After more than three decades in the shadow of the Chornobyl catastrophe — the world’s worst nuclear energy-related disaster — Ukrainians continue to live with nuclear power plants as part of their country’s landscape. A whopping 15 reactors power their towns and cities, while Ukraine’s total installed capacity makes it the seventh-largest nuclear nation in the world today.
At the same time, experts are still studying the cancerous, continent-spanning impact of the 1986 meltdown, which took place just outside the small town of Prypyat, some 150 kilometers north of Kyiv, and belched billions of radioactive particles into the wind.
In Ukraine alone, nearly two million people are estimated to have been victims in some way of the disaster, caused by cost-cutting and negligence. The Ukrainian government pays the price today: in compensation to the families of at least 35,000 people who died of Chornobyl related cancers. Across Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, fatality estimates reach into the hundreds of thousands.
Only two nuclear energy-related disasters have been rated at the maximum severity available on the International Nuclear Event Scale: the Chornobyl explosion, and the meltdowns that shook Japan and the world during the 2011 Fukushima disaster. There, some 170,000 evacuees still cannot return to their irradiated homes in the exclusion zone.
Today in Ukraine, difficult questions linger. Have the painful lessons of Chornobyl and Fukushima been learned, and can a country struggling with war, corruption and political turmoil guarantee the safety of its nuclear infrastructure?
Safety, security lacking
These days, at least 55 percent of all Ukrainian electricity comes from its 15 fission reactors, operating at four different nuclear power plants, or NPPs, around the country. They are all operated by the state-owned National Nuclear Energy Generating Company of Ukraine, widely known as Energoatom.
These nuclear reactors in Ukraine are still not as safe and secure as they could be. They are vulnerable to external shocks, internal sabotage, cybersecurity threats and terrorism, according to shortcomings identified in expert assessments.
Ukraine scored poorly in a 2018 security index published by the Nuclear Threat Initiative organization, scoring 70 out of 100 points, ranking it 30th out of the 45 countries indexed.
The most recent overall safety assessment of all Ukrainian NPPs, completed in 2010 by the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, and the European Commission, found that Ukrainian plants were non-compliant with 22 out of 194 vital safety requirements. Weak areas included the “consideration of severe accidents, NPP seismic resistance, completeness of deterministic safety analysis, and post-accident monitoring.”
The National Ecological Center of Ukraine, or NECU, and other nongovernmental organizations here warn that nine Ukrainian nuclear reactors are currently operating beyond their safe lifespan, on the basis of 10-year lifetime extension permits granted following an assessment they have labelled as “deeply flawed.”
And now, in Khmelnytsky Oblast, scientists, experts and campaigners are starting to raise their voices in protest at the latest and perhaps most serious concern.
Experts say that two new reactors which are planned to go into operation there have serious, known safety flaws and do not meet modern safety standards, widely adopted following lessons learned from the Fukushima disaster in Japan eight years ago.
The nuclear power plant just outside Khmelnytsky, a city of 265,000 people located 300 kilometers southwest of Kyiv, wants to double its reactor count with two additional atomic piles installed at facilities that critics argue have been neglected for 29 years, since a Soviet moratorium on the construction of new nuclear plants after the Chornobyl catastrophe.
Experts studying Ukrainian assessments carried out into the Khmelnytsky expansion project — which is in its planning stage — are not impressed so far. They are not happy about the draft law on its implementation; the chosen Russian-supplied reactors; insufficient impact and safety assessments; unclear plans for nuclear waste disposal and unknown safeguards against various threats. Unanswered questions are everywhere.
During the feasibility and planning stage for any new reactor projects, Ukraine is obliged under the 1991 Espoo Convention to carry out detailed assessments and also consult with nearby countries. In the case of the proposed third and fourth reactors at the Khmelnytsky NPP, Ukraine is supposed to work with Hungary, Poland, Belarus, Romania, Moldova, Austria and Slovakia.
But those consultations have had mixed results, with insiders telling the Kyiv Post that the documents shared so far have lacked important information. Nearly 100 vital questions remain unanswered, correspondence has gone ignored, and the information provided is largely insufficient.
The result is that some experts say they are currently unconvinced that the KhNPP 3&4 project is feasible, secure or safe.
Units for a third and fourth reactor at the KhNPP have been left abandoned and exposed to the elements for years.
Khmelnytsky expansion
On May 16, a senior official with an Austrian government ministry taking part in talks on the Khmelnytsky project, contacted the Kyiv Post to express concern over its feasibility and safety. The official asked not to be named for fear of jeopardizing talks with Ukrainian counterparts, but shared an official report with the Kyiv Post that makes for alarming reading.
