Editor’s note: This is the final part of a two-part series. In Part 1, published in the Oct. 2 issue of the Kyiv Post, the authors described the state of Russian-Ukrainian relations and Russia’s policy towards Ukraine. Part 2 examines Ukrainian policies.
The achievement of Ukraine’s national interests – and even its survival as a nation within the current borders – requires urgent measures. However, developing better bilateral relations with Ukraine’s vital neighbor, Russia, is not merely a task for Foreign Ministry diplomats. It requires coordinated efforts by the entire government, by financial and business groups and by non-governmental organizations.
Domestic policy
The state needs to guarantee the constitutional rights and freedoms of Ukraine’s citizens, not merely to declare that these rights and freedoms exist. The key role will be played by a judicial system that protects lawful interests based on the principle of supremacy of law. Political stability has to be achieved based on consensus to follow a European path of national development. Political competition must not be so devastating that it threatens state security. Ukraine needs to stop acting like a victim. Success would create the basis for effective state power. Dual executive power must be eliminated constitutionally, either by approving a new constitution with either a presidential or prime minister form of government, or cancellation of the December 2004 compromise constitution that ended the Orange Revolution. This current constitution could be annulled because it was not properly approved by the Verkhovna Rada.
Political patronage appointments should be curtailed. The main criteria for selection of state officials should be professionalism, reputation and devotion to state interests, rather than those of any political force. As a result, administrative and political offices should be strictly separated.
State corruption has to be reduced through deregulation of the economy, adoption of strong anti-corruption laws and enforcement of the existing ones. The police and criminal prosecution powers need to be strengthened, so that trials that set examples for all can be pursued vigorously.
The military forces have to be strengthened on the premise that Ukraine will not join NATO in the next five years and also based on inflicting unacceptable damage on any potential aggressor. We also have to act on the premise that a sharp increase in the defense budget is financially impossible. Consequently, it’s necessary to radically reduce the armed forces while preserving the potential for creation of a full-scale army to respond to the most serious threats. The Independence Day parades should be supplemented by military exercises in the regions.
Effective intelligence and counter-intelligence have to be created and tasked with several clear goals.
An information campaign needs to explain Ukrainian policies, to project a positive image of the state and to promote cultural, economic and other achievements. The key task has to be development of English-language resources about Ukraine or, at the very least, translation of legislation and creation of English-language websites of government agencies. In defining state policies, the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine will remain an important part of the nation’s social development for at least two or three more generations. Therefore, pro-Ukrainian promotion must be done in Russian and Russian-language media need to be provided with such information in Crimea and in eastern Ukraine. Also, democratic and pro-European social and political organizations working in the Russian-language sector have to be assisted.
Foreign policy
1. Ukrainian foreign policy needs to retain the option for joining NATO and the European Union while gaining tactical flexibility. Declarations have to be dropped in favor of discreet action. In relations with Russia, attention has to be focused not on differences, but on concrete problems that can be solved in a mutually beneficial way. Bilateral groups (including the presidential commissions) have to be resurrected. Meetings at the highest and other levels have to be renewed. Economic cooperation needs to be improved and trade increased. Russian investment needs to be encouraged. Increasing transparency in the energy sector is an urgent matter. So is the creation of consortiums for development of gas transit.
2. Successful development of relations with Russia is impossible without numerous improvements in Ukraine’s foreign policy, including in its relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United Nations and the Council of Europe.
3. Ukraine should initiate an international conference to prepare an agreement for guarantees of its security, which has to replace the December 1994 Budapest memorandum, in which international assurances of Ukraine’s sovereignty were given in exchange for its surrender of nuclear weapons. Influential nations such as the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain and Germany must be invited.
4. The option of making the Black Sea a demilitarized zone needs to be considered at a special international forum with nations that have a direct stake.
5. In relations with the United States, the accent has to be shifted to a working level, primarily in the security sphere. The December 2008 strategic partnership charter needs substance. NATO relations have to develop on the basis of an annual program for cooperation. However, the latest article by former U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and proclamations by others have shown that there is little hope for help from the West.
6. The key direction for cooperation with the European Union has to be the Eastern Partnership, rather than full-fledged EU membership. Bilateral relations with Germany, France and Britain have to be activated. Friendly relations with Poland also have to be developed and relations with Romania will require hard work to improve.
7. Ukraine’s foreign policy needs to support a unified Moldova. A successful solution of the problem of the breakaway Transdniester region will contribute to security.
8. A dialogue with China needs to be started and should include the security sphere.
9. Relations with Belarus, a potentially important partner, need to be improved – with energy security as well as economic and defense cooperation as the leading planks.
A consistent implementation of these domestic and international measures can reduce tension in relations with Russia or, at least, limit the conflicts and minimize damage to Ukraine’s national interests. Such policies in Kyiv would also assist those in Russia trying to establish the principle of freedom there. At the same time, we must recognize that the Ukraine-Russia relationship is a key to stability and security in all of Europe.
Volodymyr Gorbulin is an academician of the National Academy of Sciences and director of Institute for National Security Problems within the president’s National Security and Defense Council. Oleksandr Lytvynenko is his adviser.
