1.
Why has the investigation into the
murder of EuroMaidan protesters not led to arrests and criminal charges?
2.
When can we read and hear the
presidents and governments real program’s and goals for the short and medium
terms?
3.
Can the president successfully fight
corruption if one of his first decrees is to appoint a new head of DUS
(Directorate for the Service of Affairs)? DUS is a corrupt black hole and “Ministry
of the Nomenklatura Privileged” that should be closed down.
4.
Why is Valeriya
Lutkovska, overthrown President Viktor Yanukovych’s choice for parliamentary human rights ombudsman, still in place? How is she committed to European values when
she supported the imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko and other abuses of human
rights? Head of the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group Yevhen Zakharov
should replace her.
5.
Why has the (Stalinist) Communist Party
not been banned?
6.
When will a date be set for pre-term parliamentary
elections? Why do deputies
(including those who supported the Euromaidan) continue to piano vote?
7.
When will the president begin to devote
attention to building his Solidarity Party into a European parliamentary force?
8.
How can Mayor Vitali Klitschko fight
corruption in Kyiv when he is cooperating with former Mayor Leonid Chernovetsky’s
people?
9.
Why is Yuriy Prodan the current minister
of energy and coal when in his prior position as minister of fuel and energy in
2007-2010 he signed the January 2009 gas contract?
10.
Why did the Ukrainian government agree
to pay the energy debts to Russia incurred by the two Nikolai Azarov
governments? Ukraine should have advised Russia to seek payment for these debts
from Yanukovych and Azarov who fled with billions of dollars into exile in
Russia.
11.
Why are Yuriy Boyko and Serhiy
Levochkin not under criminal investigation for corruption and abuse of office?
12.
Why is the Donetsk clan and Party of
Regions leaders (other than Tsaryov) not under criminal investigation for abuse
of office and treason?
13.
When will the government begin to
renationalize assets stolen during Yanukovych’s presidency by Rinat Akhmetov and Dmytro
Firtash – in the same manner as nationalisation has begun of assets stolen by
The Family?
14.
What plans do the government and
president have to separate business and politics and not permit oligarchs to
again influence political leaders? When will parliament remove immunity from
its members?
15.
If Ukraine wishes to build the rule of
law it should close the prosecutor general’s office, not appoint a new chief prosecutor (especially somebody with no experience other than in the corrupt Interior Ministry.) Ukraine has 18,000 militarized (that is, they wear
uniforms) prosecutors while Britain with nearly 20 million more population
has only eight in its three criminal prosecution services for England-Wales,
Scotland and Northern Ireland.
16.
When will the Interior Ministry be led by a competent minister rather than by a political appointee?
Ukraine has 300,000 Interior Ministry personnel compared to Britain’s 120,000
police and prison officers.
17.
Why is it proving to be so difficult to
target separatist leaders with air strikes, spetsnaz assassination squads or
car bombs? Ukraine should seek to hire US, British or French contractors who
are specialists in training and advising counter-insurgency. Ukrainian
oligarchs and the Ukrainian diaspora should be asked to pay the bills.
18.
Why was Mykola Lytvyn (brother of the
odious Volodymyr Lytvyn) maintained as head of the Border Guards until public
protests forced him to recently resign? Why does Ukraine need 50,000 border
guards (which is more than the US or Canada has) when they are corrupt and
incompetent?
19.
Why is the odious Viktor Medvedchuk
permitted to participate in the negotiations with the Donbas separatists?
20. What
strategies are being prepared to reach out to the silent majority in the Donbas
who do not support either the terrorists or the Kyiv authorities? The
roundtables held to date are not a serious attempt at dialogue that is a
strategic part of any counter-insurgency strategy.
Taras Kuzio is a research associate for the Centre for Political and Regional Studies, Canadian Institute for Ukrainian Studies,University of Alberta. He is also a non-resident fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations, School of Advanced International Relations, Johns Hopkins University.
