Herein are some of my general takeouts of popular attitudes in Ukraine gleaned from this survey, but I would suggest reading the full survey:
1. Euromaidan appeared to offer some prospect of an improving outlook for a sizeable section of the population, but subsequent events have depressed most people’s outlook for the future which are now very downbeat;
2. There is now widespread disillusion with the political class in Ukraine (not sure it was ever that high, but I think in the May 2014 presidential elections and then the parliamentary elections later that year the population opted to hand their votes to (President Petro) Poroshenko and his party (with Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk), as a person they thought could at least get things done, and was the best of a bad bunch), and support for the democratic path has now waned (50:30 of people now value prosperity over democracy which I think is quite telling);
3. Poroshenko’s Solidarity Bloc is still the most popular political party, but still with a low teen rating, and with Yatsenyuk’s People’s Party nowhere in the running – they would not even make it into parliament in early elections (which is why they are still unlikely at this stage);
4. Of note, only one quarter of respondents think that Poroshenko is doing a good job running the country, down from over 50% in September. In September I think he got good marks for his efforts to bring peace (against the dominant view at the time in the political class), whereas now with a resemblance of peace in the East the focus is turning to the economy and the fight against corruption, where Poroshenko is struggling;
5. Approval of the work of the cabinet and the parliament is even lower, i.e. in the teens;
6. The mayor of Lviv, Andrei Sadoviy, and former Georgian President Saakashvili who is currently running the Odessa regional administration rank as the most popular politicians in the country, but only with one third or so approval ratings;
7. A large majority – more than three quarters – have seen a deterioration in their economic situation over the past 12 months;
8. There is widespread frustration over the lack of progress in the anti corruption agenda (reflected I think in the low ratings now of Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk);
9. People still see the conflict in the east as the biggest challenge facing the country;
10. The Russian language issue is a low single digit issue in Ukraine and also amongst those in Donbas surveyed. But it kind of always was, which obviously raises the question as to why the conflict in the east, and who drove the move to conflict (objective Western diplomatic opinion know full well the answers to these latter two questions and I think it is well reflected also in changing attitudes in Ukraine towards Russia also reflected in this survey);
11. Inflation, devaluation and unemployment are significant issues for those surveyed;
12. Support for European Union accession is still proving durable (57%), and far outweighs support for integration into the Russian dominated CIS CU, (15%) but views in Donbas are mixed, but even there still only one third support joining CIS CU (albeit higher than support for EU accession);
13. There is no particular love for Vladimir Putin’s Russia, or for further integration therein, note the 15% “warm” view of Russia, half that of the USA, a third that of the EU, and a quarter that of Poland. It is quite striking now how this latest survey contrasts with that prior to the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Donbas, where most Ukrainians had a “warm/friendly” view towards Russia or at least were neutral – perceptions of Russia, in Ukraine, have been transformed in a negative way over the past two years or so.
14. Close to half of the respondents favour voting to join NATO (48%) with 30% against, so a NATO referendum would pass, albeit NATO simply lacks the will to offer Ukraine any such thing given Russian opposition. It is notable that pre Russian intervention in Crimea and Donbas, support for NATO membership in Ukraine was in low teens/single digits, but Russian intervention has encouraged support for the very thing that it was supposed to be trying to counteract – albeit Russian intervention may have been more aimed at shaping opinion in the West, as opposed to in Ukraine itself;
15. There is still strong support for the concept of the Ukrainian state and statehood – indeed this has been one of the big “results” from Russian intervention in Crimea/Donbas, as the feelings of national identity were previously quite weak;
16. Few people either in Donbas or Ukraine think Donbas should be separated from Ukraine, with the bulk either favouring retention of pre-war status or some form of decentralisation;
17. There is little support for Russian military intervention in Ukraine;
18. There is limited support for a Federal solution in Ukraine as pushed by Russia, but with a clear majority of those surveyed favouring a unitary state, with/without Crimea;
19. There are split views on early parliamentary elections – 43:41 in favour;
20. In terms of revealed party preferences, Poroshenko’s Solidarity party tops the polls, but in the low teens, with the former Regions’ Opposition Party second, then Tymoshenko’s Batkyivchyna third, and then Samopomich, with a couple of other oligarchic/populist parties passing the threshold to gain representation. On this basis Solidarity and Samopomich might just be able to sustain the reform coalition with the help of likely strong pro business representation in the constituency vote, but any such coalition’s majority would likely be low/weak.
