in the protracted (and often too obvious) public relations campaign aimed at cleansing his image abroad.
The speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies was a laborious exercise of hitting all the right points within a record-short timeframe. Mr. Yanukovych assured all that he had no double standards in dealing with the U.S. and Russia, emphasized his passion for the pillars of democracy and spoke of his commitment to the stability of energy supplies. Those worried about re-privatization had their fears allayed; those concerned about corruption and justice received assurances of forthcoming reforms; and those anxious about internal divisions found some solace in the vision shared between the prime minister and the president of what Ukraine should look like in some twenty five years. Therefore, whoever you were and whatever concerns you might or might not have had, the speech was served as a soothing, if not curing, pill for all of them.
Unsurprisingly, it is becoming increasingly hard to separate the kernel of what was accomplished during the trip from the chaff of political spin lavished by an ever-growing society of mutual adoration within and outside of Yanukovych’s party. Few reliable assessments clarify that the real accomplishments seem rather modest. Upon reviewing them, one is left with the feeling that relations between America and Ukraine are at risk of becoming like the ones under President Leonid Kuchma, when the lofty rhetoric of cooperation was never translated into real actions.
However, the pattern of rhetoric without substance could be even more detrimental for the future of Ukraine than it was during the presidency of Kuchma. The reasons for this grim prediction lie both in the domestic situation in the United States and international conditions in general.
The recent release of the Iraq Study Group report has indicated a curious revival of realism in American practices of foreign-policy making. With the theoretical school back in vogue, and the 2008 presidential campaign already in high gear, it can be expected that many from the continually expanding pool of Republican and Democratic presidential candidates will go to great lengths to outbid their opponents in offering themselves as the most pragmatic and most open to practical policy suggestions. Their zeal is understandable, since on the international arena the United States finds itself in a truly critical phase. Not only does it have to resolve a multitude of pressing questions (such as the sectarian war in Iraq, and nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea), but it also has to engage in the profound task of coming to terms with a more multi-polar world, inhabited by, among many others, the chaotic Middle East, increasingly authoritarian Russia, an uncertain Europe and a rising China.
How and why, you might ask, should all of these issues concern the Ukrainian government? The answer is two-fold. The first part has to deal with the country’s relevance. A Ukraine where the two major political figures can agree on a common vision for 2026, not 2006, is not a helpful member of the international community right now. It is currently losing the coherence and strength of its external voice due to internal squabbles over the position of Foreign Minister. Ukraine may soon lack the needed credibility if Mr. Yanukovych’s activities continue to run parallel to his pronouncements, and if President Viktor Yushchenko’s strategies continue to deepen his political marginalization. In the end, a country that doesn’t know what it wants to be (or whose leadership has difficulty establishing a link between words and actions) will be pushed to the temporary periphery of American interests.
The second part of the answer is about Ukraine’s development. Contrary to the way it seemed in Washington last week, our relations with the U.S., Russia or any country, for that matter, are supposed to increase the wellbeing of ordinary Ukrainians. But cooperation is a two-way street. If Ukraine is viewed as uncertain, unreliable, or unstable (or a combination of all three), the expectations of increased foreign direct investment from the U.S. will be dreams that are simply not meant to come true. Taking into account the size and power of the American economy, the loss will definitely be that of Ukraine.
It is also clear that, given the magnitude of problems elsewhere, the United States can wait until our political leadership begins to speak with one voice and mean what it says. However, the question remains whether Ukrainians can afford to waste another two or three years that could further keep them from achieving greater economic and political progress here and now. Vlad Galushko is a doctoral student in International Studies at Old Dominion University (Norfolk, VA).
