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Russian nukes in Crimea? Experts worry they may already be there

A Tupolev Tu-160 and Tu-22M3 military aircrafts fly over Red Square during a military parade, which marks the 75th anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany in World War Two, in Moscow on June 24, 2020.
Photo by AFP

Rumors regarding Russia’s deployment of nuclear weapons in Crimea have been circulating for years — since shortly after it invaded and annexed the Ukrainian peninsula in early 2014.

As Russia continues its massive military buildup in the Black Sea region, turning Crimea into one giant “unsinkable warship,” such an earth-shattering move has been expected by many.

But some recent developments may indicate that the Kremlin has probably already done this — or, at least, it has already deployed a variety of armaments capable of employing nuclear weapons within much of the region, and it has already revitalized old Soviet infrastructure.

Ukraine’s intelligence says it has not yet detected any clear, confirmed traces of Russian nukes in the peninsula. But experts and analysts collecting evidence say it is not only possible but also very probable, as Moscow considers Crimea of top strategic importance — and it has no reasons not to make use of such an opportunity.

A picture taken on April 20, 2010, shows a Russian Iskander ballistic missile launcher rolling during a rehearsal of a military parade in Alabino outside Moscow. (AFP)

Tactical stockpile 

It is highly unlikely that Russia would even think of deploying to Crimea any strategic-scale nuclear weapons, such as major intercontinental ballistic missiles. 

The occupied region is located on the periphery of Russian-controlled territory. Therefore, any missile silos there would be almost impossible to protect with missile defenses in case of a nuclear strike exchange. 

Much more probable is the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, which are less destructive. They are normally meant to be used in battlefield combat rather than against cities and industries on the enemy’s home territory.

According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a Washington D.C.-based think tank, Russia, the world’s second nuclear power, currently possesses nearly 1,800 tactical nuclear warheads of various yields assigned to nearly all types of available weaponry ranging from air-to-surface missiles to torpedoes and aerial bombs. 

The Soviet Union also never installed missile silos in Crimea. However, the peninsula had a rather well-developed maintenance infrastructure.

In particular, Crimea boasts the so-called Feodosiya-13, a secret military installation near the town of Krasnokamyanka (close to the city of Sudak) used since 1955 to assemble, store, maintain and utilize nuclear warheads. It was this base where Soviets assembled at least six nukes that were later sent to Cuba in 1962, which soon brought humankind to the very brink of an all-out nuclear holocaust. 

With the fall of the Soviet Union and the denuclearization of independent Ukraine after 1991, Feodosiya-13 was turned into a typical base used by special police units. 

This object’s specialty seemingly started to change shortly following Russia’s occupation of Crimea in 2014. A whole range of indirect indicators may suggest that the Russian military gradually restored it as an installation working with weapons of mass destruction. 

As one of the key sites of military infrastructure on the peninsula, the base was immediately taken under control by invading Russian troops. In May 2014, the Russian high command reportedly inspected the installation.

Moreover, in late January 2015, Russian forces established a Crimean department of the 12th Chief Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, which is responsible for the maintenance of nuclear weapons. 

In September 2016, InformNapalm, an international investigative group observing Russia’s military activities worldwide, analyzed pictures posted by Russian military servicemen on social media and concluded that the Feodosiya-13 base was at that time hosting the Russian National Guard’s chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense forces. 

InformNapalm assumed that the force was reactivating the old nuclear object. 

In his recent address published in early August, Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service Chief Valeriy Kondratiuk asserted that Russia “in general has turned the peninsula into a solid military base operating a completed infrastructure for the storage of nuclear weapons.” 

The official also confirmed that, since 2016, the Kremlin had been actively restoring the Soviet nuclear grid at the cities of Feodosiya and Balaklava and also connecting the peninsula to the Russian mainland strategic transportation system.

Russia has denied its plans to deploy any nuclear munitions in the peninsula for years. Nonetheless, as far back as December 2014, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov asserted during a meeting with then-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry that “Russia, according to international law, is fully entitled to administer its legitimate nuclear arsenal in compliance with its interests.”

According to Lavrov, since Crimea ceased being a Ukrainian territory in 2014, it also stopped being a denuclearized zone. 

Ukraine, the European Union, and the United States all reject the idea that Crimea legally ceased to be Ukrainian.

