o head the National Security and Defence Council is the most intriguing political event since the government was formed last summer. Reaching out to Donetsk’s second most powerful business group indicates just how much power has ebbed away from the president since this year’s constitutional changes. Ominously, Yushchenko’s move is rather reminiscent of the way former President Leonid Kuchma turned to the Donetsk ‘clan’ and in particular to Yanukovych to ensure his re-election in 1999, and again to survive the so-called ‘Kuchmagate’ scandal in 2000. However, incorporating Hayduk, along with other figures associated with DUI, also indicates the president has finally conceded that his Our Ukraine party cannot provide him with the political base required to counterbalance Yanukovych.
Either way, what many Orange supporters and their patrons in the West most wanted to avoid has come to pass: the Donbass has moved in toto to Kyiv. The destabilising effect of the Orange Revolution, together with the country’s parliamentary electoral system and the constitutional reform passed in late 2004, has eliminated several political heavy weights: most notably the head of Kuchma’s administration, Viktor Medvedchuk; Kuchma’s son-in-law Viktor Pinchuk, tycoon-lawmaker Hryhory Surkis and parliamentary speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn. The rivalry that existed between the regional ‘clans’ for influence in Kyiv, which was not dissimilar to a competitive multiparty system, has been replaced, for now at least, by a single pre-eminent political party. The Party of the Regions has emerged as arguably the most powerful political group since independence. Political instability and the subsequent re-alignment also have geopolitical implications. The Orange Revolution, intended to hook Ukraine into Euro-Atlantic geopolitical structures, was not followed by inducements to look Westwards and if anything has weakened Ukraine’s capacity to withstand Russian influence.
Clearly it is much too soon to judge whether Ukraine will revert to a modified version of the model of politics and business that became so entrenched during the Kuchma era or whether, as the West hopes, the re-alignment of the political system has only just begun. Yanukovych catapulted many figures from the Donbass, as well as others associated with the Kuchma era, back into key political roles in Kyiv. Domestically, the discriminatory refunding of VAT to exporters hinted that opaque relations between government and business would continue. Internationally, Yanukovych strode the world stage pouring scorn on Yushchenko’s Euro-Atlantic integration agenda. But, closer scrutiny reveals a rather more complicated picture.
Yanukovych and his team came to power in a legitimate constitutional manner and enjoy a clear democratic mandate from Ukraine’s freest election to date. That Our Ukraine has decided to represent their admittedly few voters by leaving the grand coalition can hardly be blamed on Regions. Yanukovych’s appointment of trusted associates to key government posts is only surprising following the post-Orange Revolution interregnum in which governments appeared to be in office but not in power. Yanukovych clearly understands the configuration of power not only within the country but also beyond it. Moreover he possesses the levers required to exercise that power. The government has also demonstrated fiscal responsibility and a commitment to macroeconomic stability. The economy is forecast to grow by a more-than respectable six percent this year. The government has defended, albeit after a u-turn, utility price rises to reflect higher energy costs. It has also announced its intention to reduce certain welfare benefits. Both of these measures are sure to inflict political wounds in Region’s urban heartland in the east of the country.
On the foreign policy front, Yanukovych has adopted a pragmatic approach. He understands well that a referendum on NATO accession will not be won anytime soon, with or without a ‘national debate.’ He realizes too that however attractive accession to the EU may or may not be for Ukraine, the existing member states have effectively postponed enlargement beyond south-east Europe for at least a political generation. Nor has Yanukovych been supine in the face of Moscow. Efforts to co-ordinate Ukraine’s entry into the WTO along with Russia’s is simply a sensible way of ensuring Ukraine achieves the most advantageous terms possible. Ukrainian business, significantly weakened during the Orange Revolution interregnum requires robust government support in withstanding Russian competition. Whilst much of the Ukrainian industrial economy can absorb even large increases in gas prices, it needs time in which to adapt. The fact that the latest gas deal with Russia is yet another short term agreement suggests both sides are still readying themselves for the final reckoning. Yanukovych, ideally in partnership with President Yushchenko, will play East and West against each other to secure access to both western capital markets and Russian gas.
Precisely what role Hayduk will play remains to be seen. He is as much a creature of the murky world that forged capitalism in the Donbass as is Yanukovych and his supporters. Hayduk merely broke with the unacceptable face of capitalism rather earlier than his new foes in the the Regions. However his record in both business and politics reveals a pragmatism that could stitch together the domestic and international wounds opened up by the Orange Revolution. His understanding of the industrial economy and in particular of the implications of increased gas prices could prove especially valuable. Such a role could provide Yushchenko with the means to counterbalance Yanukovych and Ukraine with the means to negotiate a path between West and East. Alternatively Hayduk might attempt to build his own political power base to rival Regions. Having been associated in the past with efforts to introduce electoral competition in the Donbass, he may well be tempted to do the same nationally. However, like Kuchma previously and Yushchenko today, he could emerge as a figure trusted by the West to steer Ukraine in a Euro-Atlantic direction only to come up against powerful resistance, destabilising the country once again. The West needs to learn the lessons of the Orange Revolution. European governments especially have a strategic interest in seeing the emergence of a stable and prosperous Ukraine that enjoys co-operative relationships with all of its neighbours. That will only be achieved if its neighbours allow Ukraine’s political system and state bureaucracy to be consolidated.Adam Swain is a lecturer in Geography at the University of Nottingham, UK.
