He’s deeply unpopular, but still popular enough to win re-election in 2019.
Such is the public sentiment regarding President Petro Poroshenko after his more than three years in office.
Most Ukrainians think he’s taking the nation in the wrong direction and believe he’s an obstacle to fighting corruption and deserves more blame than anyone else for Ukraine’s problems today.
But when it comes to other choices for the 2019 presidential election, other politicians and political parties also have high disapproval ratings.
According to an International Republican Institute poll published on June 8, 76 percent of Ukrainians disapprove of Poroshenko’s performance; only 1 percent completely approve and only 16 percent mostly approve of it.
If the voting were held today, ex-Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko would get 12.4 percent of the vote, Poroshenko 9.5 percent and Opposition Bloc leader Yuriy Boiko — a former ally of ousted President Viktor Yanukovych implicated in corruption that he denies —- ranks third with 6.9 percent, according to a poll taken in May by the Rating polling agency.
The dearth of new political faces is evident, but in politics, two years is a long time.
Breaking promises
Poroshenko was inaugurated on June 7, 2014 with a resounding 55 percent first-round victory in the May 25 election, three months after the EuroMaidan Revolution drove his deeply corrupt predecessor Yanukovych from power.
Poroshenko promised to turn Ukraine into a prosperous European democracy, end Russia’s war, combat corruption vigorously and sell his business assets.
But many of the promises were not kept.
Russia’s war goes on and terrible blunders have been made that led to the massacre of hundreds of Ukrainian troops by the Russian army during the Donbas battles in Ilovaisk in 2014 and Debaltseve in 2015. Both of those debacles led to the unfavorable terms of two peace agreements neither of which have been adhered to by Moscow.
On the domestic front, impunity remains high as law enforcement agencies remain unreformed. Prosecutors have closed graft cases against several Yanukovych associates and allowed others to flee the country as part of what are suspected to be shady deals with Ukrainian authorities.
Poroshenko flew to Vienna before the May 25, 2014 election and is widely believed to have cut a deal with exiled billionaire oligarch Dmytro Firtash, who is facing bribery charges in America that he denies.
President Petro Poroshenko’s approval rating has plummeted from a 63 percent high in April 2014 to the current 18 percent as citizens see little progress in law enforcement and economic reforms.
Although Poroshenko denies any “Vienna Agreement,” Firtash endorsed Poroshenko’s presidential bid and has not faced any criminal charges in Ukraine despite being a major player in Ukraine’s corrupt gas trade.
For years, Poroshenko also refused to sell his Roshen confectionary, including the Lipetsk Factory in Russia. Under public pressure, he transferred Roshen to a blind trust in 2016 and halted the Lipetsk Factory’s operations earlier this year. Last year Poroshenko also came under fire for failing to disclose an offshore firm.
Meanwhile, Poroshenko and his dominant party in parliament have been among the major obstructionists of key democratic reforms and the war against corruption.
Limited progress has come mainly through valiant efforts of new anti-corruption institutions, with limited powers and few resources, a vibrant civil society, reformist lawmakers and Western pressure.
One only has to look at the paltry level of foreign direct investment in Ukraine — $4 billion in 2016 — to understand why. Even more than Russia’s war, surveys show that corruption and the absence of rule of law are the top deterrents to new investment.
‘Monopolized power’
“Poroshenko is an outstanding figure and one of the most educated politicians,” said Mykhailo Minakov, a political scientist at Kyiv Mohyla Academy. “He’s so strong that he has no equals. That’s why he has monopolized power so easily.”
Poroshenko controls most government bodies, a major asset during a re-election campaign. Ukraine’s state institutions remain weak and two pillars of democracy — separation of powers and checks and balances — are practically non-existent.
Poroshenko and his supporters present him as a modern, European democrat that the nation has always needed. They take credit for achieving visa-free travel with Europe (even though critics say it would have come sooner without his obstructions) and Ukraine’s association agreement with the European Union.
In 2014 Petro Poroshenko was elected president in the first round with a strong mandate and a high approval rating. Now, after three years of failed reforms and unfulfilled promises, the share of those who strongly approve of his performance stands at a mere 1 percent. But the president’s competitors are not popular either.
When his adherents call Poroshenko Ukraine’s best president, it is faint praise since under previous presidents corruption remained deeply embedded and widespread.
Meanwhile, civil liberties and free speech face attacks in certain quarters, although nothing compared to the Yanukovych era. The restrictions are sometimes justified by the Poroshenko administration as essential restrictions during a war that the president refuses to officially recognize as such.
Reformist lawmaker Sergii Leshchenko said the administration’s moves are part of a drive to switch the political agenda from fighting corruption to patriotism in the nation’s defense against Russia’s war.
In reality, Ukrainians want victory in both — the war against Russia and corruption.
Rubber-stamp Rada?
