Any government that is replaced after six months is a government that has failed.
For Ukraine’s people and its Western partners, especially the United States which has contributed hundreds of millions of dollars in the development of civil society, it is but another disappointment after its electorate delivered a stunning mandate for change in both presidential and parliamentary elections.
The blame is both President Volodymyr Zelensky’s and his recently fired chief of staff Andriy Bohdan, who convinced him to appoint a young cabinet of new faces who would symbolize transformative generational change.
But rather then appointing capable and proven ministers who would be required to introduce new values and administer reconstituted ministries, Bohdan prevailed over a president with no previous governing experience. He forced him to acquiesce to an outdated Soviet-type centralized governing model, which, despite electoral promises to change the method of governing, could not, in post-election expectation euphoria, escape the appearance of a continuation of the old ways. Despite positive presidential public rhetoric, Bohdan’s reputation as a fixer for ex-President Viktor Yanukovych and billionaire oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky’s lawyer, he did not refrain governing with the use of fear and threat of “kompromat” exposure, the acceptance of cronyism and blatant favoritism of backroom dealing, along with the blatant service of oligarchic conflict of interests.
From the very beginning, Zelensky’s government could be characterized as schizophrenic. To outsiders, it seemed transformative and that a new generation had ascended to the highest levels of power, but to knowledgable insiders, accept those with a self-interest in assuring that a positive ‘change’ narrative be propagated outside of Ukraine’s borders, there were numerous grave examples that even though old faces had been replaced, the old systems and power structures remained in place.
Since its independence, Ukraine’s chronic problem has always been its political leadership. Even in its post-Maidan life, following the revolution that ousted Yanukovych in 2014, it has failed to produce, develop, let alone elevate the best and brightest into its political class and governing elite who have the knowledge, ability, and experience to establish democratic institutions that would allow it to be effectively governed and managed as a modern democratic state.
With few exceptions, but constantly, but quietly confirmed by high-ranking Western officials, Ukraine’s political leadership and high-ranking ministry bureaucrats, lack the political and strategic skills to develop a comprehensive national governing strategy and implementation plan.
The problem in Ukraine is that it continually fails to attract and incorporate either domestic and foreign-born leaders into its ranks who have the experience and knowledge of Western governing mores, who could incorporate Western values and management techniques along with the needed administrative expertise and disciplines, to lead fundamental institution development and nation-building efforts.
This is a major reason why post-Soviet Ukraine has failed to “deconstruct” its Soviet-inspired governing attitudes, practice and systems, and that, in addition, why it continues to fail to introduce Western values into its governing matrix.
Though the Maidan was a revolutionary assertion of the rejection of corrupt and oligarchic inspired values by the populace, no one should be surprised that these deeply entrenched values continue to exist and assert themselves. Not one oligarch has been prosecuted or sits in jail. No one has yet been held accountable for the murders on the Maidan. So It also should not be shocking that the inspiration and the energy of the Madian of six years ago has dissipated, politicians having failed to harness and produce an idealistic and comprehensive vision that would guide Ukraine’s transformation.
Ukraine’s leadership has failed to learn and incorporate an essential dictum into its political life: It is one thing to say that one is against corruption and want change, it is yet another to articulate, develop and implement a strategic mandate to bring about this change.
However, Ukraine is not solely to blame. Failure must also be attributed to Ukraine’s western partners, who have invested hundreds of millions to develop effective governing models and in the development of an effective civil society. Over the last six years and despite good intentions, Ukraine’s western partners have failed to continuously maintain and exert pressure to appoint western orientated officials who have actual experience in working and success in implementing western governing and economic structures.
The post-Maidan world has been dominated by talk of reform. However, this rhetorical assumption proved to contain an inherent and assumptive fallacy. For even now, Ukraine and its partners still lack the understanding that Ukraine needs a philosophical transformation and a rejection of past thinking. The evidence is in, Ukraine’s solely politically inspired reformation has failed.
More specifically, there has been a failure to successfully prepare the political ground that would readily and productively accept the seeds, the values and practices of democratic principles, that when diligently planted and tended, would eventually produce the roots that would bring a yield of democratic products that would change the very appearance of Ukrainian society.
The makeup of the new government in Ukraine does not suggest that it has either the values, experience or proven inclination to transform and change how Ukraine is governed.
What is being missed is that Zelensky changed his government to re-establish and to ensure stability in a government whose ineffectiveness was clear and which no longer engendered confidence.
Simply put, a new government was formed to raise the perceived level of administrative competence of its governments’ ministers. This was totally a reactive move by the president, whose fear of falling polling numbers and the hardening impression that his government was not being governed effectively, nor producing fundamental results, retreated from his promised course while denying he was doing so. This is the basis for widespread disappointment in his decision. Nonetheless, there cannot be, and there will be no “change” in Ukraine until proven “change agents,” both domestic and foreign, are incorporated into a Ukrainian government.
All this said, Ukraine does have a record of accomplishment in its post-Maidan life.
In its quest to change and build a western and democratic orientated nation, Ukraine’s western partners tend to forget that Ukraine is nearing the end of its adolescent stage in the development of its democratic existence.
It has continually expressed its desire to join the western family. Though its politicians talk and promise much, they have yet to show the signs of a national political maturity, the ability, and discipline of delivering and fulfilling their commitments to its people and partners that will define its’ nation’s mature life. Ukraine, however, does pay its debts.
Ukraine has experienced a peaceful transition from one presidential administration to another. It has managed to stave off the military aggression of its existential enemy, Russia. It has shown continuity in its path towards Westernization. With the aid of its Western partners, it has established a semblance of stability in its macroeconomic situation. Importantly, it has proven that it has entered the democratic realm where its political leaders are held to standards of political responsibility and accountability. Ukraine’s polity is now subject, if not forced, to react to public opinion.
But is this enough? Of course not. Elections now matter in Ukraine. President Zelenskyy’s ascension to the presidency based on a slew of electoral promises does not make exempt his from future electoral wrath. To succeed, he must deliver.
Does his government have the knowledge and ability to counter Russia’s aggressive geopolitical moves and assert Ukraine’s sovereignty and hold open the prospects for peace?
Will his government make the tough decisions and show the determination to establish a rules-based economy and thwart the deleterious effects of oligarchic influence? At the same time, will his government have the courage to confront and judicially hold to account the still dominant anti-free market and anti-democratic values of oligarchism?
Will his government fulfill its promises to transform the institutions of justice, the judiciary, the prosecutors, the police?
Or will the president and his government become known as yet another group of mediocrities who were given an opportunity to transform Ukraine but failed to bring about fundamental nation-building change?
Whether he likes it or not, Zelensky’s political life and that of a free and democratic Ukrainian nation will be determined by his government’s ability to deliver on his electoral promises.
