The “what ifs” of history are a dangerous area to argue in support of Viktor Yushchenko’s alleged successes in his presidency.

Yushchenko’s popularity is lower than 20 percent, a level at which we would consider a Western president to be a lame duck (such as former President Jacques Chirac and current President George W. Bush). Usually a president becomes a lame duck in his second or subsequent term, not in his first term, as in Ukraine.

Here are some alternative what ifs of recent Ukrainian history from a blogger’s point of view.

If Prime Minister Yushchenko and his national democratic allies in parliament had withdrawn their support from President Leonid Kuchma during the Kuchmagate crisis and backed calls by the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc and the Socialists for his impeachment, Kuchma would have been forced to step down early. Until early presidential elections, Yushchenko would have been acting head of state.

Yushchenko, however, signed a document with parliamentary speaker Ivan Pliushch and President Leonid Kuchma denouncing the protestors as “fascists.”

If then Prime Minister Yushchenko had supported Deputy Prime Minister Tymoshenko, she may have not been arrested in January 2001. Yushchenko should have resigned in protest at her arrest.

If parliament had not voted no confidence in the Yushchenko government in April 2001, his government may have stayed on until the end of Kuchma’s term. Yushchenko would have supported a presidential request to be Kuchma’s official successor.

If Yushchenko had not agreed to constitutional reforms during the December 2004 round tables, there would never have been constitutional chaos in 2006-2007 and the disbanding of parliament in spring 2007. If the president had used his extensive powers under the 1996 Constitution to fulfill Orange Revolution demands during his first year in office, his popularity would not have collapsed. Yushchenko had millions of supporters on the streets of Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities, but betrayed them in signing deals at the round tables.

If the Tymoshenko government had not been removed in September 2005, and a memorandum had not been signed that month between Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych [Yuschenko’s arch-rival in the 2004 presidential elections when Yanukovych was prime minister, Ukraine’s current acting prime minister, and the leader of the Party of Regions – Eds. Note], the Party of Regions would never have doubled its popularity to come first in the 2006 parliamentary elections.

If the Tymoshenko government had not been removed, the Orange parties would never have been divided for 18 months. If a united presidential party had been created, Our Ukraine might not have reduced its popularity by 10 percent in the 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections, in comparison to 2002.

If an Orange coalition had been created in 2006, the Communist Party would never have entered government in the Anti-Crisis Coalition [formed between the Party of Regions, the Socialist Party and the Communist Party – Eds. Note].

If Sviatoslav Piskun had not been maintained by President Yushchenko as Prosecutor General in 2005, the “bandits” may have gone to prison, rather than to parliament and government.

If Mykhailo Potebenko, Borys Kolesnikov and Serhiy Kivalov had been criminally charged, Yushchenko could never have rehabilitated them with state medals.

If Yushchenko had not protected Kuchma from impeachment and prosecution on two occasions, Kuchma would have been criminally charged with abuse of office. In the Kuchmagate crisis, Prime Minister Yushchenko refused to back calls for Kuchma’s impeachment, and during the 2004 round table negotiations, Kuchma was granted immunity in exchange for Yushchenko’s election as president.

If Yushchenko had fulfilled his promises made to the Council of Europe, he would have put the organizers of the murder of Heorhiy Gongadze on trial. Instead, one suspect has fled from Ukraine, another allegedly committed “suicide,” and a third sits comfortably in retirement. Three lower-ranking policemen were charged in a closed trial.

If the president had heeded US calls to quickly create an Orange coalition after the 2006 elections, Ukraine would have been invited into a Membership Action Plan at NATO’s Riga summit in November 2006. Ukraine would have then been on target to have been invited to join NATO at the 2008 Bucharest NATO summit. If Yushchenko had supported the Tymoshenko government and an Orange coalition in 2006, Ukraine would have joined the WTO earlier.

Ukraine would not have increased its dependency on Russian energy if it had not signed up to a 2006 gas deal that included the corrupt and non-transparent RosUkrEnergo intermediary. During the gas crisis, Ukraine conducted negotiations incompetently, while ignoring massive Western support for Ukraine and criticism of Russian policies.

If the president had fulfilled his 2004 election promises and implemented the promises given on the Maidan during the Orange Revolution, Yushchenko would have a better chance of winning a second term in the 2009 elections.

President Yushchenko cannot win a second term in the 2009 elections by standing on his five-year record or by only relying on the support of Our Ukraine (which won 14 percent in the last two elections, but whose support has now fallen precipitously). He can only win a second term by aligning himself with either the Tymoshenko bloc or with the Party of Regions and by using negative campaigning depicting himself as the ‘lesser of two evils.’ Yushchenko’s record in his first term is poor in the eyes of Ukrainian voters and, therefore, he has little choice but to repeat Kuchma’s 1999 strategy of convincing voters to back the alleged ‘lesser of two evils.’

If he chose an alliance with Tymoshenko, the Yushchenko campaign would again aim to block a Yanukovych victory (as in 2004, when many Orange voters voted against Yanukovych rather than for Yushchenko).

Alternatively, if he chose to fight the 2009 elections in an alliance with the Party of Regions, the Yushchenko campaign would target Tymoshenko’s alleged “populism” and penchant for irrationality.

If Yushchenko were to align himself with the Party of Regions in the 2009 elections, he would lose all remnants of his Orange support and most likely lose the elections. Yushchenko would then follow Leonid Kravchuk in only having served one term in office.

Dr. Taras Kuzio is a Research Associate, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. Dr. Kuzio’s commentary is a response to “Ukraine without Viktor Yushchenko: a counterfactual history, or ‘What if?’,” by Adrian Karatnycky, which was published in the Dec. 6 issue of the Kyiv Post.