Protests in Kazakhstan suggest that rising prices across the region could make it a tinderbox for political unrest. The Kremlin’s response shows it is willing to act as a repressive Gendarme in order to avoid another Euromaidan.
On Jan. 2 protests over the rising price of fuel began in the remote Kazakh city of Zhanaozen before spreading rapidly across the country. This wave of demonstrations and political violence saw government buildings torched and security forces ordered to fire on protesters without warning.
The Kremlin’s watchful eye which, had previously been focused on Ukraine rapidly swivelled to face Central Asia and Russian soldiers were dispatched to support the Kazakh government in repressing the unrest.
Mass unrest in Kazakhstan since the collapse of the USSR has been rare, as the country has remained under the iron fist of President Nursultan Nazarbayev and his cult of personality since 1990.
In 2019 the aging Nazarbayev resigned from the presidency taking up the self-created position of head of the National Security Council while, his chosen successor, Tokayev became president. This elaborate arrangement allowed Nazarbayev to continue to hold the reins of power.
However, for ordinary Kazakhs including some members of the security forces years of austerity, corruption and now rising prices had become too much to bear and they took to the streets.
The events in Kazakhstan constitute the worst nightmare for the already paranoid Kremlin. In the past authoritarian governments in Eastern Europe and Central Asia knew to expect protests around rigged elections, as seen in 2021 in Belarus or, around important geopolitical events such as Yanukovych’s refusal to sign an association agreement with the EU which, led to the 2013-14 Euromaidan protests.
However, the cause for the protests in Kazakhstan appears to have been the doubling in the price of fuel which was heavily subsidised.
The connection between rising costs of living and political unrest is relatively new in the region and scary for authoritarian regimes; Russia had an inflation rate of 8.4% in November 2021 Belarus 10%. For such governments, this form of unrest is much more unpredictable and harder to repress than unrest centred around elections or major political events.
The rush to dispatch 2,500 mainly Russian troops to Kazakhstan suggests that the Kremlin believes two things to be true. Firstly, the post-Soviet space is currently a powder keg of political unrest and revolt. Rampant corruption and the lack of opportunities created by oligarchic societies have been festering problems for many years. However, more proximate causes such as rising prices, an ageing elite and recent increased state repression and involvement in society are starting to mobilise citizens.
Secondly In the past, while the Kremlin, directly and indirectly, intervened to stop or undermine protests that were viewed as pro-Western such as in Belarus in 2021 and Ukraine in 2014 It had also been more pragmatic towards unrest in Armenia in 2020 and Kyrgyzstan in 2010 where there were no distinct pro-Western forces.
The intervention in Kazakhstan shows that the Kremlin believes that any unrest in the “near abroad” must now be stopped! This is because it poses a direct threat to the Kremlin either because the Kremlin fears Russians would be inspired by the successes of protests in other countries and take to the streets themselves or, because it may lead to hostile governments appearing on Russia’s borders.
In this way Putin’s actions mirror those of Tsar Nicholas I who came to power in 1825 in the wake of the failed Decemberist revolt and, responded to calls for social, economic and political change within the Russian Empire with brutal repression.
Additionally, Nicholas I earned the moniker ‘Gendarme of Europe’ due to his arch-conservative views and dispatching of Russian troops to put down the Hungarian 1848 revolt against their Austrian overlords. He also created the Holy Alliance of Austria, Prussia and Russia to act as a bastion against liberalism and revolution.
While no Holy Alliance, Putin has used the unrest in Kazakhstan to change the role of Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) a post-Soviet defence treaty; from collective defence to providing support for repression and legitimizing Russian influence of other member states.
Interestingly, the support that the Kremlin has provided to states such as Belarus and Kazakhstan is the political equivalent of an authoritarian organ transplant. As the state structures of Belarus and Kazakhstan crumbled or defected to the opposition in the face of mass protests, the Kremlin has been willing to replace or augment entire state structures.
Are you worried that the journalists on your propaganda networks are refusing to do their work at a time of national unrest? The Kremlin dispatched a cadre of experienced propagandists and high-tech equipment to replace journalists on Belarussian state TV.
Are you concerned that your state’s loyal security forces may not be willing to open fire on protesters? Russian troops can be anywhere in the post-Soviet space in 48 hours.
In this way Putin seeks to make himself indispensable to leaders like Lukashenko and Tokayev while reducing their independence and autonomy.
The internet blackout in Kazakhstan means that it is currently difficult to understand the complete situation in the country. However, the government appears to have restored control in the capital and other major cities with Russian help.
However, this is no victory for the Kazakh government. The massacres perpetrated by security forces will create seething animosity between the regime and the Kazakh people.
Additionally, Nazarbayev once seen as the father of the nation, finds his statues torn down, resigned from his security role and his reputation in shambles. Any hope for leaders like Putin of following Nazarbayev’s model, quietly retiring and appointing a successor while still controlling politics from behind the scenes have been dashed.
As living standards continue to be squeezed across the post-Soviet region and demands for reform continue to grow, governments will likely turn to ever more extreme forms of repression.
Putin will likely find that this approach has a tendency of giving leaders exactly what they asked for, but not what they wanted. During his reign, Nicholas I successfully achieved his goal of repressing dissent at home and abroad but, he left the Russian Empire with a litany of problems; unwinnable wars, imperial overreach, crippled public finances, an oppressive intellectual atmosphere and a corrupt state plagued by graft. In the words of the Ukrainian professor and civil servant Aleksandr Nikitenko “the main failing of the reign of (Nicholas I) was that it was all a mistake.”
