Some Western governments would clearly like Ukraine to move first on constitutional reform, but that would still be political suicide for any Ukrainian politician at this stage – likely destabilizing domestic politics and the domestic security situation. Poroshenko is clearly accepting of this fact.
He re-affirms a willingness to work within the Normandy format – at G20 France/Germany indicated a new round of these talks could happen later this month – and to secure Minsk II implementation. There has been talk – from Moscow – of a Minsk III agenda, as Russia has increasingly been indicating that Minsk II is no longer working.
Note Poroshenko’s comments that NATO membership remains a long term strategic goal, but focus on negotiation as means to get Donbas back – point that Ukraine cannot afford to spend 3% of GDP on defence, given many other priorities.
Still unclear how Putin is looking to play Ukraine. There was a troop build up in the run up to G20, but Putin failed to pull the trigger on a much larger escalation, and then we had the Sept 1 ceasefire agreement. The question is did Putin get what he wanted from G20, and has he created enough momentum to carry United Russia to a success in the Sept. 18 State Duma elections (not the Levada centre ruling as a foreign agent, which seems to be a clear warning/sign of nervousness over popular trends in Russia perhaps). And what after the State Duma elections, and then in the run up to the US elections – and how is Putin now reading political trends in Europe, with Merkel’s poor showing in regional elections last weekend, Brexit, and then French elections next year.
Difficult to see an easy solution to the Crimea/Donbas issues in Ukraine, but maybe the status quo is ok for Ukraine, given they are likely to get 1% real GDP growth this year, and with evidence of macro stabilization, and the International Monetary Fund likely to sign off on the latest credit tranche later this month which could bring U.S/E.U. monies.
