On June 7, the final series of the four-part investigation by Bihus.Info on relations between ex-President Petro Poroshenko and pro-Kremlin lawmaker Viktor Medvedchuk aired. Ukraine’s prominent investigative journalist Denys Bihus analyzed numerous leaked phone tapes of Medvedchuk, who is currently under house arrest after being charged with high treason.
These tapes, apparently made by the Security Service of Ukraine, better known as the SBU, date back to 2014 and reveal a lot about Medvedchuk and his modus operandi.
Medvedchuk turned out to be much less influential in Russia than he wanted Ukrainians to believe. For instance, to get a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who is the godfather of Medvedchuk’s daughter, Medvedchuk had to be on a “waiting list” for weeks and even travel to the Russian Far East.
At the same time, Medvedchuk communicated with Putin’s closest associates Vladislav Surkov and Dmitry Kozak, as well as Russian-sponsored militants fighting against Ukraine in Donbas, while constantly referring to agreements with Poroshenko.
Medvedchuk’s mandate from the previous Ukrainian government turned out to be way broader than previously articulated.
When Poroshenko was president, he said that Medvedchuk was involved in negotiations with Russia because German Chancellor Angela Merkel suggested getting him involved. In reality, with Poroshenko’s support, Medvedchuk regained his business influence and got his hands on the Ukrainian section of the diesel pipeline Samara–Western Direction, which allowed him to control half of the Ukrainian diesel market.
However, few people know that Poroshenko was not the only Ukrainian president whom Medvedchuk skillfully manipulated to achieve his goals.
Yanukovych’s phone pal
The last months of Poroshenko’s predecessor, Viktor Yanukovych, were also spent in active consultations with Medvedchuk. He acted as a proxy for Russian influence during the EuroMaidan Revolution, which ended in a bloody massacre on Kyiv’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti in February 2014.
After watching Bihus’ series on Medvedchuk, I became interested in Medvedchuk’s role in the revolutionary events of 2013–2014. From my sources, I learned some shocking details about Yanukovych’s last days in power that are important for society to know.
Let’s go back in time to the fall of 2013. Ukraine was actively negotiating the signing of a political and economic Association Agreement with the European Union.
Yanukovych tried to preserve his interest: to secure a historic treaty and at the same time not to amnesty the imprisoned opponent Yulia Tymoshenko, the ex-prime minister, which Europe wanted him to do.
However, at the last moment, Yanukovych rejected the Association Agreement and borrowed $3 billion from Russia. Protesters gathered on Kyiv’s central square — thus began the EuroMaidan, which would eventually escalate into a bloodbath.
A new era begins for Yanukovych. He is now on the phone with Medvedchuk a lot.
A source close to the investigation into the EuroMaidan murders told me that the investigation found that after the start of the protests in late November 2013, Yanukovych began to actively communicate with Medvedchuk. Medvedchuk always used a Russian phone number. Yanukovych talked to him both through his Ukrainian and Russian phone numbers — yes, it turned out he had a Russian number as well.
The investigation established 54 phone calls between them during the entire period of the Euro-Maidan Revolution from November 2013 to February 2014. This is what we were able to see from the phone connections. It is unknown how many times they met in person during those days. Yanukovych’s Mezhyhirya palace was a 10-minute drive from Medvedchuk’s mansion, located on the land of the former state residence in Pushcha Voditsa, a wooded area north of Kyiv.
When Medvedchuk was questioned in the EuroMaidan shootings case, he was unable to give a reason for these regular contacts with Yanukovych.
The investigation also established that Yanukovych was awake in the early hours of Feb. 20, 2014, when special police units opened fire against protesters in Kyiv killing about 100 people.
During those hours, Yanukovych was on the phone with Medvedchuk, then-Interior Minister Vitaly Zakharchenko, then-SBU chief Oleksandr Yakymenko, and then-head of the presidential administration Andriy Klyuyev. All of them, except for Medvedchuk, fled to Russia, as Yanukovych did.
If Yanukovych was constantly in touch with top law enforcement officials that morning, it means he could have stopped the killings of protesters at any time. But he didn’t. If Yanukovych’s intention had not been to shoot people, this tragedy would not have happened.
