The Ukrainian parliament will consider the dismissal of Arsen Avakov, Ukraine’s long-serving interior minister. Appointed in 2014, Avakov has served in already five governments. He has impressive political clout and keeps his post despite the resentment of civil society. He is criticized for unfinished law enforcement reform and failed or uncompleted high-profile investigations.
The public outrage and protests sparked again after two police officers raped and beat woman brought to a police station as a witness to an alleged theft. A week later two rival criminal gangs engaged in a shoot-out which left several people wounded.
Some MPs refused to approve the new Denys Shmyhal’s government action program because of the interior minister’s presence. Such approval is necessary for the government to have immunity and work without a fear to be sacked for a year.
Despite the law enforcement committee’s recommendation to the parliament to consider the minister’s dismissal, it is not yet put on its agenda.
Avakov’s long term in the government in spite of the criticism can be explained by political games, something resembling the House of Cards, at least in part. However, the institutions and powers including the influence on police play the role too. This implies that the system could produce “a new Avakov,” a powerful interior minister. Here we aim at seeing how this political clout has evolved and what feeds it.
The change
Avakov’s tenure in the office is not the issue per se. However, a long stay makes sense only when the minister is effective.
After the EuroMaidan Revolution that ended Viktor Yanukovych’s presidency on Feb. 22, 2014, police reform was among key demand from the society. During the revolution, officers tried to violently quash the protestors.
The Interior Ministry reform made some positive changes and transformations. Other important changes include the reset of patrol police. They appointed new people, carefully selected, and trained them. Moreover, the ministry opened service centers and streamlined many procedures.
However, the main claim of civil society is low clearance of high-profile cases of killing famous journalists and activists. The police’s depoliticizing when the interior minister cannot influence investigations or police behavior during protests, was not completed either, though the Interior Ministry is formally deprived of the control over operational activities. Moreover, the reported renewal with “fair and clean” officers is smoke and mirrors except for the patrol police.
For the first time, the police reported public trust as an indicator of its effectiveness in 2019. As a result, 48 percent fully or rather trust the police. Slightly lower trust, 46.1 percent, reported the Razumkov Centre, the same year. The Rating sociological group reported 31 percent. The surveys were conducted in 2019 before the recent protests and covered only police, not all Avakov’s structures. The trust has dropped to 36 percent in April 2020, according to Razumkov centre’s poll.
Meanwhile, every fifth person asked in the 2019 poll commissioned by the police reported beating, suffering or torture by the cops.
Institutions could create “new Avakov”
The interior minister coordinates the work of five important agencies, i.e., police, national guard, border guards, emergency situations, and migration service. More important, he has a say in major appointments in these agencies including their heads (except border guards and migration service), structural unit chiefs, and the heads of regional offices.
Contrary to other agencies, the national guard, a Ukrainian gendarmerie or a military formation with law-enforcement functions, is under direct control of the interior minister. It was revived in 2014 because of Russian armed aggression against Ukraine. The gendarmerie is responsible, inter alia, for public order including during protests and demonstrations.
“This way Avakov shows that he ensures the security for the president and the government,” says Vadym Pyvovarov, the CEO at the Association of Ukrainian Human Rights Monitors.
The police is an important asset of Avakov. Because of its involvement in brutal and violent crackdown on protestors during the 2013-14 revolution, it was decided to reform it so that it serves people in lieu of a political regime. The idea was to deprive the interior minister of the influence on it, to fire older officer and hire or re-hire “fair and clean ones.” The new police were supposed to be independent.
There were two draft laws initially. One was created together with experts and civil society. The authors took into account the approaches of both old and new world democracies.
Later both draft laws were withdrawn, and a single text was proposed considering the experts’ comments. The minister no longer intervenes in the daily police work. However, the law provides the minister powers to appoint the head of the national police and regional police chiefs. He puts forward a police budget.
“The initial idea was that an independent commission proposes the chief of police after a rigorous competitive selection. Then the chief has a contract and appoints deputies himself. Thus, s/he would have the full responsibility for the police work. The dismissal procedure was also detailed. Later the committee purged this draft keeping de facto the interior minister’s control,” tells Vadym Pyvovarov, the CEO at the Association of Ukrainian Human Rights Monitors, who participated in the law drafting process.
