There is a lot of focus on the looming Joe Biden-Vladimir Putin summit on June 16, especially from Ukrainians. I guess they are trying to figure out where they stand in all this, and they hope above all that they are not the pawns to be traded by the kings during the Geneva meeting.
Ukrainian suspicions have been stirred I guess by what they see as sellouts by the Biden team over Nord Stream 2 and the lack of a NATO Membership Action Plan decision.
You could also argue that the Ukrainian side was already slighted by Biden by the fact that Biden is meeting Putin, before sparing some time to sit down with Zelensky, albeit the Ukrainian leader has been “summoned” to D.C. for a photo op in July, but only after the meeting with Putin.
I guess the spin from D.C. is that President Volodymyr Zelensky might have been invited earlier but the decision to remove the CEO of Naftogaz made such a meeting “untimely” and just affirmed the need for the Biden administration to pursue a twin-track approach to Ukraine – backing them in their battles with Russia, but at the same time calling them out for their failings in the fight against corruption and improving governance. The reality is that Zelensky has made little progress there, more a case of two steps forward, one or two back, albeit it’s fair to say the United Kingdom has done little in reality in reining in the laundering of corrupt funds through the city. Touché.
The Nord Stream 2 decision was surprising, given the near-universal and bipartisan view against it in D.C., the prior signalling against it also by the Biden and Donald Trump teams, and the fact that the Biden team appear to have got nothing in exchange from Moscow for such a massive climb down. Maybe we will see the political capital taken from Germany from the Nord Stream 2 rollover deployed at the NATO summit. Or maybe this was just what it seems, a big rollover from the Biden team. Another red line was drawn and then crossed, in effect – they seem to have found that red pen for drawing red lines from the Obama administration.
While a case could perhaps be made around Nord Stream 2, that the project was all but completed, and that Ukraine, in any event, should be weaned off gas transit, the failure to agree on a NATO MAP is hard to fathom. A NATO MAP is not equivalent to a green light to NATO membership. Indeed, just reading the NATO website:
“The Membership Action Plan (MAP) is a NATO program of advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the alliance. Participation in the MAP does not prejudge any decision by the alliance on future membership.”
The Ukrainians, largely because of the Russian invasion/annexation, have decided they would like to join NATO – or at least opinion polls now show a move from single-digit supports before the EuroMaidan Revolution that ended Viktor Yanukovych’s presidency in 2014, to a majority now.
Even Zelensky, who seemed sceptical on the issue of NATO membership before winning the 2019 election as president seems to have shifted view – likely shaped by his time on the frontline and in his efforts in office trying to counter the threats from Moscow.
It is their choice to ask to join NATO, and NATO members have the right to agree or not on this decision. But a MAP allows a country like Ukraine to build its defence capability to ensure compatibility with NATO so as to ensure speedy accession once a decision is made by NATO members whether to accept Ukraine as members.
Why would NATO say no to a MAP, and why would the Biden administration delay when Ukraine is expending blood and treasury defending Europe and the West from Russian aggression? Perhaps the West is worried that agreeing on a MAP for Ukraine would just aggravate Moscow and risk escalation by Russia against Ukraine. Perhaps that will be the case, but the Ukrainians seem to have calculated that that is a price that they are willing to pay, so why not agree on the MAP, if they are willing to take the risk? Surely this is a decision for Ukrainians. The Ukrainians after all probably understand Russia better than the West at this stage. In fact, they definitely do.
If anything it just appears that aggression by Moscow is paying off and that Ukraine is being ransomed by the West constantly, to Russia’s aggressive behavior.
The West I think just needs to remind itself that while Ukraine has made disappointing progress fighting corruption, that over 14,000 Ukrainians have lost their lives fighting to defend Western values, and Ukrainian troops continue to die on an almost daily basis in this just cause. Indeed, 250,000 Ukrainian troops are now on the front line for NATO, defending NATO states in effect from Russian aggression. The least NATO could do would be to offer them a MAP, at least to augment their defensive capabilities and indeed better help defend us all, and irrespective of the eventual decision on NATO membership.
On the ransom issue, I thought the textbook was always don’t pay – and in the case of Ukraine, it makes even more sense not to submit to bullying when Ukraine appears more than willing to pay whatever the price is of standing up to Russia.
Now going back to this idea of a twin-track approach to Ukraine, providing Ukraine with support to defend itself, while calling it out on the fight against corruption. That’s fair, but the risk is that by failing Ukraine on the issue of the NATO MAP, that Ukraine’s political elite ask themselves why risk destabilizing domestic politics by waging all-out war against oligarchs in the fight against corruption if the West does not really have their backs in helping defend against Russia.
The fight against corruption, extending to oligarchs, could well make it more difficult for Ukraine to defend itself in the short term, hence the need for a stronger backstop from the West on the NATO MAP front. I don’t think this should be another White House quid pro quo, but this time, deliver on the fight against corruption and we will then think about a MAP.
The two should be separate and I think failure to deliver on a MAP actually makes delivery in the fight against corruption less likely.
