ing train destined to nowhere.
At first, the analysts naively believed the president and his team were taking their time to come to grips with the new distribution of domestic power and making adequate adjustments.
Throughout the summer, it became increasingly clear that neither President Viktor Yushchenko nor his party (if it can be called his at all) had any understanding as to how to pull the country out of the constitutional quagmire, but instead was busily engaged in petty fights with its closest political allies. The result of those “collaborative” efforts is well known.
At this point, the president’s continuing insistence on the formation of a broad coalition between the pro-presidential Our Ukraine party and the pro-government Party of Regions, as well as his refusal to be in opposition to the cabinet, is a sign of the clearly cemented pattern that may put Ukraine on a meaningless cycle of failed and half-baked coalitional projects.
If past evidence provides any guidance, the prime minister will turn around and continue implementing his party’s agenda, regardless of whether it fits his August deal with Yushchenko. Within Yushchenko’s team, this understandably produces a wave of clarifications (which muddle rather than illuminate the position of Ukraine), resignations (among those few no longer able to tolerate coalitional idiosyncrasies) and renewed calls for renegotiations (from the staunch political opportunists). Thus, the cycle begins anew.
One could have ascribed the nightmare of coalition-making under the Yushchenko presidency to the growing pains of building institutions in a democracy, if in fact such coalitions had not retarded the democratic progress itself.
First, they obscure the notion of responsibility to Ukrainian voters. If the president and the prime minister are in the same coalition, but the policies advanced by the prime minister clearly contradict the ideas of the president, who is then to assume the responsibility for the failure of such policies? As during the Kuchma era, the buck continues to stop nowhere.
Second, such broad coalitions prevent the development of a viable opposition that is a crucial element of any democratic society. Our Ukraine remains neither here nor there. Worse than that, its relationship with other oppositional parties (like that of Yulia Tymoshenko) cannot be permanently defined, which in turn substantially weakens their joint capacity to counteract undesirable legislation and exercise effective oversight over the cabinet of ministers.
Third, and probably most important to the domestic agenda, these coalitions will impede the emergence of high quality policy proposals. It is not a secret that the president has long lacked a policy agenda that is defined beyond general slogans. Fresh and comprehensive plans for structural reforms in education, welfare and healthcare will not be generated if all energy is spent on designing new convoluted models of awkward cooperation with the Party of Regions. In the absence of original ideas, Our Ukraine and the president will, at best, end up exercising political expediency and tag along with the least objectionable agenda. At worst, they will risk becoming sidelined, marginalized and irrelevant.
Finally, broad coalitions have already created the perception of domestic instability among Ukraine’s neighbors, allies and partners. When extending his offer of help several weeks ago, Russian President Vladimir Putin knew very well that a significant number of Ukrainian “colleagues” would be willing to look up to Moscow to strengthen their standing in internal bickering at home. The cyclical effects of weak coalitions, which were described above, are bound to create some power vacuum that Russia will attempt to fill.
The solution is both simple and difficult. It begins with recognizing that the goals of Our Ukraine and the Party of Regions are in fact dissimilar, which necessitates the development of mechanisms for a civilized cohabitation. It proceeds by declaring opposition to the cabinet and generating a feasible policy agenda that is clear, practical and appealing to the currently demoralized supporters of Our Ukraine and the undecided. The solution also requires identifying key allies (such as the bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko) and creating effective instruments of coordination and cooperation in the parliament. Most importantly, it involves a long-term and often tedious job of being in opposition – monitoring your opponents, capitalizing on their mistakes by offering alternative views, challenging them (if necessary) in courts and persuading voters of the advantages of your choices.
All of these steps will of course be possible only if President Yushchenko is able to exercise leadership within his own party, overcome his personal antipathy to Tymoshenko and many former Our Ukraine members in her bloc, and put a temporary lid on his second-term ambitions. If not, Ukrainian politics and ultimately the Ukrainian public will remain hostages to the useless process of soul-searching by the president and his party. Vlad Galushko, is a Ph.D. student in International Studies at Old Dominion University (Norfolk, Virginia).
