The first year of Volodymyr Zelensky’s presidency was nothing short of eventful.
The former television comedian took office in May 2019 after a landslide victory in the presidential elections, during which he defeated veteran politicians. Shortly thereafter, his neophyte Servant of the People party won a historic majority in the Ukrainian parliament, granting the new president unprecedented powers and a broad mandate to deliver on his campaign promises.
And his promises were just as bold as his foray into big politics: to bring new people to power, to fight corruption, to improve the economy and to end the war with Russia — all in just one five-year term.
Little did he know that he would find himself at the heart of U. S. President Donald Trump’s impeachment scandal; a Ukrainian passenger plane would be “mistakenly” downed by Iranian forces and a viral pandemic would trigger a global economic shutdown.
No one said it would be easy, but many of Zelensky’s problems in the first year appeared to stem from within his own team.
He lost the support of a number of reputable reformers who previously secured the good will of civil society and Ukraine’s international partners for the newbie president.
His single-party majority in the parliament showed signs of fracture. Members of his own faction launched a smear campaign against the Zelensky-backed Cabinet and prosecutor general and tried to sabotage crucial legislation.
His peace plan for the Donbas and direct talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin sparked nationwide protests amid fears he would sell out Ukraine’s interests.
And his reshuffle of ministers, during which the prosecutor general and some reformist top officials were fired, sowed disquiet among international donors and investors.
Zelensky faces many challenges in his second year. That daunting list he made of his campaign promises has not gone away. But now he has to lead the nation not only through war, but through a global pandemic and major economic crisis, while simultaneously trying to fix his own team.
Read more: Zelensky’s first year: Checking the status of campaign promises
High ratings
All of these events have not irreparably damaged Zelensky’s electoral support.
Since winning the election with 73% of the vote, Zelensky has seen his rating slide, but his public approval is still higher than that of any other politician, May polls show.
According to the Rating Group’s survey of 3,000 people, 68% positively assessed his first year in office and 57% said they trusted him. Nearly 40% of respondents would vote for Zelensky again if the election was held in May.
In stark contrast, experts gave Zelensky’s performance only 3 points out of 10 in a survey by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF).
Olga Aivazovska, head of the election watchdog Opora, said she was not surprised by Zelensky’s ratings.
“Those who voted for him as an outsider, one of the people, still perceive him this way. Zelensky… passes his mistakes off as only human. From the beginning, he was not a politician, just an ordinary person who wants to change the country,” she said.
For those who voted for Zelensky in protest against old politicians, there is no alternative to him yet, said Volodymyr Fesenko, director of the Center for Political Studies “Penta.”
“Zelensky’s electoral rating is support for his personality not his governance,” he said.
Plaudits and weaknesses
To Zelensky’s credit, he had several important achievements in his first year.
Among his wins in the peacemaking efforts were the return of Ukrainian political prisoners from Russia, the reconstruction of a bridge at the Stanytsia Luhanska front-line crossing point and the reboot of the Normandy Format peace talks. But direct negotiations with Russian President Vladimir Putin have not brought Zelensky any closer to ending the war in the Russian-occupied eastern Donbas region.
In the first two months of the new parliament, lawmakers passed a number of important anti-corruption laws that lifted lawmakers’ immunity from prosecution, reinstated criminal punishment for illegal enrichment and made it possible to impeach a president.
Zelensky started a tradition: Whenever a crucial bill was scheduled for a vote, the president would come to the parliament to show his full support for the bill and attach himself to the historic event.
Unfortunately, the “turbo regime” — as this period was dubbed — ended and, as in the old days, the parliament became mired in foot-dragging.
Despite months-long obstruction, often coming from members of the ruling faction itself, Zelensky added two bills to his record of achievements — one on lifting the ban on farmland sales (which has been in place for almost 20 years) and another making it impossible for former owners to reclaim nationalized banks. The latter was largely viewed as a move to prevent oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky from retaking PrivatBank.
Both bills were key requirements to unlock a new deal with the International Monetary Fund. However, to Ukraine’s disappointment, the IMF recently replaced a pre-approved 3-year aid package with a smaller 18-month stand-by arrangement.
The official reason was the coronavirus pandemic, and the IMF spokesman said that once the economy recovers from the shock, the focus will return to Ukraine’s long-term structural reforms.
But Hlib Vyshlinsky, executive director at the Center for Economic Strategy, reckons that hasty and politically-motivated government changes and the absence of an economic strategy in the new Cabinet of Ministers deterred the IMF.
In early March, Prime Minister Oleksiy Honcharuk was forced to resign after six months in office. Several ministers followed him. Others were replaced. Amid the coronavirus outbreak and medical shortages, the Cabinet of new Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal had two ministers of health and finance in the course of one month. Some other ministerial posts are still vacant. In addition, the government fired tax chief Serhiy Verlanov and customs chief Max Nefyodov. Both enjoyed good reputations among reformers and Ukraine’s international partners.
“For me, it was clear that in the eyes of the IMF this government can’t take responsibility for fulfilling another 3–4 year program, and the IMF is not interested in another program that won’t be completed,” Vyshlynsky said.
Vyshinsky expects that the “fire fighting policy” without long-term strategy will continue, and reforms won’t advance.
Human resources
Staffing remains Zelensky’s weakest point, according to experts. And for many, his strategy is unclear.
The former TV celebrity won the office on a promise to change the face of Ukrainian politics and remove an old cohort of corrupt politicians and officials. He said he would fight nepotism.
However, some 30 people close to him got top jobs in various state agencies and companies, the Committee of Voters of Ukraine found. His business partners, colleagues and friends were appointed to the President’s Office or state agencies and became lawmakers.
“Zelensky bets on people whom he knows and whom he trusts,” Fesenko said.
Zelensky has also come under criticism for appointing some officials who served during the corrupt rule of ex-President Viktor Yanukovych, ousted in the 2014 EuroMaidan Revolution.
Zelensky complained about staff shortages and the difficulty of finding honest and professional people. Yet the turnover in key government positions has been high, making it hard to track all the resignations, firings and rumoured candidates.
“Not all people who worked in Yanukovych times are Yanukovych’s people,” Zelensky said, defending some of the appointments at his press conference on May 20.
Being a nice and professional person is not enough, Zelensky said at the presser. He wants quick results.
And this is yet another double standard: A widely respected prosecutor general was fired, supposedly for not delivering results in six months. Meanwhile, the unpopular and controversial interior minister of six years was given a chance “to finish what he started.”
