.
Many observers were quick to point out that had Georgia been a member of NATO, the alliance would have been obligated to come to the country’s defense and, by doing so, precipitating a war with Russia. Others, however, believe that membership in NATO would have prevented a Russian invasion. This debate will, no doubt, continue for years to come. Ukrainian political analysts should follow this debate carefully.
Will Ukraine become the next victim of Russian aggression?
The prevalent speculation in Ukraine and in the West is that “liberating” the Crimean Peninsula’s Russian population will be the next pretext for Russia to expand its grip on the postSoviet space and gobble up Ukraine.
It is a scenario which needs to be carefully examined since it is feasible, but not probable, in the short run. The factors that should be considered are:
Ukraine will not become a member of NATO in the foreseeable future and therefore cannot count on Western military support.
Ukraine is not Georgia and any provocation aimed against Ukraine will be seen as a direct threat to the West. By the same token, the West will be hardpressed to prevent any Russian move aimed at limiting Ukraine’s independence. Western security guarantees for Ukrainian territorial integrity are not likely to be concluded and will remain merely soothing phrases.
Ukraine might be forced to cut off Russian gas supplies to Europe as a weapon of last resort to force the Europeans to come to their assistance. This, in turn, would most likely evoke a harsh Russian response and could lead to an allout war.
The Ukrainian military is not prepared or equipped to win a war against Russia.
If Russia were to “play the Crimean card,” it would require an occupation of the peninsula to be successful. The prospects of this succeeding are slim at best, given that Crimea depends on Ukraine almost totally for its fresh water supplies. By turning off the spigots, the Crimeans could be brought to their knees within days.
Ukrainian leaders must remain pragmatic and concentrate their efforts on consolidating the economic and diplomatic gains they have made over the past 17 years. Kyiv’s proGeorgian and antiRussian flag waving is not likely to produce any meaningful results. Offers to lease radar stations to NATO members on Ukrainian territory is no guarantee that, in case of war, NATO will rush in to defend the owners of the lease.
The era of romantic Ukrainian nationalism should be remembered and revered, but past heroism cannot be the basis for a modern foreign policy. The days of the Ukrainian Partisan Army (UPA) are over. The tragedy of the Great Famine should be solemnly commemorated and not used to provoke endless fights with Russia.
Ukraine should abandon its futile tactic of trying to equate the famine – holodomor, or murder by famine – with the Jewish holocaust by outlawing “holod deniers,” getting the United Nations to pass resolutions declaring the famine “genocide,” and other such impractical initiatives. They will not generate public sympathy for Ukraine, which will somehow translate into support for Ukrainian policy goals or speed up Ukraine’s Atlantic integration.
Last but not least, the president of Ukraine should abandon his closest policy advisers and come to grips with reality. If the prime minister is indeed a “traitor,” she should be fired on the spot. If a “kitchen cabinet” is whispering in Yushchenko’s ear to make virulent nationalism state policy, then this lobby should be dispersed.
Roman Kupchinsky is a partner in AZEast Group, a political risk consultancy based in the United States. He can be contacted at [email protected]
