Editor’s Note: The following are remarks to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Kyiv on July 3 by Atlantic Council fellow and former NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow.
First of all, may I thank NATO Parliamentary Assembly for organizing this 95th Rose-Roth seminar in Kyiv – and for inviting me to speak. As a former NATO Deputy Secretary General and veteran of many NPA events, it is a pleasure to be with you once again – all the more so as we celebrate the 20th anniversary of the NATO-Ukraine Charter.
This seminar on the Black Sea addresses an important topic to Ukraine, to the region, and to NATO.
Ultimately, the Black Sea is the southeastern frontier of the Alliance. It lies at the crossroads between Europe, Asia and the Middle East. It is a corridor for transportation and commerce. And it is a region sprinkled with frozen conflicts, unrecognized “states” and transnational criminal groups.
And, let’s not forget, the Black Sea is where Russia’s aggression against Ukraine began. It is here where Putin decided to throw away the international rule book. It is here where Russia began to fundamentally challenge international law and the sovereignty of its neighbors by illegally annexing Crimea, and then going on to destabilize the East of Ukraine – an undeclared war that continues to this day.
Following Crimea’s illegal annexation, the situation of the local population on the peninsula has only deteriorated. This is especially true of the Ukrainian minority and the indigenous Crimean Tatars. The latter have experienced severe intimidation and persecution, with reports of abductions, un-investigated crimes against prominent members of their community, and the persecution of cultural organizations. Many have had to flee the peninsula as a result.
Although the international community has refused to recognize Russia’s attempted annexation of Crimea, Russia has also seized control of essential energy infrastructure and resources. This includes two billion cubic meters of Ukrainian natural gas storage and access to undersea hydrocarbon resources in the Black Sea, potentially worth trillions of dollars.
This has dealt a severe blow to Ukraine’s ambitions to become energy independent. And it has weakened the energy security of several other Black Sea states, seriously undermining our efforts to have energy freely developed and transported.
So for all these reasons, the region should be of critical and serious concern – not just to Ukraine and the Black Sea States, but to NATO as well.
For quite some time, however, the Black Sea has been a backwater from the point of view of the West and members of the Alliance.
As the keeper of the Straits and the Montreux convention – and given its economic interests in Russian gas and trade – Turkey has sometimes been reluctant to work closely with the other littoral states, including Ukraine and fellow NATO members Bulgaria and Romania. Meanwhile, other allies were preoccupied with issues closer to their own borders.
For Russia, however, the Black Sea has never been a backwater. Historically and to this day, the Black Sea is a springboard for Russia’s efforts to extend its reach and influence far beyond its borders.
Today, it is in many ways the nexus of Russia’s strategy aimed at reestablishing hegemony over its southern neighborhood – a strategy based on disruption and destabilization rather than mutually beneficial cooperation.
Given the political, economic and human rights implications of Russia’s destabilizing policies, all NATO Allies are stakeholders in the security of the Black Sea region.
Since its illegal annexation of Crimea, Russia has undertaken a major militarization of the occupied peninsula. It has significantly upgraded and enlarged the Black Sea fleet with new submarines and warships armed with long-range cruise missiles.
It has deployed advanced air defenses (such as the S-400) and coastal anti-ship defenses, and Russia is rumored to be planning the reintroduction of nuclear weapons and dual-capable delivery systems like the Iskander missile complex that can reach NATO territory (and, of course, Ukraine).
Occupied Crimea has become a bastion for the Russians’ ‘anti-access and area denial’ – or A2/AD – capabilities that provide the Russians the potential to impede the movement of regional forces and disrupt NATO efforts to reinforce Allies’ defenses.
At the same time, the Kremlin still sponsors and orchestrates the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, with casualties and ceasefire violations reported on a daily basis, largely caused by Russian-led forces.
While it nominally claims to support the Minsk accords, Russia has not fulfilled its obligations as a Minsk signatory – including ending the violence, withdrawing heavy weapons and removing the thousands of Russian soldiers that remain in the Donbas in overall command of military operations. (Removing their insignias or pretending they’re on vacation doesn’t make the troops any less Russian.)
As a result of Russia’s intransigence, the diplomatic process has reached a standstill, despite the efforts of Ukraine, Germany and France within the so-called Normandy Format.
And we should not forget that Russia is still fostering tensions and instability in the wider region – including by perpetuating the ‘frozen’ conflicts in NATO partner countries Georgia and Moldova, where Moscow continues to arm and sustain its proxies in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria.
Altogether this creates a loop of instability around the Black Sea that threatens to prolong insecurity throughout the region and prevent countries such as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia from pursuing their aspirations to integrate with Europe.
The question is of course, how should the West respond going forward?
Since Russia launched its aggression in 2014, NATO has implemented a series of measures to reassure its eastern Allies and bolster deterrence along the Alliance’s eastern flank. These included more frequent exercises and rotational deployments by Allied air and ground forces, increased AWACS surveillance flights, and the intensification of NATO maritime patrols in the Black Sea.