The 87-page report from Austria’s environment agency was commissioned by the country’s Federal Ministry of Sustainability and Tourism. Its lead authors are two Austrian scientists — Oda Becker, a physicist specializing in nuclear safety, and Gabriele Mraz, an expert on nuclear policy.
A major complaint is that Energoatom’s environmental impact assessments are unconvincing. Safety and security are insufficiently addressed, waste disposal is barely mentioned and plans to mitigate risks are severely lacking in detail.
And Energoatom’s plan to simply “continue” construction of facilities that would house KhNPP 3&4 is unthinkable, because the partially-finished constructions have been largely abandoned for nearly three decades and are no longer suitable, the report’s authors said.
“I was surprised that (KhNPP 3&4) was restarted…the site is in ruins… nothing has been done to protect the construction and the conditions there,” the official said.
The official asked how anyone can “think of using this ruin to build a nuclear power plant,” considering that the site and components had been exposed to ice, snow and rain over the years.
The experts also voiced concerns over the shady choice of supplier for the two new reactors.
Energoatom has selected a type of Russian-built reactor from the Czech-based (but ultimately Russian-owned) company Škoda JS. The reactor is cheap and fits within the existing, partially abandoned buildings, but features a number of known safety deficiencies, according to experts.
“They wanted a cheaper reactor — but this reactor is not considered good enough and it lacks safety features that have become required after what we learned since Fukushima,” the official said.
The Kyiv Post repeatedly tried to speak with Energoatom about its plans for the Khmelnytsky NPP, but the agency was uncooperative. Ultimately, Energoatom did not provide information or answer questions by deadline.
Yuri Nedashkovsky, president of Energoatom, tours the Khmelnytsky nuclear power plant with staff on Nov. 20, 2017. The state-owned company has not responded to questions from the Kyiv Post. (UNIAN)
Unanswered questions
In the report from Vienna seen by the Kyiv Post, the Austrian environment agency poses at least 89 separate questions to Energoatom which it said had so far gone unanswered. Some questions are highly technical, while others address issues of basic safety and security. The authors state that the Ukrainian side has not responded to many questions, or have provided materials that are insufficient and do not address their concerns.
Questions relating to the proposed choice of a reactor, a VVER‑1000/V‑320, and its safety deficiencies, are raised repeatedly. It states that the Ukrainian side has not sufficiently demonstrated how it will cope with any of the “known safety issues” of the reactors.
“The improved VVER‑1000/V‑392B (with passive safety systems) was selected and approved in 2008… The VVER1000/V‑320 design on the contrary does not comply with modern safety standards,” states the report. “It is very important to understand how units three and four will overcome the various safety shortcomings of the chosen reactor… Documents provided do not give any detailed description of safety relevant systems,” reads another passage.
“The site evaluation is not complying with current international requirements,” the report continues, referencing the site where “equipment and some 20,000 components” have been abandoned and exposed to the elements.
Experts say that potential seismic hazards need to be evaluated and highlight that the site for KhNPP 3&4 is located in a tornado hazardous area. “External hazards have to be removed or minimized as far as reasonably practical, but information as to whether these recommendations have been applied has not been provided,” the authors continue.
“The effects of third parties (terrorist attacks or acts of sabotage) can have a considerable impact on nuclear facilities… Nevertheless, they are not mentioned in the documents… and such events have not been addressed,” the experts state, adding that the site’s concrete walls are not thick enough to withstand a terrorist attack or deliberate plane crash.
With pages of analysis, as well as dozens of questions and recommendations, the Austrian experts pick apart documents provided by Ukraine which, they argue, fail to demonstrate that the proposed project is safe and feasible.
On June 13, Ukraine was asked to attend a public hearing in Vienna to discuss the Khmelnytsky NPP. Energoatom did not show up, according to officials in attendance.
Russian ties
It was revealed on Jan. 24 that Škoda JS had been chosen, without an open and competitive tender, for the $2.5 billion expansion project at Khmelnytsky NPP, despite other options such as companies from Korea, the U.S. and France.
Bosses at the Khmelnitsky nuclear power plant justified the choice of Škoda JS, saying it was mainly chosen on the basis of low costs. Some experts have said the $2.5 billion price tag for KhNPP 3&4 is an underestimate and warn of cost-cutting.
