What if Russia, defying reason, launches a larger-scale invasion of Ukraine?
If Russian mechanized convoys rush toward Kharkiv, their marine forces lay siege to the coastline between Odesa and Mykolaiv, and their special forces destroy missile defense radar stations deep in the rear?
This darkest hour would be the ultimate test for the nation’s seven-year drive to defend itself from the Kremlin.
Would Ukraine’s 250,000-strong armed forces and paramilitaries have a chance to survive the massive strike?
Many experts believe that despite all the unresolved problems that have haunted the Ukrainian military for years, the answer is still yes.
But this would be a David-versus-Goliath battle, in which Ukraine’s military can succeed only if it sheds its old Soviet doctrines and acts like a truly mobile and flexible force, making use of its homeland’s terrain and ensuring swift coordination among its elements.
If it doesn’t, Ukrainian defenses can be destroyed within a few days.
But if it succeeds, the Ukrainian military could foil Russian hopes for a blitzkrieg takeover, dragging the invaders into a war they can’t win and exposing the Kremlin to devastating global sanctions.
A Ukrainian soldier walks along the trench on the front line of the war with Russia-backed separatists in Donetsk region on Feb. 16, 2021. (AFP)
Plans for war
According to the latest figures from Ukraine’s military intelligence directorate, Russia has deployed 89,000 troops in areas bordering eastern Ukraine and in Kremlin-occupied Crimea.
This is the largest concentration of Russian military power in the region since July 2014, when the Donbas war was in full swing, the directorate’s head, Colonel Kyrylo Budanov, reported to the Verkhovna Rada on April 14.
Ukrainian intelligence expects the continuing buildup to reach an estimated 110,000 troops before it ends on April 20.
It sees three possible options in the near future.
Russia may continue to saber-rattle for political gain without going on the offensive. It may invade and seize Ukraine’s southern regions to re-establish water supply to Crimea. And it may incite a major escalation of hostilities in Donbas to set up a casus belli.
Experts and former battlefield leaders polled by the Kyiv Post predicted three of the most dangerous and probable axes of Russian assault.
Russian forces can rush through Kharkiv Oblast, block the city of Kharkiv and continue all the way to Dnipro. Simultaneously, they can strike in Donbas, driving towards Mariupol and on to Zaporizhia.
If successful, these two advances could cut off supplies to the 40,000 Ukrainian troops defending Donbas as well as other pockets of Ukrainian resistance, allowing them to be split and surrounded.
There’s also a possibility of an assault from Crimea towards Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa, aimed at seizing key coastal infrastructure and cutting Ukraine off from the sea.
If this operation is to succeed, it must take no longer than one week. But if it works, it may bring Ukraine to its knees, forcing it into a devastating new reality, with the Kremlin dictating its future.
Rough chances
Ukraine’s chances don’t look great.
According to the Military Balance 2020 database, Ukraine can count on nearly 145,000 army troops, 8,000 airborne troops, 2,000 marines, and 102,000 paramilitary personnel (such as the National Guard and the Border Guard Service). According to Ukrainian authorities, the country has up to 200,000 experienced former combatants enlisted in its rapid response reserves.
It can also count on over 800 main battle tanks, over 1,100 infantry fighting vehicles, and nearly 1,800 artillery pieces.
While the invaders would be weaker in terms of raw manpower, Russia may enjoy air and sea superiority. Ukraine’s air force of nearly 125 combat-capable aircraft (including at least 30-year-old Mikoyan MiG‑29 and Sukhoi Su‑27 fighters) are no match for the air power of Russia’s Western and Southern Military Districts.
The Ukrainian navy consists of a handful of aging warships and patrol boats that aren’t expected to make much of a difference. Coastal defense depends on a number of 152-millimeter D‑20 howitzers and heavy 220-millimeter Uragan missiles. The Ukrainian program to deploy new coastal defense Neptune cruise missiles is still in its early stages.