Poroshenko has managed to gain control of parliament, even though the ruling coalition is weak. A list of the coalition’s members has not been disclosed, and it is not clear if there is a required majority of 226 members.
There are legal grounds to dispute the coalition’s existence in court but no one has done that yet, said Viktor Musiyaka, a legal scholar and co-author of the Ukrainian Constitution.
“The president has control over parliament without a coalition, which is not envisioned by the Constitution or any law,” Minakov said.
This leaves the floor wide open for backroom dealing — and bribes, critics say.
Poroshenko has found a way to work with offshoots of Yanukovych’s Party of Regions — the Opposition Bloc (43 seats), Vidrodzhennya (23 seats) and the People’s Will (20 seats).
Poroshenko’s mastery of parliament was never on more vivid display when he managed to get Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk fired and install his pick, Volodymyr Groysman, in April 2016.
Firing critics
At the beginning of his presidency in 2014, Poroshenko’s power was balanced by two relatively independent figures — then Security Service of Ukraine Chief Valentyn Nalyvaichenko and then Prosecutor General Oleh Makhnitsky.
But now Poroshenko’s loyalists head the security service, the Prosecutor General’s Office and many other key agencies across the board.
The all-powerful prosecution service, headed by presidential loyalist Yuriy Lutsenko, hasn’t changed much. A “reform” attempt in 2015 failed, with 84 percent of incumbent top local prosecutors keeping their jobs.
Poroshenko has taken credit for Ukraine’s only independent law enforcement body, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, created in 2015. But in May an alleged loyalist of Poroshenko was appointed as an auditor of the NABU in what critics see as an effort to control it. Poroshenko’s lawmakers have also pushed legislation to curb the NABU’s independence.
Politicized judiciary
In 2014, Ukraine’s distrusted judiciary was still controlled by Yanukovych allies. Since then, Poroshenko has asserted control in a similar fashion to Yanukovych, his opponents argue.
There are currently pro-government majorities at the two governing bodies of the judiciary, the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission.
President Petro Poroshenko lags behind ex-Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, but his competitors also have high disapproval ratings.
Poroshenko also has the right to create courts, transfer judges and appoint judges nominated by the High Council of Justice. The president denies influencing the courts, and his supporters argue that he signed a law last year to remove political influence on the judiciary.
However, civic activists say that the selection process under way to choose a new Supreme Court lacks transparency and appears rigged to favor pro-presidential candidates. Poroshenko has also refused to create an independent anti-corruption court with the help of foreigners.
His adviser, Oleksandr Paskhaver, says that “the president has a conservative approach to change and believes revolutionary changes bring more evil than good.”
Unconstitutional bodies?
The Constitutional Court, which used to be a subservient tool of Yanukovych, is now also controlled by Poroshenko, according to judicial experts.
In 2014, the Verkhovna Rada fired five Constitutional Court judges for violating their oath by letting Yanukovych usurp power. Lawmakers urged the president and the Council of Judges to fire the rest of the judges.
However, Poroshenko and the council have not done so.
Several judges of the court are being investigated on suspicion of helping Yanukovych usurp power. They got a $6 million bribe from the Party of Regions, according to the party’s alleged secret accounting ledger published last year, although they deny the allegation.
The Constitutional Court’s shaky legitimacy allows Poroshenko to control its work, said Yulia Kyrychenko, a constitutional expert at the Reanimation Package of Reforms.
Poroshenko’s opponents also accuse him of using the Central Election Commission to promote his political goals.
The legal authority for 12 out of the Central Election Commission’s 15 members expired in 2014 but parliament passed a law to extend their powers until new members are appointed.
However, since then Poroshenko and the Verkhovna Rada have failed to replace these members, which some lawyers believe to be illegal.
“Poroshenko has failed to fulfill his constitutional duties,” Kyrychenko said. “He’s intentionally dragging his feet to control the commission.”
Musiyaka believes that the extension of commission members’ powers beyond any reasonable limits is legally dubious and can be grounds for disputing the results of any future elections.
Moreover, members of the commission are being investigated on suspicion of taking bribes from the Party of Regions, which they deny.
Unfree speech?
Poroshenko is also criticized for trying to restrict free speech and other civil liberties.
“In the president’s inner circle, a group that wants to restrict civil liberties for the sake of victory (against Russia’s war), is gaining ground,” Minakov said. “…This may lead to the country’s transformation into an authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regime.”
Poroshenko holds big sway over the news media, particularly television channels owned by fellow oligarchs. He also owns his own Channel 5 TV station.
According to a 2016 VoxUkraine analysis, there were almost no negative mentions of Poroshenko on Sunday news shows on Ukraine’s biggest channels — Ukraina, Inter, ICTV and 1+1.
President Petro Poroshenko enjoys overwhelmingly positive or neutral coverage on the biggest television channels, including no negative news on STB, part of what critics see as shady deals with owners of the TV channels.
