There are two interrelated misunderstandings about these notions. Those knowledgeable of parliamentary democracy argue those notions are not in line with its best practice: a minister should be a politician in order to be able to set political benchmarks by producing public policies. Meanwhile, a technocrat is, by definition, a narrow specialist, a professional in a certain sphere that is by no means a public sphere. Therefore, it is either-or: either it’s a minister or a technocrat.

Current politicians and members of parliament see a danger in appointing professional, “technical” individuals to ministerial positions in a “technocratic government” outside of affiliation with a certain political force. In such a case, we are told, a political party of the ruling coalition would miss a chance to convince voters of its program’s (ideology’s) value for practical governance. Thus, it would miss a chance to gain trust, increase its ranking and be re-elected to the Parliament.

Generally, we are having a dilemma of politics and direct governance, the executive branch as a whole and in individual spheres of the national economy and humanitarian co-existence. On the one hand, there is a need for political leaders who are able to design a vision of shared interest regarding the development of the country as a whole, and also to identify a common vector for different interests in individual branches and public policies. There is a need for political leaders, visionaries, who set promising synthetical directions of action and manage the implementation of such policies. On the other hand, when the matter is to directly manage the policy implementation, the main merit of a chief executive is, no doubt, his or her managerial skills and professionalism. In the nearest future this dilemma will be partly addressed by the introduction of state secretaries within ministries, i.e., by dividing political and organizational functions. However, amid the current parliamentary crisis that dilemma can be solved through the appointment of a technical government.

Whatever the definition, a “technical government” only refers to the method of forming the government.

For established democracies, a classic method of appointing the government is a “political” way of forming it by means of nominating politicians from the ruling majority (including the coalition in a multiparty parliament).

If a coalition lacks internal trust between its factions, which prevents it from creating a “political” government from its members, but due to different reasons and interests (discussed in more detail below) such a need exists, the majority may create a “technical” government. In that case a non-political individual is appointed to the position of the prime minister and may select members of the government who also do not have political image and interests. A non-political government is appointed in order to avoid unwanted corrupt influences of partisan bearers of clan interests on the government and, first of all, on the prime minister.

Such a technical prime minister and such technical ministers – nominated non-politically – come to do their job until the elections, temporarily, until a possibility to form a new “partisan” government is there. It is highly desirable to make a condition: neither the prime minister nor any minister will claim a political position after his or her term is over.

Therefore, if one talks about the meaning of a technical, technocratic, professional government, the idea is only to stress its “non-political” method of making and non-political (non-partisan) future after its term of service is over.

This does not directly relate to a “technical” notion of a “technocrat” or a “professional” in the sense of a specific focus or competence in the sphere that the ministry is expected to deal with. That said, it is good if an education minister is knowledgeable about education, and a minister of economy knows economics, and a minister of health understands the medical area, and preferably they have practical managerial experience in the relevant fields. That’s what is implied today in the notion of a professional government.

Those who come forward with philippics like what-about-the-classic-political-representation and, hence, the government’s political responsibility, which would be presumably lost by the majority parties, the coalition (and the would-be opposition which, in case of a technical government, would have nobody to criticize inside the parliament for executive incompetence and governance failures) – they disregard the very special situation that is causing the induced appointment of a technical, technocratic government.

In the case of our general crisis of trust in the government and, therefore, the parliamentary crisis, we have a special, unique situation or, if you wish, non-classic circumstances in which we are forced to talk about a technical government and insist of a “non-political” method of appointing it.

The Maidan that won in Ukraine had been governed by a joint will of citizens and not by politicians, not by political and party leaders known at that time. Just remember the initial two divided maidans. During the revolution of dignity politicians had low ratings. After the Maidan the citizens were forced by the circumstances to quickly elect a legitimate power institution, the Verkhovna Rada, out of sufficiently popular individuals. They had to form a political parliamentary elite largely in a situational manner and out of situational politicians, including the new parties that did not yet have a chance to prove themselves politically.

Ukraine has suffered a vile attack by a large neighboring state that is causing the break-up of traditional economic and infrastructural ties. Part of this country’s territory has been occupied and ruined. Coupled with the ineffective economy, which contrasts with a collective belief in a new European-type country inherited from the “poperedniki” (predecessors), that situation has caused and deepened the financial and economic crisis. The war has brought to life the Minsk agreements and the international sanctions against the neighboring aggressor.

Due to the external financial assistance and the pressure of sanctions on Russia we may hope that (a) the default can be avoided and (b) the bloody conflict will end or at least will not deteriorate.

Therefore, a progressive part of political parties, the majority coalition, share values of the Maidan (dignity, independence, democracy, European choice etc.). At the same time, as far as Ukraine is concerned they do not share any particular methods of putting those general values into practice. The ruination of a “European Ukraine” majority coalition would mean that the main political guideline set by the Maidan is lost. The discord in ideological understanding of methods of political governance in accordance with the “vector of the Maidan” has been made worse amid this crisis by the desire to keep the Maidan rhetoric while also preserving the old corrupt schemes of interaction between the business-political clans. This discord does not allow meeting the conditions made by the special political, economic and military situation of the crises.

In this sense, a technical, technocratic government in its exact meaning of “here and now” is a great chance to overcome the parliamentary crisis of trust between the parties and the crisis of trust to all branches of power experienced by the citizens that are still powered by the Maidan spirit of dignity.

There are certain reasons for political parties’ fears about their alleged alienation from the political governance in case a technical government is appointed. Indeed, direct connection between politics and executive action seems to be lost. However, political forces and politicians will still keep the main thing. First, this is a demonstration of good political will to appoint such a government. In fact, this would be a government of coalition trust and, in this sense, a government of people’s trust. Second, the political leverage through the parliamentary monitoring and control over actions of the appointed executive branch will not disappear. Knowing how to use those instruments of political influence speaks about a party’s political culture level.

This is where a democratic party goes through “testing by life.” It should prove to be able to communicate openly with its voters and all citizens, to convince them of its vision of reforms and the country’s future. Nobody prevents politicians from building a really open dialogue with voters, thus showing their own openness and accountability. I mean a broad spectrum of open dialogue – from de facto civil society engagement in policymaking to integrity and openness of parties’ and politicians’ income declarations. That will be a powerful tool of letting voters know about the parties’ ability to shape the political course of reforms and develop the country.

Yevhen Bystrytsky is executive director of the International Renaissance Foundation.