Ukraine’s military is regaining its strength. Hollowed out, underfunded and demoralized for most of the 27 years of Ukrainian independence, the army over the past four years has finally become a force to be reckoned with.
As it shields the rest of the country from Russia’s war in the Donbas, the Ukrainian army has been reinforced this year by another record-high defense budget — 5 percent of gross domestic prodcut, which is more than twice the NATO goals for its members.
In the battlefield, the army has made small but significant advances, creeping forward to deny the enemy strategic positions on the front line.
Reform of the sector’s legislation is meanwhile marching towards its full compliance with NATO 2020 benchmarks, with backup coming from Washington D. C., Berlin, and Brussels.
Moreover, the U.S. administration has finally provided Ukraine with defensive lethal weaponry. Kyiv has also been allowed to strike new commercial deals to purchase new U.S. and Canadian arms to enhance its firepower in the Donbas.
But the main victory for the nation so far is that, after four years of grueling trench warfare, and with the death toll from Russia’s war on the country already exceeding 10,300, the army is still on its feet, and still protecting Ukraine’s existence as a state.
Creeping war
The last 12 months in the Donbas have passed without any major battles or escalations such as those seen in the winter of 2017, first in Avdiyivka, then later near Krymske.
The autumn military campaign, which was commanded by the highly popular airborne General Mykhaylo Zabrodskiy, featured a new tactic embraced by Ukraine’s troops: creeping advances towards enemy lines.
Using this tactic, the army has brought a number of contested towns trapped between the lines, such as Verkhnyotoretske, Travneve, Gladosove, Pivdenne, and Zolote‑4, back under the Ukrainian flag.
In many other frontline sections, such as around Maryinka or Novotoshkivkse, Ukrainian forces have reclaimed hundreds of square meters of no man’s land and consolidated positions on high ground, gaining an advantage over the enemy.
On Aug. 16, Sergiy Nayev, Ukraine’s overall commander in the Donbas, said some 15 square kilometers of the so-called “gray zone” between the warring sides had been retaken between May and July.
But these minor alterations to the otherwise frozen frontline came at a heavy price: According to the military, at least 131 Ukrainian soldiers and officers were killed in combat between September 2017 and July.
And the stalled trench war continues, with seemingly no end in sight. Every time a ceasefire is declared — such as the ones during New Year’s, the harvest, and the back-to-school season — have broken down.
Meanwhile, peace talks between the Normandy Four of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine produce little more than the occasional official statement.
Nonetheless, at the turn of the year Ukraine was able to celebrate a notable victory, when a plane with 73 freed Ukrainian prisoners of war, along with civilians taken captive by Russian-backed forces, touched down at Boryspil International Airport near Kyiv during the night of Dec. 28.
The Ukrainian captives had been exchanged for up to 237 Russian-backed fighters and collaborators, who were released at the Mayorsk checkpoint near the Russian-occupied city of Horlivka, 580 kilometers southeast of Kyiv. It was the biggest prisoner swap since the start of Russia’s war in the Donbas — and a joyful end to 2017 for Ukraine.
A Ukrainian soldier walks through a meadow behind a trench line in the combat zone of Zaitseve on July 25. (Volodymyr Petrov)
New deal
On the legislative front, Ukraine’s parliament passed bills that redefine the legal status of Russia’s undeclared war on Ukraine, and eliminate some legal uncertainties.
The most important of these was the controversial Donbas reintegration act, which was approved on Jan. 18.
Three-and-a-half years after the outbreak of war, Ukrainian lawmakers finally officially named Russia an aggressor state that is illegally occupying parts of the Donbas with its irregular and regular troops. They also declared that Russia controls the territories via self-proclaimed occupation authorities.
The document states that Russia is fully responsible for protecting the human rights and living conditions of the civilian population in the occupied areas. And it gives a legislative green light to the army taking the leading role in operations in the war-torn region, without the need to declare martial law.
But as political fighting broke out between the various factions in parliament, all references to the Minsk agreements as the basic framework for achieving a peace were removed from the final wording of the bill.
And while the law states that Ukraine remains committed to the peaceful de-occupation and reintegration of the Donbas, in line with international law, it does not specify how the Russian-occupied areas will be returned to Ukrainian government control.
