The world’s collective attention has been focused on the coronavirus outbreak. Not in its entirety though. As is often the case, there are forces wishing to take advantage of the situation and push their national agenda while no one is looking. This time, Russia used a page from its own dog-eared playbook. Here is how it worked in the past.
In August 2008, the impressive Olympic Games held in China took the world’s breath away. At the same time, Russia invaded Georgia. Six years later, while the international public opinion was having a blast mocking the not-so-impressive organizational skills of the hosts of the Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia’s “little green men” invaded Crimea.
In recent months, Moscow has yet again taken advantage of an international crisis in order to dictate the terms for conflict resolution in their dealings with Ukraine. Since December last year, the Kremlin has been trying to utilize its useful friends in Paris and Munich and force Kyiv to recognize the separatist forces in the Donbas. Ukraine has been able to reject such proposals for the past 6 years. They turned them down at the December Normandy Formula meeting in Paris. Ukrainians did not fall for the “expert” proposal presented in February at the Munich Security Conference either.
The breaking news of March 11 left many pundits and experts speechless. At the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group (Ukraine, Russia, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), Ukraine’s envoy agreed to create a Consultative Council comprised of representatives from Ukraine and the Donetsk People’s Republics. According to the agreement, the Council is to serve as a platform for dialogue and a tool charged with the organization of future elections in the Donbas. The idea is not entirely original; the so-called Steinmeier Formula previously proposed a popular vote in the area.
The agreement is surprising to the point that most policy analysts have refrained from making any comments. The European Parliament’s press and analytical services completely overlooked the developments.
However, what happened on March 11 did not go unnoticed in Kyiv. Ukrainian parliamentarians and even members of President Volodymyr Zelensky’s party raised voices of objection. Protests were staged in the streets. Critics of the agreement pointed out that the newly appointed chief of staff Andriy Yermak signed the deal. They argued he had always been soft on Russia. It is commonly suspected he is well connected with the Ukrainian oligarchy, whose members are dedicated to bringing back the good old days of lucrative economic cooperation with Russia. There was even talk that the implementation of the political scenario laid down in the deal resembled the one played out by Zelensky on television when he was just playing president for a TV show.
Two days later, Yermak assured the public opinion that the agreement was not a legally binding document granting recognition to the Donbas separatists. On the contrary, it is merely a framework for consultations, argued Zelensky’s Chief of Staff. Interestingly enough, no one in Kyiv denied that such a deal was cut!
Therefore, the agreement is quite an unexpected sharp turn on Ukraine’s road to the resolution of its conflict with Russia. It is not an entirely new idea, since talks about getting rid of the Donbas and focusing on developing what would be left took place while Poroshenko was president. Such plans were never officially confirmed though. What is certain is they would not have led to the current state of affairs with a hugely autonomous Donbas within Ukraine.
The remaining actors of the Minsk Peace Process – France and Germany – are yet to accept the March 11 agreement. Seeing it through would result in the recognition of the Donbas separatist authorities, as well as giving them a status equal to Kyiv’s. In consequence, it would rebrand Russia’s aggression on Ukraine into an internal Ukrainian ordeal that Moscow had nothing to do with. Russia would no longer be the invader. Instead, it would be able to assume the position of a mediator.
Such a scenario would obviously lead to Ukraine’s federalization, and it would marginalize its central government. Russia would welcome such developments, as they would essentially subjugate Ukraine. Years ago, Moscow managed to achieve similar results in Moldova, slicing out Transnistria in the process.
Thus, the question of what exactly we are dealing with emerges. Is it a virtuous idea of de-escalation championed by Kyiv? Is it just an honest mistake or a blunder caused by incompetence followed by recent changes in Ukraine’s government? Finally, were society’s limits being tested to determine how far the people were willing to go to reach an agreement with Russia?
The implementation of the March 11 formula, followed by similar deals, could have extremely negative consequences for Kyiv’s central government. Despite being de facto under Russia’s control, de jure, the Donbas is still part of Ukraine. Following internationally recognized municipal elections, the region would return to Ukraine both politically and administratively. Representatives of the Donbas would then re-join the national parliament and the central authorities. In consequence, radically pro-Russian politicians would surface in “Bandera’s Kyiv.” Their goals would be anything but to solidify democratic reforms and the government’s position. It is a recipe for anarchy most likely followed by a pro-Russian anti-Maidan coup. The question is whether the government in Kyiv is able to see the threat.
It is no surprise then that Europe acted as if the cat got its tongue. After all, the agreement was reached right at the time when the economic sanctions against Russia were extended. At the same time, Europe was working on new programs for Ukraine within the Eastern Partnership framework. Moreover, the trial over the shooting down of the Malaysian airliner in 2014 is taking place now. The plane was filled with European citizens and the Buk missile system was delivered and operated by Russians. Europe has been going out of its way to reaching an understanding with Russia even if it means overlooking the situation in Ukraine. Therefore, will the EU consider it inappropriate to raise the issue now? Or will it deem Ukraine’s sharp turn to be a bridge to far?
The implementation of the March 11 agreement will also pose a problem for NATO and the United States. Following the pressure of its member states, the Alliance and the US decided to deploy meaningful forces in our region. It is a deterrent, indicating that defending the Eastern flank is more than just a treaty obligation. The March 11 deal would destabilize Ukraine and force NATO to review its defensive doctrine thoroughly. It is also worth mentioning that the US initially agreed to deliver massive amounts of LNG to Ukraine through Poland. Will Washington still be willing to follow through with the plan?
Finally, the March 11 deal may have negative consequences for Poland. Escalation is not the only scenario Poland fears. Federalization, partition, and anarchy of Ukraine’s political life would lead to its loss of sovereignty. It would tremendously undermine regional security. Why would Kyiv choose not to consult sudden political changes of that magnitude with like-minded countries in the region?
It appears there is a much longer list of questions. However, addressing at least the ones above will tell us what the current geopolitical direction of Kyiv is.
Witold Waszczykowski is a member of the European Parliament and Poland’s former minister of foreign affairs. He currently chairs the European Parliament’s delegation to the European Union-Ukraine Parliamentary Association Committee. The article was originally published in Polish on March 18, 2020, by Rzeczpospolita.plYou can follow him on Twitter @WaszczykowskiW