Škoda JS is a Czech subsidiary of Netherlands-registered OMZ BV, which appears to be a front for the Russian company United Machine Building Plant, in turn owned by Russia’s state-owned Gazprombank, a circumstance that security experts find troubling.
“I have serious concerns about the decision to award a nuclear power plant contract… to a company whose beneficial owner is Gazprombank,” said Michael Carpenter, a Ukraine and Russia expert, and head of the Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement.
“That’s a huge red flag, and a massive vulnerability for Ukraine that opens the door to Russia’s ‘hybrid’ influence. This contract would give Russia enormous leverage over Ukraine since Gazprombank is controlled by the Kremlin.”
Carpenter added that the “non-competitive and hastily concluded” deal must be reviewed carefully by the government and Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies.
Poroshenko’s promotion
An April 4 decree this year from then-President Petro Poroshenko instructed the Cabinet of Ministers to “immediately submit” a bill to the Verkhovna Rada on the placement, design and construction for KhNPP 3&4. With his decree, Poroshenko accelerated the project. A draft law is now making its way through committees of Ukraine’s parliament.
It would be a violation of international conventions to move into the project phase before consultations had properly taken place, let alone been completed.
“Trans-boundary consultations with at least Austria are not finished yet — so if the draft law on the placement and construction is approved now, before finalized consultations, it will be a breach by Ukraine of international law, namely of the Espoo Convention,” said Iryna Holovko, head of energy campaigns at the Centre for Environmental Initiatives in Kyiv. “This is a chance for our ministers to still do the right thing and stop this dubious project.”
Holovko summed up the problems this way: “Unfinished trans-boundary consultations with European Union countries, the pro-Russian reactor supplier, unknown reactor safety features and high risks of doubling or tripling the project price tag — all of these make it clear that the draft law should not be approved,” she added.
Holovko said that it’s not only Austria and other countries not getting the information they need, Ukrainians are also being kept in the dark by Energoatom.
“This information is also not available here in Ukraine — neither for the public nor for decision-makers.”
Khmelnytsky talks raise serious questions but few answers
Exposed and derelict units at the Khmelnytsky NPP, where a further two reactors are to be added, in spite of safety fears. (KhNPP)
Two reports on the planned expansion of the Khmelnytsky nuclear power plant, authored by Austrian environment agency experts, raise serious concerns while offering few answers to important questions.
The first report, shared with the Kyiv Post in May, posed at least 89 separate questions to project planners in Ukraine that its authors say are vital to the safety, security and feasibility of the project.
A second report, shared on July 16, reviews consultations that took place with Ukraine at a public hearing in Vienna on June 13. Frustrated with the talks, Austrian experts have now called for additional high-level talks to take place under relevant bilateral agreements.
Ukraine has taken steps to provide more information on the proposed third and fourth reactor units at the Khmelnytsky nuclear power plant (KhNPP 3&4) and answer the concerns raised in Vienna, but many vital issues remain unaddressed.
“Many questions remain unanswered because Energoatom (Ukraine’s state-owned nuclear energy company) has no answers to them,” said Iryna Holovko, head of energy campaigns at the Centre for Environmental Initiatives in Kyiv.
Site evaluations at KhNPP 3&4 have not complied with modern, international standards, states the second report. During the June 13 consultation in Vienna it also became clear to experts that site evaluations had not been performed according to the current safety standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA.
Old survey data is also being used by Energoatom, and it cannot prove that the structures onsite are fit for the continual, safe operation of KhNPP 3&4.
The experts also state in their report that the Fukushima disaster in March 2011 led to significantly increased safety requirements for all NPPs and nuclear reactors, but there is “no convincing evidence that every reasonably practical safety improvement has been made” in the case of KhNPP 3&4.
Concerns were again raised over the Russian-made V‑320 model of nuclear reactor, chosen by Energoatom over its improved variants, such as the V‑392B, which includes “safety systems that provide a significant safety level increase, including passive safety systems.”
The V‑320 model, in comparison, “does not comply with modern safety standards”.
Consultations in Vienna and the subsequent report also highlight that some Ukrainian NPPs could be badly prepared for a terrorist attack, cyber-attack or a plane crash.
“The Ukrainian regulator does not require the protection of KhNPP 3&4 against an intentional crash of a commercial aircraft… this does not meet the WENRA (Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Association) requirements for new NPPs.”
According to Ukrainian regulations, KhNPP 3&4 will only be designed to withstand the crash of a light aircraft (such as a Cessna), a measure which is not in compliance with current international standards for new NPPs.
