After a torrent of revelations from Western intelligence and media on Jan. 9, it is growing ever clearer that Ukraine International Airlines flight PS752 was not downed by engine failure.
Rather, on Jan. 8, Iran most likely shot the Boeing 737-800 down with a missile — an explanation that seemed nearly inconceivable two days ago.
The United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom have also stated that their intelligence data suggests the passenger jet was mistakenly targeted by an Iranian missile system known as SA-15 or Tor-M1. All 176 people on board died as a result.
The statements confirmed long-standing speculation in social media based upon images that purported to show missile debris near the crash site.
A video allegedly showing the plane being shot down was published online on Jan. 9. The New York Times and Bellingcat proved that it was authentic.
Iran has strongly denied shooting down the plane and called this narrative “psychological warfare.”
However, a team of Ukrainian aviation experts sent to Tehran to take part in investigating the crash considers it one of several most likely explanations for the catastrophe.
The downing of PS752 has brought public attention to the missile system that likely targeted the plane. It has also raised questions about how a military-grade weapon could end up shooting down a plane just kilometers from a busy civilian airport.
The Kyiv Post explains what a Tor missile system is, where it comes from, and why it may have brought down PS752 in the first air disaster of the new decade.
Russian-produced, internationally used
The family of short-range surface-to-air missile systems Tor (NATO reporting name SA-15 Gauntlet) was developed by the Soviet Union in the 1980s. The systems are intended to target aerial vehicles and incoming cruise missiles at low and medium altitudes in any weather conditions.
Today, nearly a dozen nations — such as Russia, China, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Venezuela, Greece, Egypt, Iran, Cyprus, and Ukraine — operate these systems.
The Tor-M1, the modernized version of the weapons family, entered into service as early as 1991. Russia still produces and exports it. Tor-M1 is considerably more accurate and can engage two targets simultaneously thanks to its second fire control channel.
Tor-M1 is a fully-mobile, self-propelled system that includes a target locator, a control station, a computing center and a launcher. It is operated by a 3-person crew. It carries up to eight 9М331 missiles that can gain a speed ranging from 2,500 to 2,900 kilometers per hour — more than twice the speed of sound.
The system is able to detect and hit moving aerial targets, including those concealed from radars via stealth, at altitudes of up to 12 kilometers.
The missile’s warhead detonates upon reaching its target, bombarding it with shrapnel fragments.
According to the system’s manufacturers, Tor-M1’s probability of successfully targeting a McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle fighter jet ranges from 26 to 75 percent. When targeting an AGM-86 cruise missile its success rate is between 45 and 99 percent. For a Bell AH-1 Cobra helicopter, it is between 50 and 98 percent.
Most importantly, the Tor systems are designed to be operated either manually or in automatic mode. In the latter case, the system constantly scans the operational airspace and automatically targets all objects not recognized as friendly via a “friend or foe” radar-based identification system.
Interestingly, despite being actively operated around the world for nearly three decades, the Tor systems have never been confirmed as engaged in actual, full-fledged combat.
According to the Military Balance 2019 handbook by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a British-based defense think tank, Iran currently has at least 29 Russian-produced Tor-M1 units. They are known to be operated exclusively by the air force component of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iran’s elite standalone military branch driven by Islamist ideology.
The Tor-M1 anti-aircraft defense system is displayed during an annual military parade, which marks Iran’s eight-year war with Iraq, in Tehran on September 22, 2009. (AFP)
Takeaways
If confirmed as a shootdown, the Jan. 8 tragedy will be yet another air defense accident involving Tor systems in Iran.
Back in August 2010, an Iranian Air Force F-4 Phantom fighter mistakenly entered a 20-kilometer no-fly zone around the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, which was being launched at the time and guarded by the Iranian Armed Forces on high alert.
Reportedly due to miscommunication between Iranian command and control components, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Tor-M1 units misinterpreted the friendly jet as a hostile target and effectively downed it. Iranian pilots managed to eject and survive the incident.
This precedent and the Tor-M1’s technical specifications offer a view of what may have happened in the sky over Tehran early on Jan. 8.
As in the Iranian fighter jet’s 2010 downing, a Tor-M1 unit could have mistakenly targeted the Ukrainian airliner after failing to identify it as a civilian flying object — particularly if the missile system was operating in automatic mode.
Moreover, that general risk could have been exacerbated by soaring tensions between the United States and Iran. Just hours earlier, Tehran had launched a missile assault against two bases used by the U.S. military in Iraq. An American counter-strike was likely expected.
Expert view
Glen Grant, a retired British Army colonel who is currently a security expert with the Ukranian Institute for the Future think tank, suggests that numerous factors precipitated the disaster over Tehran.
“Air defense is the most technical and academic subject in defense by a long way,” he told the Kyiv Post. “Medium- and high-level air defense is rarely commanded by those who are (near the top of the) command chain for battle — and this brings multiple problems. They are often not completely up to date with the battle flow.”
Identification is also a serious issue, he says.
“To make (identification) work effectively, it has to be in radars, planes, missiles, drones, and launchers. This costs millions, and probably only the U.S. can afford to do it properly,” Grant says. “So if not done or the rules of exclusion are not followed properly, then everything becomes an enemy to the missile — unless you can identify it by sight and turn the missile off.”
At night, this is not possible. In those cases, one needs very strict command and control, he added.
Human nature can also cause problems.
“There is always a danger of (new) conscripts using air defense or any part of the system,” Grant says. “This is because it needs maturity, intelligence, technical skill, and battlefield knowledge. Only a professional army or volunteer reserves with ability can deliver that.
“Then any system that can work automatically is always a danger if the crew does not fully understand the merits and limitations of that ability. They can turn it on whilst they go out for a smoke for example.”
How could this have played out in Iran?
“It could be the night shift taking over and still frightened after the missile attack — or just plain stupidity,” Grant says.
