Following a number of controversial statements on Ukraine-Germany relations in the Ukrainian media recently, I felt compelled to voice my own, personal opinion on the state of these relationships and their prospects.
First, however, I must admit that I have a thing for Germany. Nothing is more romantic to me than Rhineland’s tiny medieval towns, more cheerful than the Christmas market in Nuremberg, funnier than good old German Cabaret and crazier than “Weiberfastnacht” – the final night of the Carnival in Cologne.
Germany is where dozens my friends live. Germany is the country that in the past stood by Ukraine when it counted – for instance, when we were coping with the Chornobyl nuclear explosion.
In a nutshell, Germany is a dear friend to me. Therefore it hurts me to hear over and over again criticism on Germany’s role in the Ukraine-EU dialogue. Whenever I ask my colleagues in charge of negotiations with the EU – “Who is your biggest headache?” I get the answer – “Heck, your German ‘friends,’ of course!”
How did it happen that a friend became a “friend”? How did the country that for years vowed to be Ukraine’s “advocate in the EU,” became her most avid (and not always fair) accuser? The first answer on some people’s minds would be – because of Ukraine’s human rights record. Well, not exactly. “Systemic problems” surfaced way before human rights in Ukraine became the talk of the day.
Even as early as 2004, when Ukraine was celebrated in Europe as a new addition to the world’s democratic scene, German populist media portrayed Ukrainians as hordes of potential illegals just itching to flood Germany’s serene plains.
For those who don’t remember – I’m talking about the “visa affair” of 2004-2005 that caused a change of hand in Germany’s leadership. Back then Ukraine found herself in an unusual position of a scapegoat for some German domestic issues – with no chance to defend itself. I’ll never, never understand Ukraine’s ambassador to Berlin who sat it out like a mouse while his country was dragged through the mud.
So, if we are looking for the juncture when the Ukraine-Germany renowned partnership took the first heavy dent – most probably it will be the “visa affair”. However finding the true reason behind the overall decline in relations would be a more complicated matter.
Some hint mysteriously at the “Gazprom factor.” Some claim that Germany simply cannot play “an advocate in the EU” to someone it doesn’t want to see in the EU in the first place. Others trace the problem back to personal skepticism on the part of German political leadership.
It was in 1996 when I, a Foreign Ministry officer in charge of Ukraine-Germany relations, was introduced to Angela Merkel, the then Germany’s minister for environment who traveled to Ukraine to visit the Chornobyl power plant. Young, modern, energetic, she was nothing like any politician I met before. She struck me as competent, quick-witted and curious.
Fluent in Russian, she easily picked up on Ukraine’s complicated realities. But most importantly – she left a distinct impression that she sincerely cared about the Ukraine-Germany partnership. She was clearly a person of integrity. And as I was following Mrs. Merkel’s mind-boggling career over the years – this impression only grew stronger.
So, if someone thinks that Mrs. Merkel has a problem with Ukraine, I’m not buying it. The problem must be deeper. And I tend to side with those who see it in Germany’s overall tiredness with the EU enlargement.
As it often appears, German voter, the proverbial “Otto Normalverbraucher” (Otto the average consumer) is rather pessimistic these days about the United Europe in general and its further extension to the East in particular. Which translates on the whole political class. Which, in turn, translates on Germany’s readiness to even consider Ukraine’s perspective in the EU.
The real problem is that we don’t speak about this. We pretend that all problems of our relations are solely about Ukraine’s “mishaps.” Not true. On the one hand, Ukraine’s record is not all that bad. And on the other, I sometimes feel that if it wasn’t for Ukraine’s true blunders, Germany would make up some. Simply because it needs reasons to say no.
So, what do we do about it, aside from finally airing the suppressed grievances? Ukraine’s to-do list is very obvious: to become more convincing as a true reformer. Words don’t count anymore. The deeds are in order. What the world expects from Ukraine is an actual record of successful transformation. We either achieve it or go under as a nation.
As for Germany, I am most certainly not the one to speak for Berlin. But I think it would be utterly wrong to build a longtime policy on the assumption that the political travails and economic hardships that were so typical for Ukraine’s first 20 years will go on and on. .
Ukraine is changing.
As the generation that grew up in independent Ukraine assumes more control over things (and this is already starting to happen) the world will increasingly see Ukraine as a reliable and effective partner. Do we want to enter this future with the notion that it was Germany who shot down Ukraine’s faintest chance at EU membership?
After all, remembering how much effort it took Germany to dissolve the “Teutonic” image, I can’t believe that Berlin would so easily agree to play the role of an “dream killer” in the eyes of Ukraine’s pro-European youths.
And, if you really think about it, it’s not only about Germany. For years EU rightfully took pride for resolving historic animosities in Europe. Has it embarked now on a mission of creating new ones? One thing I’m sure about – this can’t be what “Otto” really wants.
Olexander Scherba works as ambassador-at-large at Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
