More than 1,000 years after the Christianization of Kyivan Rus in 988, an internationally recognized independent Orthodox Church emerged in Ukraine on Jan. 6.
This is expected to reduce Moscow’s influence on religious matters in Kyiv as Russia continues waging its war against Ukraine. The Russian Orthodox Church’s Ukrainian branch has been criticized as a tool of the Kremlin, although it denies the accusations, and some representatives of the branch have supported Russian proxies in the Donbas.
There are concerns, however, that the Orthodox Church of Ukraine could become a copy of the Russian church, turning into a political tool ahead of the March 31 presidential election rather than a neutral moral authority. The boundaries between church and state in Ukraine have become a sensitive issue.
President Petro Poroshenko has denied the accusations of violating the constitutional principle of separation between church and state, saying that the Orthodox Church of Ukraine would be independent from the government and that the rights of other religious groups would be respected.
According to skeptics, the new church is also an easy way to shift public attention away from other issues – such as reforms, corruption and the economic situation.
Representatives of two unrecognized churches – the Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church – and of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Ukrainian branch on Dec. 15 set up the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.
They also elected Epiphanius from the Kyiv Patriarchate as metropolitan of Kyiv and the head of the new church. Epiphanius is seen as the right-hand man of Patriarch Filaret, who was the head of the now dissolved Kyiv Patriarchate until December.
The Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, the highest authority in the Orthodox world, granted independence to the new church on Jan. 6.
Church and state
Poroshenko has heavily promoted his role in the establishment of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, placing ads on the Internet about it and participating in every step of the process.
Specifically, Poroshenko sat in the presidium at the assembly that set up the Orthodox Church of Ukraine on Dec. 15. Later in December Poroshenko and Epiphanius toured around Ukraine to promote the new church.
Poroshenko also went to Istanbul with Epiphanius to receive the tomos – a document on independence from Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew – on Jan. 5-6 and brought the tomos to Kyiv with the metropolitan on Jan. 7.
Bishops of the new church have lavished ample praise on Poroshenko.
In October Macarius, then head of the unrecognized Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, urged Ukrainians to “bow to Poroshenko,” while Epiphanius on Jan. 7 compared Poroshenko to Prince Volodymyr, who Christianized Kyivan Rus in 988.
Meanwhile, Ukrainian law enforcers have opened several criminal cases against Moscow Patriarchate clerics and initiated checks of the Moscow Patriarchate’s property in Ukraine.
“The question is whether the response to the Russian merger between church and state would be a Ukrainian merger between church and state,” Archimandrite Cyril Horovun, a Ukrainian born cleric at the Moscow Patriarchate and a supporter of the Ukrainian church’s independence, told the Kyiv Post. “It’s the easiest response to the Russian church but it’s not the best one.”
Hovorun, who teaches theology at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles, argued that the Orthodox Church of Ukraine should not repeat the mistakes of the Russian church – such as abuses of human rights and violations of religious freedom.
“The Ukrainian response should be to demonstrate that human rights matter, that religious freedom also matters, that the rights of believers should be protected by the state regardless of the church to which they belong,” he said. “The church should not become a part of the state.”
Hovorun, who had been considered as a potential candidate as the head of the new church, said he had been prevented from taking part in the church unification council in December.
Unification of churches
The Moscow Patriarchate is still the largest Orthodox Church in Ukraine, with about 11,000 parishes, while the Orthodox Church of Ukraine has about 7,000 parishes.
However, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine has more believers. In April 28.7 percent of Ukrainians identified with the Kyiv Patriarchate, which later became the new Ukrainian church’s backbone, while 12.8 percent said they were believers of the Moscow Patriarchate, according to a poll by the Oleksandr Razumkov Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Research. The rest are Orthodox Christians not affiliated with either of the two churches, representatives of other religious groups and atheists.
Since December, at least 42 parishes have switched from the Moscow Patriarchate to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.
Religious expert Dmytro Horyevoy told the Kyiv Post he expected the Orthodox Church of Ukraine to become the largest church within 10 years.
Hovorun argued that the transfer of parishes to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine would “depend on which course the church will take” and on “whether it will be open, inclusive, welcoming and inviting.”
Last year there were media reports that about a dozen bishops of the Moscow Patriarchate supported the creation of an independent Ukrainian church.
However, so far only two Moscow Patriarchate bishops – Oleksandr of Pereyaslav Khmelnytsky and Simeon of Vinnytsya – have joined the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Gorovun said that other Moscow Patriarchate bishops had wanted to vote by proxy without being present at the Dec. 15 church council but Constantinople allowed only direct voting.
Horyevoy said that some pro-independence Moscow Patriarchate bishops had decided not to join the new church due to intimidation.
He said the switch of Moscow Patriarchate parishes to the Ukrainian church would depend on how fast it is recognized by other Orthodox churches.
The churches of Antioch, the Czech Republic, Poland, Serbia and Bulgaria are seen as pro-Russian and are less likely to recognize the Ukrainian church. Meanwhile, the churches of Jerusalem, Albania, Greece, Romania and Cyprus are more friendly with Constantinople and may recognize the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.
Constantinople’s role
There is also speculation that the new church will be dependent on the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
Specifically, the Ukrainian church is required to get myrrh, an incense used for Orthodox liturgies, from Constantinople – a potential tool of influence on the Ukrainian church. Moreover, Ukrainians abroad cannot be serviced by the Ukrainian church and will be within Constantinople’s jurisdiction.
The Ecumenical Patriarchate will also have stavropegia – churches subordinated directly to Constantinople – in Ukraine, and its right as the final court of appeal for Ukrainian clerics is officially stipulated.
Sofronius, bishop of Cherkasy at the Moscow Patriarchate and a supporter of the Ukrainian church’s independence, lambasted the new church’s statute in December, claiming that it is less independent than the Russian Orthodox Church’s Ukrainian branch.
Horyevoy disagreed, saying that all episcopal appointments made by the Russian church’s Ukrainian branch have to be approved by Moscow, while the appointment of bishops of the new independent Ukrainian church don’t have to be sanctioned by Constantinople.
However, the Ukrainian church’s sovereignty is limited and can be compared to the churches of Poland, the Czech Republic, Albania and Romania, he said. In contrast, the Russian Orthodox Church and some other churches are seen as more independent from Constantinople and have often defied its authority.