Sailors march during a military parade, which marks the 75th anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany in World War Two, in Sevastopol, Crimea, on June 24, 2020. (AFP)

High probability

In response to a Kyiv Post request for comment, Ukraine’s Chief Directorate of Intelligence, part of the country’s Defense Ministry, asserted that “as of now, there are no indications of Russian deployment of nuclear weapons in occupied Crimea.”

Numerous pieces of evidence over the last years, however, leave few doubts among many analysts in Ukraine. 

“It should be understood that if the intelligence community says it can’t confirm (something), it means only that it doesn’t have either documents or material samples that could be 100% proof,” Andriy Klymenko, head of the BlackSeaNews project, which monitors the situation in the occupied peninsula, told the Kyiv Post.

“We admit the possibility of the presence of nuclear warheads for naval and coastal defense missile systems in Crimea starting since approximately 2016… We believe that, since there is a top-level security depot and all transport capacities, the probability of nuclear deployment is very high.” 

Although Ukrainian intelligence lacks clear evidence, it says Russia’s 28,000-strong military contingent in Crimea and the Black Sea fleet based in Sevastopol have acquired a whole range of arms capable of carrying tactical warheads.

And over the last few years, increasingly large quantities of such hardware have been seen in Crimea.

This particularly touches upon the Black Fleet’s flagship, the missile cruiser Moskva, which is capable of employing missile system P-1000 Vulkan, which can carry nuclear warheads with a yield of 350 kilotons. 

In a statement to the Kyiv Post, Ukrainian military intelligence also said it saw a particular threat in the deployment of Russian Kalibr cruise missiles (NATO reporting name SS-N-27 Sizzler), which reportedly have operational ranges of nearly 2,600 kilometers when equipped with thermonuclear warheads.

These missiles are already present in occupied Crimea and operated by Russian Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates (3 in active service with the Black Sea Fleet), by Buyan-class corvettes (also 3 in the Black Sea), and by Varshavyanka-class submarines (6 reportedly operated). 

Tactical nuclear missiles can also be deployed for Sukhoi Su-24 (NATO reporting name Fencer) attack bombers. According to Military Balance 2020, the authoritative handbook from the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, Russia currently holds at least two regiments operating such aircraft in Crimea.

Moreover, according to Ukrainian intelligence, Moscow may have plans for replacing them with more modern and universal Sukhoi Su-34s fighters-bombers (NATO reporting name Fullback).

Sukhoi Su-57 fifth-generation fighter aircrafts perform during the MAKS 2019 International Aviation and Space Salon opening ceremony in Zhukovsky outside Moscow on August 27, 2019. (AFP)

Strength required 

For years, Russians also denied any plans to deploy even heavier types of military power in the peninsula. 

Only in early 2019, they finally confirmed the deployment of strategic, nuke-carrying bombers Tupolev Tu-22M3 (most probably at the military airfield of Belbek outside Sevastopol) and also Iskander-M missile systems, which can also deal 50-kiloton nuclear strikes within the range of 500 kilometers.

Ukrainian military intelligence points out the strategic bombers and the ballistic missiles as key nuclear threats in the occupied peninsula.

In fact, with all these deployments over the last few years, Russia has effectively created for itself vast opportunities for the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons in combat in the Black Sea region and beyond. 

If it is confirmed that nukes are or were present on Crimean soil, it would signal a grave violation of the global non-proliferation regime, since Ukraine is a nuclear-free zone.

However, given the history of the Kremlin’s disdain for international legislation, this would hardly be a big surprise.

“(Russia) uses force and the threat of forces to coerce its neighbors, along with its entire periphery, including with nuclear weapons,” Ben Hodges, former U.S. Army Europe commanding general, told the Kyiv Post.

The Kremlin continues using Crimea as its “launching pad” for its operations in Syria, Libya and the eastern Mediterranean Sea, the retired general said, adding that without its presence in Crimea, these operations would have not been possible.

“None of these are good for Europe,” he said.

“(Russia) having the potential for increasing its nuclear weapons delivery capability in Crimea should be a clear signal to Germany, France, and the United States that the Kremlin will do whatever it wants — unless the West demonstrates strength more than rhetoric and more than sanctions that really don’t hurt (Russian President Vladimir) Putin or his circle of enablers.”