Neither does the law stipulate the breaking of diplomatic and economic ties with Russia, or even directly refer to the fighting in the east as a war.
Nonetheless, the Donbas reintegration act, which was signed into law by President Petro Poroshenko on Feb. 20, heralded the end of the four-year “anti-terrorist operation” or ATO, which Ukraine had waged against Russian-led forces since April 2014.
Instead, starting from April 30 Ukraine launched a new military campaign, the “Joint Forces Operation” or JFO, which is led by the country’s top military command rather than the SBU security service as the ATO was.
Since that day, all Ukrainian army, police, SBU, National Guard, and Border Service forces deployed in the war zone fall under the JFO’s direct command, with General Sergiy Nayev being the first top JFO commander.
And even though this brought no drastic change in the situation in the war zone, it has given Ukrainian military units more discretion in returning fire when Russian-led forces launch their regular attacks on Ukrainian positions.
Meanwhile, under the new military command, the tactic of creeping advance has continued to improve Ukraine’s position on the battlefield.
National security
But the main defense-related bill of the year — the new National Security Law, which was passed on June 21 and signed into law on July 5 — should make a real difference to Ukraine’s defense policies for years ahead.
Drafted and reviewed with the help of the U. S. Embassy in Kyiv, the NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine, and the European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM), the document introduces several fundamental institutions previously absent in Ukraine, but seen by its Western allies as essential.
Most notably, this includes civilian control of the military, and the liability of military commanders to parliament. Even the SBU, long seen as a tool of the executive, is to come under the direct supervision of parliament.
According to the bill, starting from 2019 Ukraine’s defense minister must be a civilian, and a new NATO-compatible top command structure for the armed forces is to be in place by 2021. The document also enshrined in law Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration as a principal instrument for ensuring the country’s national security.
But while generally welcomed by Western envoys, the law fell short of expectations. Its final text was somewhat less radical in terms of putting Ukraine on course for NATO membership, for instance.
Worse, the law fails to bring more transparency to Ukraine’s military procurement. A large part of the country’s $6.1 billion defense budget in 2018 remains, in Soviet-style, hidden from taxpayer oversight, encouraging corruption.
Ukrainian soldiers deploy a BM-21 Grad multiple launch missile system during drills at the Divychky firing range in the Kyiv Oblast on Oct. 26. (Volodymyr Petrov)
Javelin points
However, Ukraine saw one truly groundbreaking success this year when it took delivery of a batch of U.S.-made Javelin anti-tank weapons.
Years of arguments over whether the United States should arm Ukraine with lethal defensive weapons were finally over.
The FGM‑148 Javelins — advanced third-generation man-portable anti-tank missiles — are not just a formidable deterrent to Russian armor in the east; they also have symbolic significance as an indicator of Washington’s readiness to continue supporting Kyiv.
Despite fears that U. S. President Donald J. Trump, who delayed signing the bill on supplying the Javelins, might scupper the deal, the administration in November 2017 greenlighted a new defense aid package that envisaged a shipment to Ukraine of 210 Javelin missiles and 37 launch units, two of which would be spares, with a total value of $47 million.
By late April the weapons had been tested by Ukrainian troops on Ukrainian soil. The weapons were provided at no cost and paid for from the U.S. federal budget.
And Javelins were not the only U.S. weapons to appear in Ukraine. In December 2017, the Trump administration also approved the sale of M107A1 Barrett sniper rifles to Kyiv, and later, in May, some 500 U.S.-produced 40-millimeter PSRL‑1 shoulder-fired rocket launchers were supplied to Ukraine’s National Guard.
According to U. S. Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch, the U.S. has provided a total of $1.1 billion worth of military aid to Ukraine since 2014.
Ukraine also received lethal hardware from Canada in late 2017, when Ottawa finally added Ukraine to the Automatic Firearms Country Control List, a special register of the countries to which Canada can export arms.
Ukraine became the 40th country on the list, joining Ottawa’s NATO allies and states including Australia, Botswana, Chile, Colombia, Finland, Israel, Kuwait, New Zealand, Peru, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Sweden.
The first arms contract with Canada, however, came only in August 2018, when the Winnipeg-based PGW Defense Technologies company confirmed that Ukraine is to purchase a number of 0.50 caliber LRT‑3 sniper rifles, worth a total of $770,000.
