The beginning of the 29th year of Ukraine’s independence was a time of high expectations for strengthening the country’s defenses. Those expectations are lower today.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky made promising appointments during the first few months of his presidency in key positions of the defense sector. He vowed to immediately give a green light to all urgent reforms that were stagnant for years under his predecessors. But the appointments were short-lived and his promises unmet thus far.
Key appointments were made under Zelensky’s first days of leadership — Andriy Zagorodnyuk was placed to head Ukraine’s Defense Ministry while Aivaras Abromavicius was picked to manage the country’s military production giant UkrOboronProm. For the first time in the country’s history, the two structures were headed by successful forward-minded business managers rather than by veterans of the outdated post-Soviet bureaucracy.
Before becoming president, Zelensky promised to be firm and resolute in championing Ukraine’s vital interests in negotiations with Russia over Donbas. Under his early rule, key bills to combat corruption and to transform the military under Western benchmarks were finally signed.
But this seemingly positive period in Ukraine’s defense ministry was short-lived. Reformists eventually were squeezed out by people of the old regime who started to create new bureaucratic structures and take control over the sector’s lucrative businesses.
Furthermore, the Zelensky administration has been trying to achieve a deal with Russia seemingly at any cost in order to fulfill the president’s previous promises. This resulted in often turning a blind eye on the enemy’s defiance as the Ukrainian administration does its best not to irritate the Kremlin.
Squeezed out
Despite having a clear to-do list of reforms and strong anti-corruption politics endorsed by watchdogs, Zelensky’s first defense minister, Andriy Zagorodnyuk, was fired only after six months in office.
Reportedly, this happened because the president believed the new defense minister “did not prove himself.” But sources said Zagoronyuk was fired due to his opposition to Andriy Yermak, Zelensky’s chief of staff, over strategy to end Russia’s war in the Donbas.
The skilled business manager was replaced by retired general Andriy Taran, a veteran of the bureaucratic establishment that had effectively brought Ukraine’s military to its downfall and unpreparedness to withstand Russia’s attack in 2014.
The spirit of Zagoronyuk’s team of young pro-NATO enthusiasts is now gone and replaced by distinctive Soviet-style, according to many experts. Notably, Taran never presented his own reform to-do list, and the first major step he made in office was abolishing the Project Office for Reforms, a council of civilian volunteers supervising reforms in the military.
The same fate is just about to meet UkrOboronProm’s Abromavicius, the former economy minister who resigned due to his opposition to corruption in the government.
He also came to his post a year ago, saying that president Zelensky had given him a carte blanche to transform the giant structure riddled with corruption.
Abromavicius finally launched many things put on halt under the previous administration — such as a comprehensive due diligence of the defense production concern. His team started working on dividing the structure into several industry-based components, which were meant to become fully independent public corporations that are able to draw investments and compete. In the long run, the goal was meant to
disband UkrOboronProm into smaller more transparent structures. But instead, Zelensky’s administration decided to reverse the Western-oriented path.
On July 22 the government decided to create a new Ministry for Strategic Industries. The new ministry is meant to take full control of all of the country’s key state-run enterprises and corporations, particularly in aerospace and defense domains, including UkrOboronProm.
Oleh Uruskiy, the recently-appointed head of the new ministry, is quite clear on his intentions: on Aug. 12 he confirmed that Abromavicius together with his whole team would be sacked in the nearest time. This also means that all key decisions in regards to sales, defense procurement, exports and imports, and corporate policies will be concentrated under one structure.
More assistance
Despite the many negatives, this year saw the passing of many key defense bills that had been delayed for years — particularly ones meant to introduce a new hierarchy of military ranks and numerous amendments to Ukraine’s military instructions that would be in line with NATO regulations.
The same goes for the long-awaited bill on state defense procurement hailed by anti-corruption activists. It was meant to help eliminate numerous loopholes through which corrupt contractors can siphon millions through non-transparent tenders.
Foreign military aid to Ukraine, particularly from the United States, has also been on the rise. According to Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, the amount of U.S. military assistance to Kyiv has surpassed $2 billion since 2014.
Despite U. S. President Donald J. Trump’s attempt to withhold the aid in return for Kyiv’s promise to find dirt on his election rival Joe Biden, military assistance to Ukraine has increased thanks to bipartisan support in the U. S. As recently as in July, Congress pledged to increase the annual funding allocated towards Ukraine’s defense to $300 million in the next financial year.
The U. S. has also been helping Kyiv resurrect its maritime power amid an increasing Russian threat.
This year Ukraine received its first two Island-class patrols from the U. S. Coast Guard and is expecting to receive three more. Ukraine was also confirmed for the procurement of at least 16 modern U.S.-produced Mark VI boats for its littoral waters. Also, this year Ukraine has seen the arrival of the second batch of FGM‑148 Javelin anti-tank missiles.
Altogether, Ukraine’s arsenal was increased to a total of 47 launchers and 360 missiles. Ukraine’s overall military command has demonstrated a major shift in their rules of engagement promising to enhance each combat brigade deployed to Donbas with Javelins.
Another victory for Ukraine came on June 12 when NATO finally designated Ukraine as its Enhanced Opportunity Partner, opening itself for deeper cooperation with Kyiv in security consultations, access to interoperability programs, exercises, and information.
Peace at any price?
Over the previous year, Zelensky has tried to follow through with one of the key provisions of his presidential campaign — to bring peace to Donbas. Within months after his coming to power, the frozen 420-kilometer frontline has finally seen major shifts in years, which continued in the following months through 2020.
This resulted in three rounds of mutual disengagement of warring forces near the cross-frontline entry points of the villages of Stanytsya Luhanska and Zolote (in June and October) in Luhansk Oblast, and also near the village of Bohdanivka in Donetsk Oblast in November. This was followed by two major prisoner swaps with Russia in September in December, which took place for the first time since late 2017.
Nonetheless, these major developments were viewed with high criticism by Ukrainians and experts. Especially when it became known that Ukraine’s negotiating team in Minsk accepted the ill-fated “Steinmeier Formula” — a roadmap to implement the Minsk agreements, in compliance to which Ukraine was to provide currently-occupied parts of Donbas with a self-rule privilege after holding local elections that were recognized free and democratic by international standards.
The news triggered a nationwide furor, with angry crowds protesting against Zelensky’s “surrender” to Russia.
Zelensky’s attempts to reach more progress in talks with the Kremlin, meanwhile, continues.
Many of his recent moves, such as the appointment to of political old-timers to head the Minsk talks — Ukraine’s first President Leonid Kravchuk and the country’s first Prime Minister Vitold Fokin, both of whom have decades-old connection links with the Kremlin — is perceived by many as something done in a bid to make the talks as comfortable for Russia as possible.
The current Ukrainian administration has also not been mentioning Russia as the aggressor behind the war in Donbas and has been referring to the enemy as “the other side of the contact line.” This has angered many Ukrainians and put the administration’s intentions in question.
During the past few weeks, the battlefield has been more silent than usual since Ukraine and Russia struck yet another cease-fire starting July 27. Nonetheless, few believe that this silence will last much longer and on acceptable terms for Ukraine.