The Kremlin amasses forces near Ukraine’s borders, in the annexed Crimea, and in the occupied areas of eastern Ukraine. Both Kyiv and Washington took these steps seriously: President Joe Biden called his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky and ensured him of U.S. support.
But what is the probability that Russia isn’t just saber-rattling but preparing to escalate the conflict?
To understand the real risks, we have to analyze the possible intentions of the Russian Federation’s leader, Vladimir Putin.
What is in it for Putin to escalate the war? There are several reasons to consider.
- To set the stage for the talks with the new U.S. president.
That’s a relatively standard, if not traditional view of negotiations among post-Soviet business people and criminals. Strike first, create a crisis and make its solution a part of your offer in the trade.
Putin used this approach in Ukraine to impose the first and second Minsk agreements. He could scale this up to a global level. Talks with the Biden administration are unavoidable, so Putin is trying to keep them on his terms. He could be thinking: “The one who called me a killer will see how many people I’m eager to kill to prove no one can talk to me like that.”
- To impose his agenda on Ukraine, either using Minsk agreements or through other means.
Putin’s plan in the Ukrainian conflict is keeping Russia’s hold on Crimea, undermining Ukrainian democracy, which could otherwise be an appealing example for the Russian people, and ensuring Ukraine won’t become part of the Western defense system.
The eastern Ukrainian region of Donbas that Russia invaded was never meant to become a part of Russia — rather, it was meant to become a new crucial point of Russia’s leverage in Ukraine. That was the Russian view of the Minsk agreements.
Still, Ukraine refused to implement the agreements the way Russia wanted them and the ceasefire became a war of attrition, which Russia is losing. The sanctions worked, the support of the Donbas “republics” became more and more costly for Russia, and even the most stubborn of the pro-Russian people in the Donbas and Crimea became disillusioned in their hopes for prosperity under Kremlin’s rule.
- To solve the problem with the water supply in Crimea.
That may be the most dangerous option because it means direct incursion of Russian troops on non-occupied Ukrainian territory.
The Crimean peninsula has experienced a severe water shortage after the closure of the North Crimean Canal by Ukrainian authorities just after the Crimea annexation in 2014. This year the situation can change from bad to catastrophic — most of the water reservoirs are gone. There will still be enough water for people, but not for industry. In Ukraine, even talks of restoring water supply to Crimea cause significant protest from the patriotic and veteran community.
Ukrainian intelligence and open-source analysts highlighted not only the massive build-up of troops on the occupied peninsula but also some specific pipe-laying machines in their ranks. The only possible explanation is that they are preparing to restore the channel — but that would require them to at least partially seize Ukraine’s Kherson Oblast.
- To solve Russia’s domestic problems.
Putin rules an unstable country in a downward spiral of repression. His popularity is lower than ever and dwindling. The only way Putin knows how to fix it is war.
Those are the reasons for Putin to be acting now. Knowing that, we can deduce what can be expected from Russia in the next six months. There is no point in guessing whether Russia’s actions are a bluff or not. Russia’s bluff can swiftly turn into a real attack or vice versa.
Here’s what Ukraine and its Western allies should expect and try to avoid:
- Military provocation in the Donbas region, accelerated by the use of information warfare. Russia will try to frame Ukraine as the aggressor and provoke heavy clashes that will cause the Ukrainian army to take significant losses. Moscow will try to force Zelensky to implement the Minsk agreements the way Russia wants — to include Donbas, still controlled by Russian proxies, in Ukrainian politics and economics, as well as to supply water to Crimea and to reverse his latest sanctions against pro-Russian politicians in Ukraine. If the Kremlin fails here, it could send its troops to Donbas openly, posing them as peacekeepers.
- Heavy diplomatic pressure on EU and NATO countries with proposals to “take Russian interests into account” — to allow the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, lift sanctions, recognize Crimea as a part of Russia, etc.
- A Russian attack from Crimea on the neighboring Kherson Oblast, with the minimal goal of capturing Nova Kakhovka town — the North Crimean Canal’s main gate.
- The least likely possibility that’s still too dangerous to ignore is a direct Russian attack on Ukraine from other sides: across the Russian-Ukrainian border, through Transnistria, or even through Belarus. Still, it’s an improbable scenario because Russia would need to amass much bigger forces and could face intense resistance.
The main principle in dealing with Russian aggression remains the same: Don’t back down. The Kremlin will stop and turn back if met with pushback.
If Russia stays on the offensive and keeps violating international law, Ukraine, the EU, and the U.S. should leave behind the culture of compromise and the habit of negotiating with the aggressor.
The response to the aggression should combine military, political, economic, and media countermeasures. The Ukraine of today is not the Ukraine of 2014: It can withstand and counter at least limited aggression on its land, and make Russian forces pay dearly.
Still, Ukraine needs all the help it can get from its Western allies — from intelligence data to lethal weapons and actions that minimize Russia’s ability to use aerial or naval units.
Victor Tregubov is a Ukrainian political journalist, activist, and a popular blogger. During 2015-2016 he participated in the war in the Donbas as a conscripted officer of the Ukrainian army. He is a co-founder of the Democratic Axe (Demokratychna Sokyra) political party.