The independent commission is a must-have only for newcomers. “When you graduate from the university and apply for an entry position, you are interviewed by a police commission in addition to physical assessment and the test on legislation. The commission can include representatives of civil society. These interviews are not envisioned for manager positions or promotions,” explains Eugene Krapyvin, the Centre for Policy and Legal Reform’s expert.s
Meanwhile, the composition of these police commissions was altered. “We proposed at least half of the selection commissions outside the system. It could be attorney councils or professional associations. But it was not supported. According to the law in force, they are a minority and are proposed by local authorities that could have some ties to the local police,” says Andrii Hnidets, the expert of the Law Enforcement Reform Group of the Reanimation Package of Reforms who participated to the law drafting process.
There is no single formula how the police head should be appointed. At the same time, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime suggests that the appointments of only highest rank(s) are subject to political control to dodge political interference. But even if this case, clear and transparent selection and dismissal criteria are crucial to ensure the security of tenure.
The system reload failed either. The recruitment of new police officers was accompanied by the reassessment and retraining of the present staff. But only 7 percent of then existing police officers failed the reassessment and about half of those were reinstated by the courts.
“There was fear that the police reset could fail. And it was risky in 2015 when the war in eastern Ukraine escalated. At the same time, Avakov alone could not resist the old system. Since he protected the latter’s interests to some extent, the system welcomed him, thus, enhancing his heft,” Hnidets said, explaining the reasons of unfinished reform.
And any future minister would have a temptation to keep this system consisting of five bodies.
Media presence
Influence on key police appointments is important leverage for Avakov, though it is not decisive. Still, the police reform deprived him of managerial powers and operational control, thinks Krapyvin.
Nevertheless, the interior ministry is perceived as law enforcement ministry in part due to active presence in public. “It should be the chief of police who publicly comments criminal proceedings, investigations, searches, and other operational procedures. And this was the case when Khatia Dekanoidze was in charge [the police chief in 2015-2016 – eds.] Her successors have been publicly absent. The minister should comment only on institutional reforms, budget, and maybe international cooperation. Instead, he comments operational procedures, reforms, and even international politics,” admits Krapyvin.
On the latter, for instance, Avakov warned Marie Yovanovitch, the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine in 2016-2019, about the actions of Donald Trump’s personal lawyer, Rudy Giuliani, to replace her according to Ambassador Yovanovitch’s testimony to the Congress.
Avakov’s media presence was evident during the COVID-19 crisis. He announced tighter restrictions in March, though the health minister is responsible for the issue.
Despite the formal lack of powers, the ministry has a virtual influence on police. For instance, Avakov sent the police officers under the pretext of a bomb threat in an attempt to stop anti-corruption body’s searches in the house of Oleksandr Avakov, the minister’s son, in 2017. Oleksandr was suspected of being the middleman in closing the government contract for the purchase of military backpacks at an inflated price.
Street politics
Another asset is Avakov’s good relations with Azov volunteer battalions. It was formed during the war with Russia to fight in eastern Ukraine in 2014 and later integrated to the national guard. The battalion’s leader Andrii Biletskyi established the National Corps far-right political party. He denies any ties to the interior minister.
The National Druzhyny, a militia founded by Azov Battalion’s veterans, is also quite visible. For instance, it got great attention when almost 600 members marched through the center of Kyiv and “swore an oath” to defend public order.
Although Avakov does not confirm his influence over the militia or National Corps, the public perceives him as having it. And this is enough to be viewed as a person who can affect public order beyond the influence on police and the control over the national guard.
Loyal MPs
The interior minister had also the People’s Front party in the previous parliament. He is one of its leaders, and the party was a part of ruling coalition in 2014-2019. Its role was further enhanced after other parliamentary groups belonging to the coalition ditched the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, then the president, in 2016.
“Avakov was a counterbalance to Poroshenko. The president had the army, security service, and intelligence. The minister, instead, had the national guard which was virtually an alternative army,” explains Hnidets.
The People’s Front is no longer in the parliament, considerably undermining Avakov’s support there. Nevertheless, there are MPs friendly to him including the law enforcement committee or For the Future and Trust parliamentary groups.
For instance, the law enforcement committee has never discussed and moved forward the draft law transferring the gendarmerie from the interior minister to the president. The draft on a separate financial investigation body is also stuck, and the police still perform theri functions.
Meanwhile, some MPs proposed to make the gendarmerie conduct military intelligence. Another initiative would have provided it more policing functions in lieu of depriving the present ones. In particular, the gendarmerie would detain people and perform body searches if the draft had been adopted.
Though Avakov’s clout is not only about the institutions, they are significant assets. Structural changes in law enforcement institutions including national guard and police are needed to disrupt old informal ties. Otherwise, any future interior minister may potentially become “a new Avakov.” And the parliament is key in this process since it hires and approves the government.
Ruslan Minich is a journalist at the Centre of United Actions, a Ukrainian think tank.
