When in early March the Turkish-backed Syrian opposition lost control of the strategic highway M4/M5 in eastern Idlib, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey had to go cap in hand to Moscow.
While the Turkish forces did inflict a devastating strike in retaliation for the scores of Turk-ish troops killed during the Russian-Syrian offensive, Erdogan eventually had to ask for a cease-fire.
Erdogan went personally for talks. He didn’t go to Washington, or Brussels, or Geneva. He had to go to Moscow — and, as it was reported, Kremlin master Vladimir Putin did not miss a chance to humiliate the sultan by forcing him to wait for the reception.
Erdogan had to bite the bullet of the tactical loss in Idlib. And he persuaded Putin into a yet another fragile cease-fire, likely just a lull before the Russian-backed Syrian regime’s new offensive on the last rebel-held enclave.
It was yet another sign that the Kremlin has conclusively cemented itself as a principal power broker in this decade-long multisided war that has claimed at least 380,000 lives. As time goes by, the fate of the devastated nation falls deeper and deeper into the hands of Putin — especially when it comes to Idlib, where at least 3 million impoverished civilians are trapped.
The Kremlin, which cares little about the price of achieving its goals in Syria, is acting boldly and decisively in Idlib.
It openly challenges the West’s scarce military presence in Syria, it enjoys being unpunished for its indiscriminate bombing of civilians, it brings its newest weapons for testing, and it continues making big plans for a post-war Syria.
Meanwhile, the West — leaderless, falling short of resolve, and busy dealing with the coronavirus paralysis — is rapidly losing its active role, leaving it more for the Russia-Iran-Turkey triangle.
Training ground
The latest of Russia’s numerous stings towards the Western military presence in the region occurred as recently as April 20, when the U.S. 6th Fleet reported that a P‑8A reconnaissance jet was intercepted by a Russian Sukhoi Su‑35 fighter off the coast of Syria.
According to the U. S. Navy, the Russian aircraft conducted a “high-speed, high-powered maneuver that decreased aircraft separation to within 25 feet, directly in front of the P‑8A, exposing the U.S. aircraft to wake turbulence and jet exhaust.”
The Russian military described this a “quick reaction” against an “air target” approaching the Russian airbase in Hmeymim in east Syria, leaving the American side to call upon Russians to fly safely and show more professionalism.
This was just a new account in a long list of Russian force’s bold brushes against U.S. forces overseas.
In Syria, Russian forces are encouraged to act particularly bold to challenge the Western military presence and resolve — and also to test their advanced weapons and gain valuable experience in modern warfare.
And this is what has been happening since day one of Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015.
A member of the Russian military police and Syrian government forces patrol near the village al-Hamidia in the Syrian Golan Heights on August 14, 2018. (AFP)
“Russia is gaining significant amounts of combat experience for its officers and soldiers in Syria,” as Ben Hodges, the former U. S. Army Europe commanding general, told the Kyiv Post.
“They have been able to employ nearly all of their weapon systems, including missile launches from submarines, aircraft, and other vessels. They’ve also gotten a lot of experience with drones, both in terms of employing their own and in learning how to counter the very effective Turkish systems.”
Up to 60,000 Russian troops, mainly air force personnel, military police, and special task units, had been deployed to Syria for the sake of saving the regime of President Bashar al-Assad from being dethroned in the civil war.
The figure does not include hundreds, if not thousands, of mercenaries deployed with the notorious Wagner Group to fight for control over profitable resource deposits for Putin’s circuit.
The intervention that changed the course of war in the regime’s favor saw Russia broadly applying under actual combat many of its most advanced weapons, such as its cruise missiles Kalibr and Kh‑101, as well as its 4++ generation fighters Sukhoi Su‑35 (NATO reporting name Flanker-E).
Upon many reports, the Syrian war also saw Russia making steps in mastering robotized ground combat vehicles, as well as a reported deployment of experimental Sukhoi Su‑57 jets — Russia’s first word in the industry of most advanced 5th generation fighters.