As part of the decisions adopted at the Warsaw Summit in 2016, NATO is delivering the biggest reinforcement of its defense and deterrence posture in a generation – four battalion-size battlegroups in the Baltics and Poland and, on top of that, a tailored forward NATO presence in the Black Sea region, including a multinational brigade in Romania.
And despite early concerns about the direction of the Trump administration, the US 2018 defense budget includes an increase of more than one billion US dollars for the European Deterrence Initiative – a sign of the continued US commitment to European defense and security.
Likewise, it was encouraging to hear President Trump unequivocally commit to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as he did in early June, after missing the opportunity to do so at the May 25 NATO mini-Summit in Brussels.
Although these are all positive steps, there are still some significant gaps in NATO’s deterrence posture in Europe – including gaps in maritime presence and insufficient air and theater missile defense. Russia is exploiting those gaps.
Also, we need to recognize that Russia’s strategy in the Black Sea is not done in isolation. It is part of a broader strategy to assert Russian power from the Arctic to Syria, with a view to weakening and challenging NATO’s unity and undermining our resolve.
To meet this challenge, our approach must be equally comprehensive and broad. In this regard, let me highlight five elements that the Western alliance must continue to address going forward:
We must continue to strengthen our capabilities and collective security. To this end, we need to invest more in our own defense. While his tone may have been harsh, President Trump was right to challenge allies to live up their pledge to increase defense spending toward the 2% of GDP target during his May visit to Brussels. Indeed, his predecessors have all insisted on the same thing. What’s different is that most European states seem to have finally gotten the message, and have plans to increase their defense budgets over the coming years.
Along with spending more money on defense, Allies need to ensure the highest levels of interoperability – the ability of their militaries to cooperate against common threats. Interoperability is an essential consideration for governments buying new equipment and military platforms. Cooperation between Allies – especially between our Black Sea Allies Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, and involving the United States – will be key to meeting the security challenges we face. But partners like Ukraine should be involved as well.
NATO needs to consider a more persistent military presence in the Black Sea region, especially when it comes to maritime capabilities. This means building a presence that is robust and persistent, but defensive and non-permanent, fully in compliance with the Montreux Convention.
NATO cannot just circle the wagons and look after its own members’ security. Allies also need to bolster the capabilities of Russia’s neighbors, like Ukraine and Georgia, who are threatened by Moscow. Since 2014, NATO has expanded its assistance through the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package and Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine, and it has deployed a team of resident defense advisors to each country. But these efforts are relatively under-resourced in comparison to European Union efforts in the police and judicial sectors, and it’s time that they be expanded, including a greater focus on countering cyber and other hybrid threats.
NATO should maintain its Open Door policy. While the issue of NATO membership for Ukraine is a delicate question and not on the immediate agenda, Allies should not rule this out in the medium and long term – both as a matter of principle and because the freedom to choose one’s security arrangements is enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, a document that Russia helped write.
In fact, the best answer to Russia’s aggression would be a strong, secure and economically prosperous Ukraine. For this, I’d like to leave you with three concrete steps that I think are absolutely necessary if we are to help Ukraine succeed:
While Ukrainians bear the ultimate responsibility for their own destiny, Europe needs to step-up its support for Ukraine’s reforms. Critical decisions are needed in the coming months on judicial reform, anti-corruption courts, pension reform and land market privatization, all areas where the European Union can help. In this regard, Europe should consider new ways of integrating Ukraine with the EU looking beyond the Association Agreement, as well as supporting it financially and helping rebuild its war-torn East.
Washington, for its part, needs to step up its own support by giving the Ukrainians the tools to defend themselves from Russian aggression and thus deter further attacks. This means providing Ukraine with a broader range of defensive weapons to better protect the forces along the line of contact, and to raise the costs to Russia of its daily aggression in Eastern Ukraine. The goal of additional assistance is not to promote a military solution, but to convince Moscow to accept a political settlement that restores Ukrainian sovereignty over the Donbas.
Toward that end, Europe and the United States need to breathe new life into the negotiating process. The Minsk process is clearly not delivering on its intended goal, and the fighting in the East has continued despite multiple ceasefires. In fact, the violence has intensified since the beginning of the year, as Russian and proxy forces violate the Minsk ceasefire on a daily basis with almost complete impunity, raining down artillery and rocket attacks and inflicting significant civilian casualties. A stronger US diplomatic role (to include the possible appointment of a special envoy), working hand-in-hand with Kyiv, Berlin and Paris, is needed to secure a lasting ceasefire and full implementation of the Minsk agreements.
Implementing Minsk, and restoring Ukrainian sovereignty over the occupied territories in the East, must remain the precondition for normalization of relations with Moscow and for any easing of the economic sanctions. In fact, Europe and the United States should be prepared to tighten sanctions further if Moscow continues to block a solution.
Thank you for your attention and thanks, once again, for the opportunity to address this seminar. I know that meetings of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly are always the venue for lively debates, and I look forward to answering your questions.