The Ukrainian skies are also defended by over 300 surface-to-air missile systems, which include 250 aging S‑300P/PS/PT systems (NATO reporting name SA‑10 Grumble).
The standing army would require assistance from organized civilian militia in the rear. As of now, Ukraine formally deploys 25 weekend warrior brigades across the country. But its territorial defense grid is still embryonic, and it is often criticized for being chaotic and only there for show.
The 89,000 Russian troops near eastern Ukraine and in Crimea include two motorized infantry divisions, two rifle brigades, a marine, and an airborne brigade.
While this is a formidable force, some experts, such as defense journalist Yuriy Butusov, believe that the Russian group falls short of having sufficient operative reserves for a major offensive on Ukraine’s mainland.
Therefore, Butusov believes that this is a display of power rather than a real preparation for war.
President Volodymyr Zelensky kneels next to the graves of Ukrainian soldiers killed in battle on the front line of the war in the Donbas on the Armed Forces Day on Dec. 6, 2020. (Presidential Press Service)
Mobile warfare
On the bright side, Ukrainians would have home-ground advantage. They would be more motivated than their enemies, who were brought in from somewhere in central Russia to fight a clearly unjust war away from home.
Besides, experts believe the invasion would trigger a massive self-mobilization of combat-hardened Donbas veterans and new volunteers from among the civilian population. Given the potential scale of hostilities, the surge of volunteers would definitely outshine that of the early days of Russia’s war in 2014.
The key to victory would depend on the Ukrainian forces’ ability to move and react quickly.
“Relying on static defense, erecting borderline anti-invasion barriers, painting ‘not-a-step-back’ lines on maps would be a fatal error,” says Viktor Vertsner, a Ukrainian-born Israel Army reserve officer and former volunteer firearms instructor for Ukraine’s National Guards.
“The assailant always enjoys the element of surprise, it would choose the place, the time, and the direction of its main and auxiliary strike. A defense barrier will be overwhelmed, and we’d get new death traps.”
Instead, Ukrainian forces should embrace mobile defense, making use of terrain, constantly harassing the Russians, coordinating their actions with air defense, artillery, and militias, and constantly trying to lure the enemy into killing zones.
“The goal behind such a campaign must be to make the enemy pay an unacceptable price,” Vertsner said.
“Hostilities will be halted as soon as this aim is accomplished.”
Glen Grant, a retired British Army colonel and former advisor for Ukraine’s Defense Ministry, also suggested putting an emphasis on mobility — and on greater freedom of action of combat units instead of the ineffective and slow Soviet-style highly-centralized command.
“This war, if it happens, will be won by maneuver, quick defense, flexible thinking of commanders, and stubborn resistance by soldiers of every level,” the retired officer said. “Senior commanders who are control freaks must be removed before the invasion starts. They will never accept the loss of control or think quickly enough.”
Despite years of NATO-style reforms and record-high budgets, Ukraine’s armed forces still suffer from poor service conditions, overwhelming bureaucracy, and Soviet-style mismanagement that has already forced tens of thousands of motivated career personnel to leave the ranks and return to civilian life.
Still, even in its current condition, the Ukrainian military is in better shape compared to 2014. If everything is done right, there is hope of defeating a new Russian invasion.
“The armed forces of (Ukraine) today are much better prepared and more experienced at most levels,” said retired Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, the U.S. Europe Army commanding officer from 2014–2017.
“If Russian forces were to in fact invade further, it would be extremely costly for them. There are, however, still problems that must be addressed: air and missile defense, electronic warfare capabilities, and secure communications are at the top of the list.”
Ukraine’s armed forces would have to fight as they are now, Grant added.
“There are no magic potions to make them better. But some practical things can be done,” he said.
“First of these is to give clear political direction that this war must be won. This must come from both the commander-in-chief and parliament. There must be no doubt in the mind of any officer or soldier or society, that if Putin decides to invade — he must lose.”
