Moscow’s meddling in the U.S. presidential election in 2016 has finally made the Western public aware of Russian cyber-attacks, propaganda and lobbying at various levels. This phenomenon, however, is not new.
For decades, Moscow has exerted pressure at different levels, including through election meddling, in different countries, especially in post-Soviet states where history, language and culture allow Moscow to use its full toolkit in support of authoritarian pro-Russian politicians.
It is no secret that through Russia’s state-controlled gas company Gazprom and its pipeline network, Russia’s revenues have risen exponentially over the past two decades. Throughout this time, the Kremlin has weaponized these resources to exert a more powerful influence in various capitals. These funds, however, also go to finance Russian aggression and interference in the elections of democratic states. Therefore, curbing the dominant position of Russia in the European Union’s energy market is, first and foremost, a strategic issue for Europe, and the first step in that direction should be the immediate banning of North Stream II, the expansion of a Russia-to-Germany pipeline under the Baltic Sea. If completed, it will have — with Nord Stream I — the capacity to carry 110 billion cubic meters of gas to Europe bypassing Ukraine’s gas pipeline system.
Election meddling
We see traces left by Moscow in almost all major elections over the past two years — the U.S., Germany, France or the U.K. referendum. Interference varies depending on the case — in the U.S., Russia used hacked emails and Facebook messages polarizing American society, in Italy and Germany, it used its economic ties and supported certain political parties. In France, it is overtly financing the National Front of Marie le Pen. In the Czech Republic, a pro-Russian president won the recent elections and in the U.K., Brexit serves Russia’s interest to divide and conquer.
In Ukraine, however, Russia is able to make full use of its entire arsenal of interference — making Ukraine the ultimate test case for hybrid warfare and meddling.
In addition to its tools above, the Kremlin uses more aggressive means such as fake nongovernmental organizations, the influential Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine, political assassinations, sabotage of key industrial or military targets, corruption and bribery, and major cyber-attacks that can cripple the country’s infrastructure, including the banking system, energy sector, and nuclear power plants. These are not things of the past but omens of what is about to come, especially as our country faces crucial presidential and parliamentary elections next year.
Western response
A response from the Western world is beginning to take shape.
The Atlantic Council together with the newly-created Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity have recently launched a new format for cooperation with members of parliament across the world.
The first event was “Pulling at the Strings: Kremlin Interference in Elections,” held in Washington D. C. in mid-July.
Following a fruitful discussion, legislators from Canada, Czech Republic, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the United Kingdom, the United States, Ukraine, and others agreed that the tactics that were employed by Russia are not unique to the U.S.; rather they pose a threat to open democratic processes all across the world. This first event stressed that, now more than ever, it is necessary to fortify transatlantic unity through the sharing of information — risks, vulnerabilities, and best practices.
In this context, Ukraine is especially concerned about its 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections, and expressed its hope that the global community would take the threat of cyber-attacks and manipulation of information space more seriously. Our upcoming double-election should be under close scrutiny of the world community. This is not just to defend elections in one country — it would help draw important lessons learned that can be useful for the rest of the democratic world.
With the world only beginning to wake up to Russia’s election meddling in our democratic system, there is a lot that governments across the Atlantic can do.
This includes allocating funds to counter election interference and disinformation, empowering social civil society groups to monitor and report on foreign interference, and encouraging technology companies to cooperate with their respective governments in their efforts to increase transparency, promote accountability, and generally reduce vulnerabilities on social media platforms (e. g., raising public awareness about ways messages and news can be manipulated and regulating online political advertising and creation of fake accounts).
Defending rights
Efforts to preempt Russian interference should involve a collaborative, end-to-end evaluation of the security of election systems; the development of a strong, coherent deterrence strategy; punitive options should interference occur; and contingency plans for ensuring resiliency and bolstering public confidence in elections and legitimate media. The world community should impose strict sanctions on Russia while reassuring countries disproportionately affected by Russian interference (i. e., Central and Eastern Europe).
Ultimately, stemming foreign interference is not just about preventing a foreign power’s attack — it is about defending every individual’s right to freely select their own representatives. Welcome to the democracy vs authoritarianism in the 21st century.
Hanna Hopko, a member of the Verkhovna Rada, is the chairwoman of the foreign affairs committee in parliament.