Official reports also suggest that Russia sent its memorable tank T‑14 Armata for combat testing in Syria, although many analysts doubt this was a case.
“The Russian deployments in Syria are also part of their arms industry marketing effort,” Hodges also added.
“To put on display for their potential customers all that Russia has to offer.”
However, it should be noted that Russia is still very far from being an absolute power in the Syrian battlefields.
Turkey, with its fast-growing progress in using its killer drone swarms in action, demonstrated impressive results in destroying Syrian armor and even Russian Pantzir air defense systems during the February-March offensive in Idlib, as Hodges said.
Lack of interest
As stated in the March cease-fire deal in Idlib, Russian forces continue patrolling the strategic M4 highway leading across the whole of North Syria to Iraq, cooperating very reluctantly with Turkish forces.
Instead of that, the Russian contingent continues rushing in and out across the regime-controlled territory and beyond as an active dealmaker and enforcer.
For instance, on April 2, Russian troops intervened in a spark of fighting between pro-Assad and Kurdish forces in the city Quamishli in Syria’s northeast. According to the Washington-based Institute of the Study of War, “the Russian unit intervened to de-escalate the situation and negotiate with (Kurds).”
Or, on April 12, it became known that nearly 400 former opposition fighters from the southern province of al-Quneitra were recruited to fight alongside with Russia’s Wagner mercenaries for General Khalifa Haftar, the Russian-backed warlord fighting the internationally recognized government of Libya.
The Institute of the Study of War considers these actions as Russia “asserting influence” and “leverage” in Syria and beyond.
Meanwhile, the Western involvement in the recent months appears to be nearly the lowest ever, especially in contrast to the active role of U.S. — and French-led coalitions that used to help inflict a deadly blow to the Islamic State.
After the withdrawal of much of its forces in late 2019 under the order of President Donald J. Trump, the U.S. currently have nearly 500 troops involved mostly in patrolling oil fields in Syria’s east.
The military assistance of Kurds, decried and terminated by Trump also in late 2019, has never been reinstated.
The European nations switched to a more passive role in Syria, except for anti-regime sanctions, although this remains a painful problem for the Assad dynasty.
As numerous observers note, the general vacuum of leadership, interest, and resolve in the West continues reshaping the power balance in Syria — and Russia is naturally doing its very best in gaining its boost.
Russian troops on patrol with Turkish forces in the countryside of the town of Darbasiyah in Syria’s northeastern Hasakeh province on the border with Turkey, raise a national flag atop an armoured personnel carrier on Nov. 1, 2019. (AFP)
“I don’t think we can say the West has absolutely weaseled out of the Syrian matters,” said Iliya Kusa, an international policy expert with Kyiv-based Ukrainian Institute for the Future.
“It is still a player, but its influence somewhat decreased when it became clear that they can’t win this war. Besides, the interests of Western nations have changed… The U. S. administration, as I believe, has no understanding of America’s long-term interests in Syria. As Trump said, ‘we need oil, so we kind of stay in Syria,’ and this shows that (the Trump administration) has no strategic goals there. Therefore, they have not played a very active role in Syria for the last several years.”
Once again, on April 22, Russia had talks on the future of the Idlib cease-fire. And it was talking only to Turkey and Iran, the only principal decision-makers in the region.
Few still have any hopes that the last rebel stronghold will not be stormed again in the near future, despite Turkish protection.
Another reason behind that could be the thing that effectively paralyzed much of the world for months and drew the focus off the embattled Middle Eastern nation — the coronavirus pandemic.
“The coronavirus has given Assad the perfect opportunity,” as Dania Koleilat Khatib, a U.S.-Arab relations expert at the American University of Beirut.
“He started to accelerate his attempts on Idlib as news of the outbreak in Europe started emerging. Now that Europe and the U.S. are at the center of the virus crisis, Assad can have a free hand.
“Russia may be encouraged to take a step further and seek to bridge the differences between the three lead actors in the Syrian conflict. If it succeeds in doing so, it will have a much better bargaining position with the West and will have the final word in deciding on the future of Syria.”