20. However, of those likely to vote, the Opposition Party (OP) would likely get one third of the vote (31%), remarkably versus just 8% for Poroshenko’s Solidarity, and then a host of the smaller parties in lower single digits. Net-net early elections could see former Yanukovych supporters in the Opposition Party (headed by former minister of energy, Yuriy Boiko) return to office. I think this would suggest that the current ruling coalition will be very averse to going for early elections just yet as there would be a high probability of them losing power. However, this also explains perhaps why Russia has decided to take a back seat in Ukraine for the time being, to allow domestic politics to unravel and perhaps in the hope that early elections see the return to power of former members of Yanukovych’s government with whom I guess they think they can work.
21. The Opposition Party clearly look set to benefit from lower turnout in early elections, with the share of those saying they would vote dropping from over 80% in April 2014, just after the Maydan protests, to just over 60% of of this survey in November 2015. The question is would those clearly disillusioned with the pro-EU reform parties end up voting if it seemed as though early elections would see the return of former Yanukovych ministers to power?
The Opposition Party has tried to distance itself from former President Yanukovych, and in order to broaden its appeal in Ukraine has been careful to angle that they favour a reform line, and are not supportive of Russian military actions in Ukraine. In power though they would likely try and pursue a much more neutral path between the West and Russia, which would be similar to the course that Yanukovych tried to ply at least up until the Vilnius summit in late 2013 when he appeared finally to move course towards Russia likely in response to threats and offers of cash financing from Moscow (USD15bn Eurobond programme). The problem for the OP is that while there is popular disillusion with the current reform coalition in power, support for Ukraine’s Western orientation remains strong/enduring, and how the OP would manage this in government would be open to question. There is also concern that in an early election scenario where the OP returned to power on a low voter turnout, how the Maydan would react if they saw a move back and away from the move Westwards for Ukraine. Could this easily see a Maydan III? Or if the OP delivered growth and economic prosperity would the bulk of the population just keep their heads down and accept the results of any such early elections?
That said, early elections are not my core scenario, but more likely the current Poroshenko/Yatseniuk coalition will continue to battle/muddle through/on, hoping that perhaps a low base return to growth, and some stabilisation/pick up in the economic situation eventually begins to see some recovery in their poll ratings. Indeed, as I note above this survey would suggest little merit for the ruling reform coalition going for early elections – Yatseniuk’s Kamikaze cabinet would indeed prove to be just that if they did in fact opt to leave the ruling coalition and force early elections. It just is not logical at this stage – so Poroshenko and Yatseniuk are likely to remain in the current marriage of convenience. The West will likely prod them along the reform path with the offer of cash financing, with Russia still likely to “meddle” (looking to destabilise the economy) and now eager to force early parliamentary elections.
Just one final point, there has been a suggestion that Ukraine could come back and re-enter international capital markets, with a new Eurobond issue as early as last this year or next.
Some might view this as a success, and the result of Ukraine’s successful macro-stabilization, and that it had been weaned off foreign official financing.
I would argue that such a scenario would be a disaster for Ukraine’s long-term development – albeit some large bond investors might be willing to repeat the script of the past.
The problem is that such an outcome would very well see a repeat of 2011-2013 under the Viktor Yanukovych administration when Ukraine financed itself from the market, went off track with to IMF programme and with reform.
In a nutshell, experience suggests that Ukraine’s politicians only push through reforms if they are being drip fed financing from the IMF, and the official sector.
If they have other financing options, they quickly go off track on such difficult issues as the anti-graft agenda. So my vote would be to set clear limits for Ukraine – no Eurobond market access financing for the duration of the EFF, unless reform implementation is near perfection.
Don’t repeat the mistakes of the past.
