Lots going on, and this stuff is important for Ukraine and indeed European security.
So to recap, Russia heaps the pressure on Germany/European Union to get Nord Stream 2 certified – while shows little inclination to help Europe ease the ongoing gas crisis. We can debate whether Russia has positioned for this by limiting gas supply over the summer months in the first place to maximize the gas price leap and maximum pressure on Europe. I think they have, but hey ho.
Vladimir Putin then sends a very pointed message that Moscow can help resolve the crisis, but Europe needs to work harder to resolve “its issues” with Russia. These issues being Russian annexation of Crimea, invasion of Eastern Ukraine, cyberattacks by Russia, the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skrypal, the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, the imprisonment of Alexei Navalny, Moscow backing coup attempts in Montenegro and more.
Surprise, surprise, U.S. Undersecretary of State Victoria Nuland, heads off to Moscow – even has to do a visa swap with a Russian counterpart to circumvent existing sanctions and get into Russia. I guess Nuland is trying to ask Moscow “What do you want?” to turn on the gas taps to Europe?
The assumption here is that Ukraine is pretty high on Putin’s want list – see his earlier essay on Ukrainian statehood or his lack of respect for it. And also this week note ex-Russian President Dmytry Medvedev’s comments that Ukraine is nothing but a vassal state of the West and it’s not worth Moscow negotiating with Kyiv. In terms of Kremlin-speak, this likely means exactly the opposite, i.e. Moscow actually wants to sit down and talk about the future of Ukraine, but not necessarily with the Ukrainians. Meanwhile, Putin drops a massive hint by noting that Ukraine’s gas transit system could be subject to an “accident.” This sounded more like the Sopranos than West Wing. I think we all got the message therein.
Meanwhile, European Council President Charles Michel and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen turn up in Kyiv, I assume to be there to take the call from Nuland and deliver the message as to what exactly Moscow wants.
What does Moscow want?
I assume here top of the list is recognition of the annexation of Crimea, and then implementation of Minsk 2 on Russia’s terms, that is a federal structure for Ukraine, where Donbas has a veto on Ukraine’s geopolitical outlook. Read there no EU or NATO membership. Maybe Moscow does not care about the EU as it does not see the EU as a geopolitical rival and arguably sees it as weak, compromised, and easy to manipulate. But no NATO for sure.
Now that is all a huge problem for Ukraine and President Volodymyr Zelensky, as there is little chance that he can sell any of that to the Ukrainian body politic.
Notable perhaps that the IMF team is currently conducting its latest review under the $5 billion loan program, while the EU already cut Zelensky massive slack in the release of the latest tranche of 600 million euros. The assumption is that the IMF and EU offer to write Ukraine some big cheques, in exchange for seeing things Moscow’s way about a final settlement on Ukraine. But therein perhaps they don’t realize that any such sell-out to Moscow is simply not saleable in Ukraine. Likely we would see a EuroMaidan Revolution 2 and Zelensky would have huge problems maintaining political stability at home, likely that is what Moscow wants as it would then be able to seize any weakness to intervene further in Ukraine.
Interestingly, Zelensky has upped the ante over the past week by leveling treason charges against Putin’s friend, Viktor Medvedchuk, in Ukraine, and raised the stakes further by hinting of action also against former President Poroshenko, for links therein to Medvedchuk.
I just cannot see Zelensky being able to offer any concessions to Moscow that could be saleable at home, irrespective of how big the cheques are that the EU and IMF are willing to write. Not sure how the Kristalina Georgieva crisis fits into all this, but her European allies stuck by her side.
Moscow has tended to pull its punches in the past on using the gas/energy issue against Europe – even during the Cold War, the Soviet Union continued to pump energy, uninterrupted to Europe. True we had a mini-wobble in 2009 with the Ukraine- Russia gas spat, but Moscow backed off quickly in that year, worried about being labeled an unreliable supplier. Energy is clearly the Golden Goose for Moscow but whats seems evident is that Russia is realizing that with the climate change and carbon transitioning, its goose is getting cooked. So it’s a chance to continue laying golden eggs on energy is kind of now. If it is going to enforce its will on Europe, and particularly Ukraine, it is now when gas prices are on the ceiling, not on the floor, which is likely the end game five years down the line. So Putin will surely press his advantage now.
All this rests on the Ukrainians caving in for Europe, but I just don’t see that. They have fought long and hard to fend off Russian aggression in Donbas, et al, and I just cannot see them folding now for a few billion in bailouts from Europe. The Europeans might give assurances that they will assure Ukrainian sovereignty but that is not worth the paper the Budapest Memorandum was written on and is about as much value as a World Bank Doing Business report.
Long term the result will be Russia will be seen as an unreliable energy supplier and Europe will diversify away from it, but guess Moscow already realizes this. The West, Europe, and the US look incredibly weak at this stage – and showed they lacked any strategic long-term thinking on the threat from Russia. They are now dependent on Russia and Ukraine playing ball, but I just don’t see that.