Separatist plan
What Yanukovych’s plan was and what Medvedchuk was pushing him to do has never been established. We can only speculate with a high degree of probability about what the scenario for Ukraine was. From all indications, Russia, taking advantage of the worsening situation in Ukraine, planned to split the country and establish its puppet quasi-regime to rule in one of its parts.
Another strange event points to this. On Feb. 18, 2014, Mykola Azarov — the former prime minister who had already resigned by then — flew to a secret meeting with Putin at his residence between Moscow and St. Petersburg. The presumed location of the talks was Valdai, which Yanukovych himself secretly visited a month earlier.
The airplane carrying Azarov arrived in St. Petersburg, after which, according to his guards, the former prime minister was taken in a separate car to an undisclosed location, where he spent a long time apart from his guards. At the end of the meeting, he was taken to the airport — this time not in St. Petersburg, but in Moscow.
It’s noteworthy that Medvedchuk contacted Yanukovych before Azarov flew to Putin. And when their meeting began, at the same time a violent special operation was under way to free a part of the Maidan Nezaleshnosti from protesters.
According to the investigation, at this time Yanukovych and Putin had already agreed to hold a special congress in Kharkiv. From then on, there were two possible scenarios. According to one, they were to move the governing bodies to Kharkiv, which once was the capital of Ukraine. Azarov also flew to Kharkiv right after he met with Putin.
Another scenario contemplated a deeper disintegration of Ukraine, up to the announcement of a special regime of self-government in Kharkiv for eastern and southern Ukraine as a result of the unrest in Kyiv. That is, the notorious Novorosiya project would not have been limited to Donbas. The likelihood of this scenario was also indicated by the fact that an impressive delegation from Russia, including the deputy speakers of the State Duma, had flown in to the congress in Kharkiv.
However, when Yanukovych arrived in Kharkiv, he realized that the situation on the ground was different from the reports that had been submitted to him. No one could guarantee the safety of the then-president. And the mayor and informal “owner” of Kharkiv, the late Hennady Kernes, re-fused to play into Yanukovych’s game.
Realizing that the plan to move the governing bodies from Kyiv to Kharkiv was failing, Yanukovych first rushed for help to billionaire oligarch Rinat Akhmetov as his most trusted party associate and business partner. Yanukovych’s helicopters landed in Donetsk. The two spent a sleepless night talking. But Akhmetov, realizing that Yanukovych had turned from a cash cow to a toxic asset, decided to distance himself from him.
Only after that, a special military operation brought Yanukovych to Russia.
Cozy with SBU
But Medvedchuk’s influence didn’t stop after Yanukovych left. A source familiar with the Euro-Maidan investigations told me that when prosecutors asked the SBU to establish up-to-date information about Medvedchuk’s addresses and phone numbers, the service didn’t do it. Informally, prosecutors were told that then-head of the SBU Valentyn Nalyvaichenko banned his subordinates from investigating Medvedchuk.
A few years later, it would become known that Nalyvaichenko, as head of the SBU in 2015, repeatedly traveled with Medvedchuk to Russia on his private plane. The visits were carried out in maximum secrecy, and Nalyvaichenko’s departure in Medvedchuk’s company was carried out using the documents of another person. My source in the SBU told me that the plane flew to Belgorod, where Nalyvaichenko was probably met by either a high-ranking Russian official Sergei Ivanov or by the head of the FSB Alexander Bortnikov.
One SBU employee was charged with organizing illegal crossings of the border for Nalyvaichenko. The case has been in court for four years.
Medvedchuk, during his interrogation in the case, refused to talk about the trips, referring to an article of the Ukrainian Constitution that allows not to testify against oneself.
All the events described here are not the author’s speculation, but the materials of criminal cases that are being investigated in Ukraine.
And sooner or later they must start looking at Medvedchuk’s role in the events of the EuroMaidan Revolution and Yanukovych’s escape. This means that the current high treason charges may not be Medvedchuk’s last.
Sergii Leshchenko is a Kyiv Post columnist and a member of the supervisory board of Ukrzaliznytsya. He is a former investigative journalist and a former member of Ukraine’s parliament.