The share of negative mentions of Poroshenko in news and talk shows amounted to 7.3 percent on 1+1, 4.9 percent on Ukraina, 3.1 percent on Inter, 1.6 percent on Channel 112 and 0 percent on STB in May, according to the Content Analysis Center.
In 2016, the Strana.ua news site published an alleged memorandum between lawmaker Oleksandr Onyshchenko and Channel 112’s then owner Andriy Podshchypkov, under which the channel would abstain from criticizing Poroshenko, which was confirmed by Podshchypkov. Meanwhile, Leshchenko published an alleged 2015 plan by the government to take over Channel 112.
Since then, the channel has had problems with extending its license, while its coverage of Poroshenko has become less critical.
In January Dmytro Nosikov, a protege of Poroshenko’s top ally and lawmaker Igor Kononenko, became the general producer of another TV channel, NewsOne.
TV journalist Savik Shuster, a critic of Poroshenko, has faced a tax evasion case, problems with cable providers and the temporary cancellation of his work permit before his 3sTV channel stopped operations altogether in March.
The president denies stifling free speech.
“Never in its history has Ukraine had such a level of freedom for journalists and civic activists,” Poroshenko said on May 14.
In contrast with Yanukovych’s era, public television airs anti-corruption shows critical of Poroshenko and other top officials.
According to the Press Freedom Index, Ukraine now ranks 102nd in terms of press freedom in the world, up from 126th in 2013.
Russia’s war has given Poroshenko more leeway to restrict free speech.
Ukraine’s National Television and Radio Council banned Russia’s Dozhd TV channel in January and stripped Ukraine’s Radio Vesti of its license in March, citing violations of Ukrainian law, even though both outlets were mostly pro-Ukrainian and liberal in their coverage.
In May, citing their role in fomenting Russia’s war and their control by the Kremlin, Poroshenko banned Russia’s Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki social networks.
Political cases
Numerous criminal cases have also been opened against those who have taken on Ukraine’s corrupt establishment.
These include ex-deputy prosecutor generals Vitaly Kasko and Davit Sakvarelidze, ex-reformist customs official Yulia Marushevska, NABU deputy chief Gizo Uglava and Leshchenko.
In 2016 Yury Pavlenko, who tore up a Poroshenko portrait in 2014 during clashes with the police in Vinnytsya, was sentenced to 4.5 years on charges of hooliganism and seizure of a government building.
Meanwhile, Ruslan Kotsaba was sentenced to three-and-a-half years in prison for urging people to evade the draft in 2016 and was declared by Amnesty International to be a prisoner of conscience. He was subsequently released by an appellate court but is now on trial again.
Ex-Deputy Prosecutor General Vitaly Kasko smiles as prosecutors speak during a hearing of a fraud case against him at Kyiv’s Pechersk Court on April 14, 2016. Kasko believes the case is a political vendetta by President Petro Poroshenko and ex-Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin for his criticism. (Volodymyr Petrov)
“If Ruslan Kotsaba is re-arrested following the cancellation of his acquittal, I would certainly regard him as a political prisoner,” said Halya Coynash, a member of the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group.
In March, Poroshenko also signed a law introducing the same declaration requirements for anti-corruption activists as for government officials. The measure has no equivalent in the West and is widely seen as a major attack on civil society, although Poroshenko defends it as a justifiable step towards greater public accountability.
Attack on opponents
Poroshenko has also come down hard on political critics.
In March 2016, opposition lawmakers Yegor Firsov and Mykola Tomenko, who left the Bloc of Petro Poroshenko, were expelled from the Verkhovna Rada by the party.
The Constitution allows for the ouster of lawmakers who leave their political parties, but Firsov and Tomenko say their expulsion was illegal due to procedural and other violations. Before Poroshenko, opposition lawmakers had never been expelled from the Rada.
In April, Poroshenko also suspended the Ukrainian citizenship of Sasha Borovik, an ally of ex-Odesa Oblast Governor Mikheil Saakashvili and a critic of the president, and Radical Party lawmaker Andriy Artemenko, because they allegedly have German and Canadian citizenship, respectively.
Borovik called it “an unprecedented move that is more characteristic of the Soviet Union and other dictatorships.”
The Constitution bans the authorities from stripping anyone of citizenship, though lawyers differ on whether this also applies to suspension. No president had previously applied this measure to his opponents before.
Evgen Zakharov, head of Kharkiv Human Rights group, called this suspension of citizenship a “rude violation” of the Constitution, while Musiyaka said it can be disputed in court.
“Laws are violated every day,” Minakov said. “The president contributes to this by failing to reveal the coalition’s composition, pass new election rules and create a functioning election commission… But a disruption of legitimacy always leads to the same result — a crisis that jeopardizes the state’s very existence.”
